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 The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain exactly what news people in the 
occupied zone of France received during the First World War, in an attempt to assess the 
general assumption that the people of occupied France received little to no news. It is 
certain that the people in the occupied cities of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received 
less news than before the occupation, and most of the news they did receive came from 
an untrusted source, namely the German occupiers. However, research for this 
dissertation reveals that the cities at the urban heart of northern France, Lille, Roubaix, 
and Tourcoing, received more news than historians previously have believed. Research 
for this dissertation comprised of reviewing all the sources available in Lille, Roubaix, 
and Tourcong during the occupation, which included German-controlled newspapers 
produced in France and Belgium, a short-lived clandestine press, and newspapers 
published outside the occupied zone covertly imported into the cities.  
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Introduction 
 Consistent receipt of news from a trusted media source plays a vital role in the 
modern consciousness of western societies. People have a need for news, that is, a 
composite, shared, ordered, and edited product, informing them in a timely manner about 
current events.1 This was no less true for the people of occupied northern France during 
the First World War, who for four years suffered German occupation and isolation from 
their own country.  Despite the numerous physical hardships they endured under 
occupation, including food shortages and forced labor, history remembers the lack of 
news as one of the greatest deprivations the people of occupied northern France 
underwent. Very nearly every historical work that examines the experiences of northern 
France agrees with Deborah Buffton’s assertion, “It was the lack of information that was 
perhaps the hardest thing to bear during the war and occupation.”2  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to ascertain exactly what news people in the occupied zone received, in an 
attempt to assess the general assumption that the people of occupied France received little 
to no news. It is certain that the people in the occupied cities of Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing received less news than before the occupation, and most of the news they did 
receive came from an untrusted source, namely the German occupiers. However, research 
for this dissertation reveals that the cities at the urban heart of northern France, Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing, received more news than historians previously have believed.   
 Our concentration on the flow of news in no way diminishes the dreadfulness of 
life under occupation. Northern France became a virtual German colony, governed by a 
                                                 
1
 Michael Schudson, The Power of News (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 3. 
2
 Deborah Buffton, The Ritual of Surrender: Northern France under Two Occupations, 1914-1918, 1940-
1944 (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987), 39.  
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regime aimed at economic extraction rather the production.3 Leonard Smith, Stéphane 
Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker aptly describe the horrors of life under German 
occupation. They note, “The paradigm of imposed brutality adhered to the true meaning 
of terrorism, designed to humiliate and thus dominate the civilian population by keeping 
it in a state of shock through the systematic use of emergency regulations and violence.”4 
The Germans, they further state, employed “…[a]ncient practices of extraction and 
slavery… administered through the most modern bureaucratic techniques of coercion.”5 
A central component of this system of domination was a control over the flow of 
information. The position of occupied France behind the German trenches gave the 
Germans dominion over the transmission of information.  To make their monopoly 
greater, they quickly issued restrictive measures forbidding the publication of any 
material without their prior reading, as the Fourth Convention of The Hague allows in 
occupied zones during war.6 The Germans immediately banned the publication of any 
newspapers without their approval and all French newspapers disappeared. The Oberste 
Heersleitung’s (OHL) order pertaining to the publishing and distributing of news 
appeared in the Bulletin de Lille in May 1915, as the activities of the clandestine press 
motivated the German occupiers to reiterate their publication rules. Article one of the 
order stated that all printed material must be submitted to the German censor, and article 
two noted that reproduction and publication of any written material could not be done 
until signed by the censor. Article three stated that a free copy of every issue had to be 
                                                 
3
 Leonard Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker, France and the Great War 1914-1918 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 42. 
4
 Ibid., 45. 
5
 Ibid., 51. 
6
 Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I (New York: New York 
University Press, 2004), 79.  
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submitted to the censor after it was printed.7 Article four stated that everything submitted 
to the censor must be identified with the name and address of the printer or editor.  
Article five of the order forbid having in one’s possession imported newspapers.8  
The Germans did not limit their control to public media, but brought private 
communication under their eye as well. They only allowed personal letters in a limited 
form, sent unsealed to allow censor supervision.  The German occupiers confiscated 
almost all private and public telephones and all radios and outlawed the keeping of 
pigeons, which they feared could carry messages back and forth to unoccupied France. 
For urban populations habituated to having multiple local, national, and international 
newspapers at their disposal, the limitations placed upon their consumption of 
information was greatly discombobulating.  
 This dissertation is an act of historical reconstruction, aimed at revealing what 
information was available through newspapers in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing region 
during the occupation. Paul Connerton writes that historical reconstruction is still 
necessary even if the social memory preserves direct testimony.9 The social memories of 
survivors of the occupation, displayed in numerous sources, long have asserted the 
absolute lack of news in occupied France. Yet, Connerton urges us to question such 
memories. He continues on to note, “Historians do no continue to question the statements 
of their informants because they think that the informants want to deceive them or have 
themselves been deceived.  Historians continue to question the statements of their 
informants because if they were to accept them at face value that would amount to 
                                                 
7
 Bulletin de Lille, May 30, 1915. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 14.  
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abandoning their autonomy as practicing historians.”10  Such an historical questioning as 
urged by Connerton will reveal that there was not a complete lack of news.  Survivors’ 
memories may have been shaped by their juxtaposition of the wartime news they 
received with the information they had access to before the war.  Combined with the 
direness of their situation under occupation and the painfulness of the uncertainty 
surrounding their future, the people of occupied France may have created a collective 
memory that they received less news than appears to be the case after looking at their 
media sources. 
 The German-controlled press was the single greatest source of news in the 
occupied zone, comprising newspapers published in Lille and Roubaix, and papers 
originating in other areas of occupied France and occupied Belgium.  This was the only 
media allowed by the German occupiers, but the area did mange slightly more press 
diversity than the Germans intended. Outdated Parisian newspapers appeared irregularly 
in the region, either smuggled in or dropped from airplanes. Newspapers recorded 
reaching the occupied zone include issues of Matin, l’Echo de Paris, and Petit Journal.  
Dutch, English, and clandestine Belgian papers were also infrequently available on the 
black market, as well. A clandestine press also published within the confines of the 
occupied zone, with at least such eight newspapers appearing in Lille alone between 
January 1915 and December 1916.11 The French government also made some rather 
anemic attempts at influencing people through newspapers in the occupied zone. The 
French army was in charge of propaganda directed at French territories occupied by the 
Germans.  The Section de la propagande aérienne dropped forged German newspapers 
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meant to demoralize the occupiers and French newspapers meant to raise the morale of 
the French population.12 French people trusted these sources, but they were infrequent 
and outdated.  The German-controlled press, while biased and chocked full of 
propaganda, was regularly available and provided a surprisingly substantial amount of 
war information.   
 The first three chapters of this dissertation provide the background necessary to 
understanding the environment and context in which the people of occupied France 
received news. The first chapter will examine life in metropolitan northern France before 
the war. For a successful reconstruction of news dissemination, one needs to know the 
receiver. This chapter will allow for a better understanding of the people receiving the 
news and why they believed they received such little information under the German 
occupation.  This view examines the physical layout of the cities, and the economic and 
social make-up of the tri-city area, including the living and working conditions, language 
usage, political and religious trends, and the pre-war newspapers available in the area. 
The second chapter provides an overview of German occupation of Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing. This will supply the context within which the occupied people received 
information via newspapers and why they were so unreceptive to news from German 
sources. This overview includes a look at the invasion and capture of the three cities, as 
well as the German administration and economic exploitation of the area, including the 
ensuing food shortages.  To better understand the relationship between occupier and 
occupied, it shall examine the French resistance to occupation and the German response. 
                                                 
12
 Andreas Laska, Presse et propagande allemandes en France occupée: des Moniteurs officiels (1870-
1871) à la Gazette des Ardennes (1914-1918) à la Pariser Zeitung (1940-1944) (Munich: Herbert Utz 
Verlag, 2003), 109. 
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The third chapter briefly discusses news coverage in unoccupied France and 
Germany, to demonstrate how the warring powers cast the news received in occupied 
France. This chapter reviews how the French and German governments availed 
themselves of their nations’ presses to influence their people to support the war. A 
Chicago Tribune reporter noted during the war that, “The most serious and the most 
disheartening thing about this war… is the strict censorship which will lie in the face of 
overwhelming defeat as well as exaggerate the importance of a minor victory…The 
papers print only what the ministry dictates, and they all print the same thing.”13 This 
quotation referred to the French press and people, but was also applicable to the 
Germans. Almost all newspapers in warring nations contained propaganda and faced 
censorships; what made the lot of occupied French people more painful was that they 
were exposed to propaganda and censorship controlled by the enemy rather than their 
own nation.     
 Chapters four through eleven of this dissertation dissect the German-controlled 
sources of information available to the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. The 
agenda of all the newspapers in this category was to terrify the population and create a 
defeatist mentality among the occupied French people. The aim was discouragement. 
Realistically, the German-occupiers knew they would not turn the populace to their side, 
but they could hope to create a dislike for the Allies, in particular the British, and a desire 
for peace under any terms. The German-controlled papers obviously had an agenda that 
distorted much of the news, but that agenda was clear to the audience. This was an 
intelligent audience aware of the occupiers’ aims, and hence they had the ability to a 
                                                 
13
 Carolyn Wilson, “People of Paris are Victims of Censorship,” in Under Siege: Portraits of Civilian Life 
in France during World War I,  Robert J. Young, ed. (London: Berghahn Books, 2000), 11. 
  
7
 
certain extent to screen out the propaganda and extract the nugget of news it was 
enveloping. An extraction process – or seeing beyond the propaganda – was made easier 
by the fact that German propaganda was not that well crafted.  It was obvious and heavy-
handed, as we will see in analyzing German-dominated newspapers. Thus, the fourth 
chapter of this work looks at the Bulletin de Lille and fifth chapter studies the Bulletin de 
Roubaix.  These two regional newspapers played the distinctive and important role of 
supplying their communities with local news and information, while continuing to instill 
fear and a defeatist attitude. La Gazette des Ardennes is the focus of the sixth chapter. 
The next three chapters examine the three newspapers imported from German-occupied 
Belgium. Under the control of a different censorship bureaucracy, the Belgian 
newspapers in general provided more information and a tad less propaganda than those 
produced in occupied France.  Chapter seven looks at La Belgique and chapter eight at Le 
Bien Public.  These two newspapers were available only briefly in occupied France, until 
February 1915. The Germans imported these two newspapers only temporarily because, 
despite being under the control of a German censor, the staff of these two papers allowed 
points of view and information that the Germans did not relish into their papers. 
However, the subject of chapter nine, Le Bruxellois, was a newspaper available 
throughout most of the occupation, because of its staff’s willingness to follow German 
publication orders. These newspapers are at the heart of this dissertation, as the fact that 
these newspapers reached occupied France is hardly remembered. 
Chapters ten and eleven of this dissertation examine the clandestine press and less 
influential sources of news. Chapter ten details the short-lived clandestine press, which 
for a brief period of time was the only truly trusted source of information for a fortunate 
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few in the occupied cities. While short-lived and only reaching a small portion of people, 
the existence of newspapers untainted by German meddling was as important as the 
actual information they contained. Finally, chapter eleven provides a rundown of the 
other sources available to the readers of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing that the people did 
not read as regularly, for various reasons. This category includes smuggled-in 
newspapers, in whose case the difficulty and danger involved with attaining the 
newspapers made them a relative rarity. Another infrequent but cherished news source 
were newspapers produced in France and England for the occupied territory.  The 
German passion for intercepting these papers and the need for good weather to drop them 
made them an infrequent source.  German language newspapers were easy to attain but 
few Frenchmen in these cities could read German, and these newspapers only provided 
more news from the German perspective, hence their lack of popularity.  Finally, while 
the focus of this dissertation is newspapers, it is worthwhile to briefly mention the books 
and pamphlets the Germans tried to sell to the French people.  Not surprisingly, these 
books were not too popular, as again, they promoted German righteousness and 
greatness. 
 This dissertation is the product of a great deal of help from multiple sources. I 
would like to thank the staff of the five archives that graciously allowed me to consult 
their collections. These archives are the American Naval Historical Center, the University 
of Minnesota archives at the Anderson Library, the Archives Departamentales du Nord in 
Lille, the Royal Library of Belgium, and the Widener Library at Harvard University. I 
would like to thank the Marquette University Graduate School for its support in the form 
of an Arthur J. Schmitt Fellowship, as well as research and teaching assistantships, which 
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were invaluable experiences. I would like to thank my committee members, Professors 
Philip Naylor and Timothy McMahon for their input.  Finally, and most of all, I would 
like to thank my advisor, Professor Julius Ruff for his tireless effort to better this work.  
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Chapter One:  
The People of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing 
  
Félix-Paul Codaccioni opens his work, De l’inégalité sociale dans une grande 
village industrielle: Le drame de Lille de 1850 à 1914 by noting that Lille could be the 
symbol for inequality created by nineteenth-century industrial expansion.1 Nothing 
defined life prior to the war in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing more than the presence of a 
large worker population.  The industrial era transformed this area, bringing great wealth 
and comfort to a few, but a hard life of toil and near-poverty to many. To understand the 
people of this area, this chapter begins with an examination of the physical layout of 
these three cities in the Département du Nord.  Then it examines the economic and social 
makeup of the tri-city area in the years leading up to war. This summary of pre-war 
conditions will conclude with an overview of the people of the area, including such 
features as living and working conditions, language, available newspapers, political, and 
religious trends. 
 
Physical Layout 
 Louis Trenard describes the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area of the First World War 
era as a polynuclear conurbation, with Lille being the biggest city but with the majority of 
the area’s population living outside Lille.2 Lille is in the Département du Nord, situated 
on the Deûle River, near France’s border with Belgium.  Roubaix is six miles northeast of 
Lille, on the Canal de Roubaix and one mile from the Belgian border, with Tourcoing 
                                                 
1
 Félix-Paul Codaccioni, De l’inégalité sociale dans une grande ville industrielle: Le drame de Lille de 
1850 à 1914 (Lille: Université de Lille III Éditions universitaries, 1976), 1. 
2
 Louis Trenard, ed., Histoire d’une métrople (Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1977), 5. 
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touching Roubaix to the north. Historically, the Département du Nord was part of the old 
counties of Hainaut and Flanders, both dating back to the ninth century. The area became 
a part of France during the late seventeenth century under Louis XIV. Towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization forged Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing into 
an unbroken urban sprawl. The area represented an exceptional level of urbanization for 
France during this period.3 However, the three cities’ histories varied, and all three 
preserved some unique characteristics, representative of their different pasts. 
 Before Lille was a manufacturing town, it was a port settlement on an important 
northern river, a key link in European trade for almost a thousand years.  It conducted 
most of this international trade with Belgium. Lille, moreover, was a city dating back to 
medieval times, unlike Roubaix and Tourcoing that remained small villages into the 
nineteenth century. It swiftly went from a trading hub with a blossoming commercial 
center to a large industrial city. This development of industry fuelled a surge in 
population, due to the high birthrate of nineteenth-century workers, immigration from 
Belgium, and Lille’s annexation of neighboring towns.4 Despite this growth, much of 
Lille retained a medieval aspect that was in place during the First World War.  The center 
of the city lay around the historic Grand’ Place, which is still the heart of the business 
district.  To the east of the Grand’ Place, were the Saint-Maurice and Saint-Sauveur 
neighborhoods, notable for numerous factories and busy streets. While many workers 
lived in Saint-Maurice and Saint-Sauveur, a middle-class element also called these 
neighborhoods home. The upper class lived to the west and north of the Grand’ Place, in 
                                                 
3
 Patricia Hilden, Working Women and Socialist Politics in France, 1880-1914: A Regional Study (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 9. 
4
 Ibid. 
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beautiful neighborhoods made up of the homes of the bourgeoisie and upscale hotels.5  
Most of the mills sat on the outskirts of town, allowing the heart of the city to retain its 
medieval character. Also north and west of the Grand’ Place was the citadel designed by 
Vauban. The citadel made Lille one of the keys to France’s national defense, and added a 
concentration of armed forces to the city’s makeup. During the Second Empire Lille 
underwent the same urban revolution as Paris, as a series of gigantic public works, 
including the development of parks near the citadel and the widening major 
thoroughfares, transformed the city, at least in its wealthier center.6 
Unlike Lille, which had been an urban center for centuries, both Roubaix and 
Tourcoing remained very rural in character well into the nineteenth century. Roubaix’s 
lack of growth stemmed from its isolation from the important national commercial 
channels. Instead, it grew slowly as a small town, on the left bank of the small Trichon 
River, located at the intersection of local roads. Patricia Hilden describes Roubaix as “a 
city without a past,”7 although in truth, as early as the seventeenth century people began 
weaving luxury cloth in a few scattered cottages.  The village carried on this way for two 
hundred years, but factory production of cloth overwhelmed the traditional economy 
around 1850.8 As industrialists built factories, they gave little regard to the layout of the 
existing village.  Segregation of the rich and poor did not occur in Roubaix as in Lille; 
rather workers’ slums surrounded the small brick homes of white-collar employees and 
the ornate mansions of the bourgeoisie, allowing for daily confirmation of the stark 
                                                 
5
 Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 319. 
6
 Ibid., 366. 
7
 Hilden, Working Women and Socialist Politics in France, 11. 
8
 Ibid. 
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contrast between rich and poor.9 Sadly, a lack of thought and rapid growth caused 
Roubaix to lose all vestiges of its rural character. This early form of urban sprawl 
absorbed small neighboring villages, such as Wattrelos, “transforming them into squalid 
terraced housing for Roubaix’s growing textile workforce.”10  
Unlike Roubaix, Tourcoing managed to retain much of its medieval town 
character. As in Lille, industrialists built their mills and factories on the open land that 
encircled the city, leaving the heart of the city unscathed. Despite differences, both 
Roubaix and Tourcoing quickly became part of a conurbation centered on Lille.  Railway 
trains and trams connected the three cities during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Trams in particular provided a relatively cheap mode of transportation, and 
slightly better off workers utilized them to expand the physical area in which to look for 
jobs.11 
 
The Economy 
 These three cities formed one great industrial center prior to World War I.  
Economic growth accelerated quickly in this urban region. Beginning in 1810, the area 
transitioned to industrial capitalism, fuelled by small textile and manufacturing 
workshops.12 The tri-city region was a great industrial center by the mid-nineteenth 
century, based on chemical manufacturing, metalwork, and, most importantly, textile 
production. By the twentieth century Roubaix and Tourcoing focused upon the wool 
                                                 
9
 Hilden, Working Women and Socialist Politics in France, 11. 
10
 Ibid., 12. 
11
 Ibid., 15. 
12
 Stéphane Gerson, The Pride of Place: Local Memories and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century 
France (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 17. 
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industry, while Lille became a center of cotton and linen production.13 According to the 
1911 census, 25 percent of France’s textile workers worked in the Département du Nord. 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing were the heart of French textile production: woven in the 
conurbation was 60 percent of the nation’s cotton textiles, 80 percent of its woolen cloth, 
and most of its linen.14 The Michelin Illustrated Guide to Lille Before and During the 
War noted that the Lille region, called the “Key to France’s Treasure-House,” also 
contained the country’s richest coalfields.15 Indeed, coal production and related metals 
trades were a second cornerstone of the economy of the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing region, 
which before the war accounted for 53 percent of the France’s coal production, 64 
percent of its pig iron, and 62 percent of its steel.16 
 Lille’s regional economic dominance was uncontested. By 1821, forty-three 
cotton factories in Lille employed almost 30,000 workers.17 By this time Lille was the 
premier linen producing area in France, and one of the most important in all of Europe. 
Receiving a boon from the cotton famine of 1861-1865, linen production continued to 
grow in Lille thanks to the city’s tradition of textile work, the number of workers 
available, its proximity to the Belgian border, an infrastructure that allowed easy 
transportation of goods, an abundance of capital for investment, and the dynamism of 
local industry owners.18 Beyond this, the city enjoyed a plethora of other industries, 
including food processing, woodworking and furniture manufacturing, soap production, 
                                                 
13
 Philippe Marchand, Histoire de Lille  (Lille: Jean-Paul Gisserot, 2003), 84.  
14
 Herbert Adams Gibbons, France and Ourselves: Interpretative Studies, 1917-1919 (New York: The  
Century Co. 1920), 198 and Albert Aftalion, “The Effect of the War Upon the French Textile  
Industry,” in Effect of the War upon French Economic Life: A Collection of Five Monographs, Charles 
Gide, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), 37-72. 
15
 Lille Before and During the War: Michelin Illustrated Guides to the Battlefields (1914-1918) (Paris:  
Michelin et Cie, Clermont-Ferrand, 1919), 3. 
16
 Tom Kemp, The French Economy 1913-1919: The History of a Decline (London: Longman, 1972), 31. 
17
 Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 319.  
18
 Ibid., 352. 
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leather production, the processing of building materials, and porcelain production.19 A 
key industry for the city was non-heavy metal works, with the sector’s most important 
company, Compagnie de Fives-Lilles, founded in 1861.20 Beyond this, Lille was a major 
banking and commercial center. By the end of the nineteenth century, Lille developed 
important banking and service industries.  The city was home to 80 percent of the area’s 
transport services, 68 percent banking and economic services, 70 percent of the public 
services, and 66 percent of the commercial services.21 Between 1850 and 1914 Lille’s 
total wealth rose by 383 percent as its population reached 218,000 people.  Another 
indicator of wealth: deceased Lillois left assets of 344 million francs in 1908-1910, as 
compared to 72 million francs in 1856-1858.22 Lille was also the university capital of the 
entire northern region of France, adding thousands of academics to the workforce. All 
this made Lille the de facto capital of northern France. 
 By 1875, Roubaix and Tourcoing were the center of a wool empire, a fact made 
possible by improved communication channels, including roads and tramways, and a 
strong pride in the area’s tradition of producing fine materials, combined with knowledge 
of advanced production techniques.23 Félix-Paul Codaccioni describes Roubaix’s growth 
during the second half of the nineteenth century as a “miracle.” In 1851 the city had 
grown to 35,000 people; by 1861, 50,000 people, and by 1900, it had 125,000 
occupants.24 Tourcoing’s population also grew, from 28,000 people in 1851 to 85,000 in 
1911.  While tripling the population in sixty years represents amazing growth, Belgian 
                                                 
19
 Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 319. 
20
 Non-heavy metals are most metals other than cadmium, chromium, copper, iron, mercury, nickel, 
manganese, lead, zinc, arsenic, or selenium. Compagnie de Fives-Lille specialized in the construction of 
steam locomotives at that time. 
21
 Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 368. 
22
 Ibid., 370. 
23
 Ibid., 348. 
24
 Ibid., 360-1. 
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workers, who utilized the development of the tramways to travel daily to work in 
Tourcoing, and then return to their homes in Belgium, lessened the city’s potential 
growth. The region’s transport network allowed many Belgian workers to profit from the 
relatively higher wages available to workers in France and the lower cost of living in 
Belgium.25 Unlike in Lille and Roubaix, factory production of textiles by largely 
unskilled labor did not immediately dominate Tourcoing’s economy.  Rather, the small 
town continued to support a class of skilled wool spinners and weavers.26 A bustling 
smuggling trade from Belgium also gave Tourcoing’s economy a unique aspect. 
 The industrial and urbanization trends that defined Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing 
during the first half of the nineteenth century continued up until the outbreak of the First 
World War. Textile activity gained such momentum that the area became one of the 
leading textile manufacturing areas in the world.27 The industrial character of Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing created a small wealthy elite, a moderate sized middle class, and 
an enormous working class that accounted for most of the population. Even before the 
German occupation, the majority of northern France’s urban population lived in dire 
straits. Philippe Marchand describes Lille on the cusp of the First World War as a “city of 
workshops and workers.”28  
 
Societal Trends 
 Two important societal trends were the population boom, born of an influx of 
immigrants and high birthrates, and the uneven distribution of wealth. Both directly 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 362.  
26
 Hilden, Working Women and Socialist Politics in France, 14. 
27
 Trenard, Histoire d’une métrople, 347. 
28
 “…Lille est une ville d’ateliers et d’usine.” Marchand, 2003, 85.  
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related to the area’s industrial nature. Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing all assimilated large 
immigrant populations from Flemish Belgium. By 1875, approximately half the 
population of Roubaix was either Belgian or of Belgian descent.29 Lille also experienced 
an influx of people beyond that from Belgium, including transplants from the rest of 
France.  By 1872, 30 percent of the city’s population was born in a department other than 
the Nord.30 In 1889, France passed a law encouraging foreign settlers to take French 
citizenship in an attempt to increase military conscripts.  Belgians in the Département du 
Nord did so in high numbers.31 However, this did little to abate French xenophobia; 
Belgians continued to be scapegoats for native workers’ anger at unemployment, working 
conditions, and low pay. An interesting side effect was that local xenophobia seems to 
have trumped traditional French misogyny; little animosity developed between the sexes 
in northern France as Belgians were always the focus of distain.32 Immigration helped 
fuel the population boom that accounted for much of the misery of the working class by 
creating a plentiful labor supply that helped hold down wages.  A high birthrate was the 
other main factor adding to the population explosion.  The tri-city area had 41.54 births 
per 1,000 people in 1870, as compared to 25.9 births per 1,000 for the whole of France.33 
While this number began to decline towards the end of the nineteenth century, and by 
1908 it was down to 25.2 births per 1,000 people, a high birthrate had already ensured 
overcrowding in the poorest areas of the cities. 
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 As stated earlier, Lille was a wealthy city as it entered the twentieth century.  
However, that wealth was not distributed evenly. Félix-Paul Codaccioni notes, “in this 
regard, an organic inequality reigned unchallenged in the capital of Flanders, and nothing 
is more representative of a deep split of the three social components of tryptic Lille, with 
its dominating managerial class, its working class that was overwhelmed with misery, 
and its paradoxical and disengaged middle class.”34 The upper echelons of Lille society, 
which included industry owners, those in the liberal professions, and high-level civil 
servants, comprised 9.21 percent of the population, but possessed 92.9 percent of the 
city’s wealth. Interestingly, wealth was not the only element that distinguished the upper 
reaches of Lillois society.  The industrial haute bourgeoisie was a close-knitted stratum of 
society, and very few examples exist of social ascension into this level of Lille society 
prior to the First World War. Families kept large businesses within the family, oftentimes 
via marriage between cousins, such as with the Motte-Motte marriage in Lille and the 
Delannay-Delannay marriage in Tourcoing. Each son usually expected to receive his own 
factory.  This upper class truly only respected one profession: business owner.35 Their 
class believed in not only this dynastic conception of business, but also a complete 
identification of family interests with those of the company; business, religion and family 
were the trinity that defined them.36 This group set itself off residentially too, by its 
congregation in Old Lille, surrounding the rue Royale.37 
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 The working class, composed of manual laborers in the factories, domestic 
workers, and those with miscellaneous occupations, comprised 67.5 percent of the 
population in 1872, and 60 percent of the population in 1911. They held less than 1 
percent of the wealth.38 Towards the end of the nineteenth-century approximately 65 
percent of Lillois had no property to leave heirs when they died.39 The number of 
working class people dropped slightly as Lille became less industrial and it developed 
secondary sectors (like banking) that created a petite bourgeoisie.40 Between the suffering 
of the working class and the luxury enjoyed by the upper classes, Lille developed a 
middle-class, largely composed of mid-level civil servants and service industry workers. 
By 1890, this group made up 27 percent of Lille’s population and held just over 9 percent 
of the wealth. Nevertheless, Félix-Paul Codaccioni declares with certainty that social 
inequality pervaded life in Lille.41  That social inequality was even more pronounced in 
Roubaix and Tourcoing, where the social structure was less complex.  These two cities 
had a larger worker class, and a much smaller middle-class due to the lack of service and 
banking industries. As the First World War approached, however, even the lives of the 
working class were slowly improving, often thanks to socialist political gains discussed 
later in this chapter. These gains are not to be exaggerated; they simply meant not every 
worker’s life was constant misery.  
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Living and Working Conditions 
 Working conditions in factories varied greatly according to duties. Workrooms 
could range from extremely unhealthful to well ventilated, and tasks from safe to 
extremely dangerous.  However, in almost every case, adversity and harsh conditions 
characterized the experiences of most textile workers.42 The monotony and long hours 
workers endured physically and emotionally drained most of them. In mid-nineteenth 
century northern France, the working-day in cotton mills ranged from fifteen to seventeen 
hours, and one investigator asserted that some male workers occasionally worked twenty-
fours at a stretch.43  The factory workforce was nearly half female.44 They earned lower 
wages for doing the exact same work as their male counterparts. Relief from such toil 
came late in life. People worked until an advanced age; one quarter of workers in the 
thread industry were over fifty years old.45  
Many workers blamed poor working conditions and low pay upon the immigrant 
population rather than on industry owners. Manual laborers from Flemish Belgium were 
expert workers, willing to accept almost any salary that kept them alive.  Their 
employment lowered wages, and hence they experienced some xenophobic responses to 
their presence in the workforce.46 The inadequacy of workers’ wages, the unhealthful 
conditions they often worked in, and the squalid quarters they could afford to inhabit 
severely limited both the quality of life and lifespan of most workers. A charity worker 
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visiting a Lille slum just prior to the war commented that Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing 
were “waiting rooms for the dead.”47 
 Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing faced enormous housing problems. Like 
purchasing food, rent was a colossal burden for most workers in Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing. With average wages of two francs a day for a man and one franc a day for a 
woman, bread costing fifty-two centimes a kilo in 1847 represented a huge portion of a 
person’s salary.48 In 1843 Lille a single room cost six to seven francs per month and a 
cellar room six francs; this cost represented a week’s wage for the lowest paid textile 
workers.49 Frequently every family had to work to be able to afford one or two rooms.   
By the 1880s, squalid housing for the cities’ workers scarred the cities. The working class 
living in dank cellars and extremely crowded tenements had an exceptionally high 
fertility rate, bucking the general French decline. Without adequate sanitation, working 
class neighborhoods were incubators for diseases, hence residents also suffered a high 
rate of infant mortality.50 The Lille neighborhoods of Wazemmes, Moulins-Lille, Saint-
Sauveur, and Fives were enclaves of poverty where the working class lived.  Incredible 
population density, as people lived in very tight quarters, characterized these areas.51 A 
housing survey in 1911 found that 32,442 Lillois living in homes with less than one-
quarter of a room per person. A further 69,925 lived in homes with more than one-half 
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but less than one room per person. In Roubaix, 4,288 people lived in less than a quarter of 
a room, and 29,555 people live in just over one-half a room each.52  Nothing was done to 
alleviate the misery, and, particularly in Roubaix, speculators built more and more 
courées (tall buildings built around a small courtyard that could house thousands of 
workers in a very small space) at low cost for high profits.53 Patricia Hilden speculates 
that perhaps textile owners and authorities, stunned by the rapidity of social change, felt 
too overwhelmed to take action.54 Even if workers could afford the higher-rents of nicer 
neighborhoods, for reasons of prestige and fearing “the rapid deterioration of property 
associated with overcrowding,” owners preferred to rent to middle-class tenants.55 Hence, 
a situation that began as appalling squalor in the 1880s worsened over the next thirty-four 
years. 
 Such misery afforded workers few recreational activities. One of the few luxuries 
the working class indulged in was having a drink at the local estaminet.  Estaminet, a 
word of Walloon origin, encompasses cabarets, cafés, inns, taverns, and bars. In his short 
history of estaminets, Jacques Messiant writes that the history of northern France cannot 
be told without including them.  Indeed, the workers of these three cities possessed a 
historical tradition from French Flanders, which concentrated upon communal life, social 
activity, and a love of drinking establishments.56 Estaminets helped characterize the 
urban landscape; in most working-class neighborhoods, there could be one or two per 
block. Defined as an “assembly of smokers and drinkers,” these establishments were the 
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bastions that kept oral traditions alive and provided peace and repose for the lower 
classes.57 At the 1912 Conference of the French Socialists (SFIO), Jules Guesde 
contended that cafés provided a refuge for the working class.58 Estaminets prior to World 
War I were places workers came to “listen” to the newspaper and hold political meetings. 
Local leaders of the socialist movement that swept much of northern France before the 
war planned in bars and cafés. Estaminets also provided a refuge from the overbearing 
industrial leaders, priests, nuns, and police, who believed it their duty to check up upon 
workers, including in their homes.59 In areas where living space was extremely limited, 
these taverns became communal living rooms, in which alcohol was an escape that 
deadened the effects of the new industrial discipline of the time clock and production 
lines. Of course these bastions of enjoyment did nothing to help the cycle of poverty and 
debt that characterized the lives of most industrial workers. The social problems of 
alcohol abuse were legion, including domestic abuse, male-on-male violence, 
absenteeism from work, and the misuse of money needed for food.  While the Northern 
department had one of France’s lowest murder rates, “cabaret murders” – or murders 
connected to alcohol consumption in estaminets were an acknowledged occurrence. Anne 
Parella notes that after the 1870s, drinking establishments became a place to bury one’s 
troubles without being disturbed, and barkeeps and patrons did not tolerate disorderly 
people. Hence the type of murders connected to estaminets occurred against a spouse or 
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other intimate, with a prior situation worsened by alcohol, rather than murder of a 
stranger resulting from rowdiness taken too far.60 
While it was culturally acceptable for women and even children to visit 
estaminets, working women’s dual role of employment outside the home and continued 
responsibilities for domestic chores, meant that drinking places were primarily the 
domain of men, with women making fewer and much shorter visits,61 and it was almost 
always the fathers and husbands who over drank. Many did drink wine or beer, but the 
potentially lethal absinthe was still legal and a popular drink. The role of the estaminet as 
a working class living room meant that children also frequented such places in the 
company of parents.  Children’s cries, often fuelled by exhaustion and hunger, were 
quieted with laudanum, an opium based drug, purchased from the bartenders. 
 Singing songs was a form of entertainment that cost little to no money that many 
workers enjoyed. In his work, Chantier pour survivre: Culture ouvrière, travail technique 
dans le textile Roubaix, Laurent Marty examines the lives of Roubaix textile workers 
through their culture of song writing and singing.62 Songs sung in the estaminets and 
homes of Roubaix workers revealed little pleasure in their work or pride in their skills, as 
machines now provided the expertise in preparing textiles. Rather, songs frequently 
described the factory as a prison and workers as convicts allowed only a few hours a 
week to meet friends and play billiards at the local estaminets for relief.63 These songs, 
whose working-class composers were frequently socialist in leaning, told of hostility 
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towards Roman Catholic charities, whose true aim was to control every aspect of their 
lives, and disillusionment with the Republic that had once promised so much.  Songs 
were usually male and misogynistic, but they also displayed a fierce form of “frontier” 
patriotism, that at best revealed great pride in the French nation, and at worst deteriorated 
into anti-Belgian xenophobia.64  
Sports were another form of recreation available to some workers.  Large 
employers attempted to strengthen company loyalty by subsidizing (male) workers’ 
football teams.65 Workers also followed the Easter Paris-Roubaix bicycle race with great 
interest, and one could imagine it was frequently a topic of conversation in the 
estaminets. Newspapers allowed workers to follow sporting events occurring throughout 
France at little cost. 
 
Newspapers 
 A “city of readers” is how many people described Lille prior to the war. By 1914, 
thanks to the Ferry school laws, almost all adults were literate, including those of the 
working class. By 1910, the city had fifty-five libraries, including its municipal library, 
which possessed over 96,000 titles.  Before 1914, Lille enjoyed six daily newspapers, and 
a number of weekly papers. The larger Lille agglomeration had fourteen newspapers in 
1884 and twenty-one papers in 1914.66 By 1903 there were ninety-eight different 
locations in the city where one could purchase a newspaper.67  Being informed was a way 
of life. As in the rest of France, none of the newspapers available in Lille, Roubaix, and 
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Tourcoing were unbiased – newspapers had a clear point of view. The majority of 
newspapers were political in nature. 
Several Catholic newspapers published in the area, including la Vraie France, le 
Nord hebdomadaire, le Propagateur, and La Croix du Nord, which became a daily in 
1890 under Paul-Féron Vrau.68 These newspapers combined their religious message with 
a political slant on the news of the day. La Croix du Nord reflected many of the values of 
industrialists, while La Vraie France reflected legitimist values. The Comité Vrau 
assured that several of these papers were given out for free in poor neighborhoods and 
Paul-Féron Vrau created La Presse Régionale, a media trust that centralized much of the 
work of Catholic newspapers, including their finances and some editorial work, and 
allowed northern newspapers to share information with Catholic papers in other parts of 
France.69  
 Le Journal de Roubaix, founded in 1856, and la Dépêche de Lille founded in 
1882, were both daily conservative, monarchist newspapers.70 Another right-wing 
newspaper available in the three cities, la Nouvelliste du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, was 
an evening newspaper, founded in 1883 through the fusion of Mémorial de Lille and 
Propagateur. Socialist newspapers proliferated as well.  The Réveil du Nord began 
publishing in Lille in 1889, as a radical newspaper but became a socialist organ in 1894. 
It displaced le Progrès du Nord as the left-wing radical paper, and combined with its 
Roubaix-Tourcoing edition, titled l’Egalité, sold more than 100,000 issues daily.71   
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 L’Echo du Nord was by far the most important and widely read newspaper in the 
three cities.  A republican-leaning newspaper, it could be found on the desks and 
nightstands of almost every industrialist, who could safely assume the day’s news would 
be told in a manner that reflected his sensibilities.  Workers must have read this 
newspaper in large numbers as well, for combined with its evening edition, le Petit Echo 
du Nord, it sold more than 180,000 copies daily in 1914.72  
 
Language 
Until the end of the Second Empire, most working class people in Lille, Roubaix, 
and Tourcoing still spoke the local patois rather than a more standardized French.  To 
outsiders, this patois sounded like French spoken very rapidly with a Flemish accent.  In 
some working class neighborhoods before the First World War, this patois was still 
prevalent.73 The dialect of French spoken in the Département du Nord remained quite 
distinctive from that found in the capital. Timothy Pooley notes that this parlance resulted 
from the three-way language contact between Flemish, Picard, and French.74 Louis 
Vermesse published a dictionary of Lille vernacular in 1861, noting that the local 
language had vitality and a poetic quality to it. The vocabulary of the patois lillois 
remained so unique that Richard Cobb included a glossary of it in his work on occupied 
France, and Vermesse’s 183-page book enjoyed republishing in 2003.75 The Ferry laws 
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may have created a population mostly literate in French, but there is little indication they 
did anything to undermine the unique version of the language spoken in Lille, Roubaix, 
and Tourcoing. 
 As Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing evolved into manufacturing hubs, thousands of 
Belgians flocked to the area looking for work, some commuting daily across the border. 
But many of these mostly Flemish-speaking workers also ended up living in sordid 
ghettos in the neighborhoods of Wazemmes, Moulins, Fives, Saint-Sauvier, and Saint-
Maurice.76 Their presence added a linguistic element to the social inequality created by 
industrialization. Timothy Pooley notes in his recent study examining the linguistic 
ramifications of Flemish immigration to northern France that, for such a large group, 
living in close proximity to their native land, Belgian immigrants became active 
participants in the economic, cultural, and political life of their new home, often while 
also remaining a tight-knit community among themselves.77 
 
Political Trends 
Lille prior to the war was “a place of intellectual ferment.”78 Along with Roubaix 
and Tourcoing, these three industrial cities were ardently socialist on the eve of war, but 
it was a different form of socialism than that found in the capital.  A strong allegiance to 
both royalism, and later Bonapartism, were the prevalent sentiments through most of the 
nineteenth century.79 The history of republicanism in the tri-city area was brief and 
                                                 
76
 Marchand, Histoire de Lille, 87. 
77
 Pooley, 207. 
78
 “Lille … un lieu de bouillonnement intellectuel.”  Codaccioni, Histoire d’une métrople,  387. 
79
 R.D. Anderson, France 1870-1914: Politics and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 59. 
For example, in 1914 the city of Roubaix did not contain a single monument to the French Revolution, a 
rarity in France. 
  
29
 
complex. The history of republicanism coincides with the rise of a liberal bourgeoisie, 
who were the republican leaders prior to the war. Business owners remained loyal to 
Catholicism despite the laic nature of republicanism, perhaps due to a link between their 
Catholicism and capitalism, as industrial leaders understood success in business as a sign 
of divine protection.80  However, republican electoral success depended greatly upon 
working class support.  
There was an evolution of working class political consciousness in the Nord.   It 
began with national - Catholic - habits of deference, which initially bound the working 
class to the radical republicanism of their bourgeois employers. When the Republic 
offered no tangible amelioration of conditions, workers drifted into socialism, and a few 
into syndicalism and anarchism. This was possible, as republicanism and radicalism were 
not deeply entrenched in the Nord.  Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the industrial 
workers of the Nord were uncommitted to any definite philosophy of working-class 
emancipation.81 There was a large group of newly industrialized workers that had 
previously been conservative or apolitical, that during the 1880s were drawn to the type 
of Marxism preached by Jules Guesde, which mixed reformism and French anti-
clericalism with orthodox Marxist economic and social ideals.82  
 Workers’ strikes became quite frequent and intense between 1889 and 1893 and 
aided the rise of socialist parties. At this time, Nord workers turned more and more to 
Jules Guesde’s Parti Ouvrier Français (POF).83 The textile workers of Lille and Roubaix 
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were quick to embrace the POF’s socialist message of class solidarity.84 A nationwide 
party, the POF garnered its greatest support from the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing 
metropolitan triangle.  Despite the suffering of workers, however, the party remained 
passive for quite a while, and Guesdists, including Guesde himself, suffered electoral 
defeat in the early 1880s at the hands of traditional elites. Nevertheless, the rise of the 
POF began in the Nord as it won the allegiances of the textile union, whose initial 
membership was largely unskilled females and Belgian immigrants.  However, by the 
1890s, when the POF became more concerned with electoral victories than union 
achievements, it began to concentrate mostly upon male workers’ demands.85 By the turn 
of the century, no vestige of women’s earlier contributions to the movement remained.86  
Socialist electoral success began in 1891, when Lille elected the POF co-founder, 
Paul Lagargue to the Chamber of Deputies as a deputy from Lille. In 1892, Guesdists 
captured all thirty-six seats on Roubaix’s city council, with Henri Carrette, an organizer 
of a textile workers’ union, becoming mayor.87 In the legislative elections of 1893, Jules 
Guesde took industrialist Motte’s seat in the Chamber. POF politicians captured the 
municipal government of Lille in 1895.88 Guesde won election to the Chamber of 
Deputies from a district outside Roubaix in 1893. Motte won that seat back in 1898 and 
again in 1902, but Guesde regained it in 1906, and then held it until his death in 1922.89 
Gustave Delory, who began as a newspaper peddler for the socialist Le Cri du Peuple, 
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became a loyal disciple of Jules Guesde.  Mayor of Lille from 1896 till 1904, Delory 
became a national, then international figure for the party, as he became its secretary-
general, internationally representing first the POF and thereafter the new, unified socialist 
party founded in 1905, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO).90 Once 
Guesdists gained control of municipal governments, they provided social assistance that 
challenged the traditional church and public system of aid.   Dues-paying members had 
access to food cooperatives, financial assistances through mutual aid societies if injured 
or fired, maternity benefits, and childcare including free kindergarten.91 Socialists even 
established a seaside sanatorium for textile workers’ children suffering from 
tuberculosis.92 While socialist parties would remain a defining characteristic of the 
Nord’s major cities, they would not command the unquestioned loyalty of the majority of 
workers.93 
 This urban, proletarian disposition toward socialism did not prevent the traditional 
industrial elite from remaining a force in politics. The socialist movement, however, 
clearly weakened the position of the traditional elites. Pierre Pouchain writes, “The 
industrial citadel of Roubaix-Tourcoing was menaced from within.”94 However, 
industrial workers showed themselves to be less interested in advancing the POF’s 
socialist vision then in backing whichever politician would provide them with the greatest 
material benefits.95  For example, Eugène Motte in Roubaix and Charles Delesalle in 
Lille, won their mayoral positions by promising great things.  Both then came through on 
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those promises.  In Roubaix, Motte built a beautiful city hall and hospital, and then 
helped Roubaix successfully host the 1911 international textile exposition. Motte 
presented himself as a moderate republican and played upon native workers’ xenophobia, 
too, portraying the POF as a “foreign” party that was more concerned with the rights of 
immigrant Belgian workers than with Frenchmen.96 Delesalle was mayor of Lille from 
1904 until 1919, and transformed that city into a true regional capital, expanding public 
electricity, and building beautiful boulevards.  He also incorporated some socialist ideas, 
such as bread banks and funding maternity and newborn assistance, into his works.97 
Delesalle may have been a conservative, but two out of three of his deputies were from 
the extreme left.98 The POF overcame electoral losses to men like Delesalle and Motte, 
but at the turn of the century their electoral support leveled off at approximately one third 
of the total in the Département du Nord.99 Guesdists believed that a socialist municipality 
in Lille foreshadowed a potential national socialist government. However, these dreams 
were often met with dismay, as Nord workers hedged their bets, often voting for the POF 
locally but for a “bourgeois” candidate nationally.100  
 Tourcoing took a slightly different path to socialism than Lille and Roubaix. 
While Tourcoing had become more socialist leaning by the start of the twentieth century, 
it was socialism of a different flavor than Roubaix or Lille.  The worker population 
remained much more ardently Catholic, and, despite their urban environment, retained 
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their rural mentality.101 It took longer for textile workers to make the shift from a wider 
community loyalty to class solidarity. When the shift did occur, it was more gradual than 
in Lille and Roubaix, where it came intuitively.102 Hence, as Patricia Hilden describes it, 
the “socialist conquest of Tourcoing lagged behind.”103 It was not until just before the 
outbreak of war that Tourcoing voters began to elect a number of socialist councilors, and 
it was only in 1914 that the Guesdist militant, Albert Inghels, became their deputy.104 
Socialism plays an enduring role in the Nord; Lille is still a bastion of the socialist party 
to this day and gave the Fifth Republic a prime minister, Pierre Mauroy from 1981-1984, 
under François Mitterand.  Pierre Mauray served as mayor of Lille from 1973-2001. 
 
Religion  
 Spain governed the Lille triangle until 1667 and that country’s influence created a 
virulent type of Counter-Reformation Catholicism that endured late into the nineteenth 
century. Perhaps tied to this, northern France remained Catholic despite the de-
Christianization trend some claim spread across most of France.105 While church 
attendance decreased in the large industrial cities of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, and 
the secular socialist worker movement gained influence, the people of these cities 
celebrated religious holidays in much greater numbers than much of the rest of the 
country. Weekly church attendance may have waned but in terms of still taking part in 
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rites of passages, such as marriage and baptism, the working-class remained largely 
christianized as the war approached. Deborah Buffton suggests that the celebration of 
religious holidays increased even more once the occupation occurred because they 
established a sense of continuity and comfort to people feeling helpless and alienated.106 
 Different factors ensured Catholicism remained relevant in these cities. One factor 
was the influx of Flemish-speaking Belgian immigrants who clung to Catholicism as part 
of their cultural identity.107 The strength of Catholicism also remained greater in the north 
than elsewhere because a large majority of the working class had to rely on Catholic 
charities to supplement their meager wages.108  A related element was that the industrial 
elite of the cities remained religious, and frequently imposed their convictions on their 
dependent workforce.109 Some members of the bourgeoisie returned to the fold of the 
Church in response to worker unrest. At least one historian suggested that the northern 
business elite was actually largely unconcerned with matters of faith, and simply saw 
religion as a tool to control workers.110  Whether their faith was real or a façade, 
industrial leaders wanted the church to act as “gendarmes in cassocks,” or to be agents of 
industrial discipline and social control, a role most Catholic churches were more than 
willing to play.111 Many Nord textile industrialists employed the sisters of Notre Dame de 
l’Usine confraternity to oversee the installation of religious artifacts and religious 
practices on factory premises.112 They also regulated sexual segregation in the workplace, 
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and monitored the “morality” of employees requesting charitable aid.113 Indeed, the upper 
classes felt horrified by the immorality of fraternization between the sexes at work, and 
frequently asked sisters to watch over workers to ensure no unnecessary interaction took 
place. They required female workers to attend mass at work and made obligatory 
confessions within the chapels in the mill.114 It should be noted that the clergy did not act 
merely as agents of control.  At times they attempted to oppose industrial abuse, however 
most of the time their efforts were futile because of the inability of individual priests and 
sisters to change the whole industrial system. One exception was Philibert Vrau. A 
wealthy industrialist and lay Roman Catholic activist, he made it his mission to 
reinvigorate the religiosity of the citizens of Lille while improving their lives through 
beneficial societies for workers and demands that workers receive a decent wage. His 
work was a rare example of religious and socialist aims over lapping. However, the 
socialists and Vrau differed greatly on the issue of education. His Comité Vrau (which he 
ran with his relative Paul-Féron) paid for 9,045 (out of the city’s school age population of 
20,700) Lille children to attend parochial schools, rather than secular public schools by 
1883.115 His aim was to counteract what many saw as the positivist side of the lay 
movement, which opened seventy-five laic schools in the tri-city area. Even at the height 
of socialist programs providing relief and support to the working class, many still relied 
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upon the church for both comfort and charity.  This ensured that Catholicism remained 
relevant in the Nord even when anticlericalism was a politic theme. 
 
Conclusion 
 While life in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing was difficult for most prior to the 
war, it did nothing to prepare them for what was to come under occupation. Political 
battles, waged through the democratic process, did not prepare the citizens of these three 
cities for the authoritarian rule that would accompany German occupation in October 
1914. Problems faced by people before the war were often just exacerbated under 
occupation. A large portion of the population was already physically weakened preceding 
an occupation that would send an already high death rate even higher.116  It is interesting 
to note that a large number of people in these cities truly internalized their religion during 
occupation rather than simply attending mass to conform to societal demands. Under the 
union sacrée, the church openly supported the war effort and the French government took 
a hiatus from criticizing the church.  This occurred throughout France, and during the 
war, distinctions between religion and politics blurred. In occupied France the blurring 
occurred at an even deeper level – that between the daily lives of the people and their 
religion. All Saints’ Day, the day Catholics remember their dead, became a focus for 
people in the occupied zone. Living in harsh conditions so close to the battlefront, almost 
everyone in these major towns had recently lost a loved one, and consequently November 
1st had meaning for almost everyone.  Buffton illustrates how the Nord in general dealt 
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with the holiday, describing, “Mixtures of pride, sadness, hope, and grief seemed to 
characterize the accounts of the holiday.  Toussaint [All Saints’ Day] was deeply 
meaningful and its significance had increased because of the conditions of war.”117 
 People in this area, although not geographically far from Paris and the heart of 
France, were in some ways culturally different from the rest of the country. Their 
geographic location shaped by their feelings towards the war. Unlike some of their 
countrymen, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing were not jubilant at the thought  
of war.118 Mayor Delesalle of Lille and other politicians made obvious their pessimistic 
sentiments about the war once France declared it, but most treated the war as a grim but 
important duty.119 The pacifist tendencies of this area did not translate into any 
sentiments of affection toward the Germans once the war began. 
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Chapter Two: 
The German Occupation of Northern France 
 
Alan Kramer’s Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First 
World War describes the German occupied zones during the Great War as vast prisons.1 
While not always utilizing prison imagery, every historian examining occupied France 
from 1914-1918 provides the same bleak image of inhospitable living conditions in the 
metropolitan area of France encompassing Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. These harsh 
conditions included food shortages, requisitioning, severe and often-time arbitrary 
German rule, and enemy control over the availability of news, which is the focus of this 
work. To comprehend how the conurbation of Lille understood the news it received 
during the war some background information about the German occupation is necessary. 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the war leading up to the invasion and the 
capture of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing.  It then explores the German administration of 
the three cities, and the economic exploitation of the area, including requisitions and 
labor requirements, and the resulting food shortages. Additionally, this chapter examines 
examples of French resistance to German rule and the German response.  
 
The War Leading to Occupation 
 Fighting began on the Western Front in August 1914. The German military plan – 
a slightly modified version of the Schlieffen plan - required Germany to defeat France to 
the west before engaging Russia to the east.  To do so quickly, the Germans planned to 
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outflank the French fortifications by attacking through Belgium, consequently violating 
Belgian neutrality.2  The Germans placed only light covering forces to the south – where 
French military leaders assumed the major offensives would take place – and instead 
placed a heavy concentration of troops further north, made up mainly of their First and 
Second Armies, with 320,000 men and 260,000 men respectively.3 The right wing of the 
German attack swept through Belgium and northern France then moved toward Paris, 
eventually pushing the French army toward Switzerland.4  France’s General Joseph Joffre 
expected a German offensive via Belgium. However, he assumed that the British 
Expeditionary Force could contain what he expected to be a small German force, 
allowing him to utilize most of his troops in a French offensive beginning in Alsace and 
heading towards Berlin. What surprised General Joffre was not where Germany chose to 
attack, but the strength of that attack. He believed Germany lacked the numerical strength 
its military possessed. Joffre’s incorrect assessment grew from his assumption that 
Germany manned its army like France, that is that it did not include utilizing reserve 
troops in the frontline. Germany did employ reservists on the frontline, providing it with 
thousands more troops than Joffre expected. Joffre frantically attempted to reposition 
French armies while the British landed to make a heroic stand in Mons, Belgium, on 
August 23, 1914. These miscalculations placed Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing in the 
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Germans’ path. Historians traditionally understood Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing’s 
capture by the Germans and the cities’ proximity to the front a result of the failure of the 
Schlieffen Plan at the Battle of the Marne, during which the Germans failed to capture 
Paris and were pushed back to a position that led to a war of attrition.5 
 
The Capture of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing 
 The battles of August through October 1914 swirled around Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing; the cities changed hands several times. In an attempt to save the city from the 
devastation wrought on several Belgian towns, the French military declared Lille an open 
city on August 1, 1914, much to the surprise of the Military Governor of Lille, General 
Lebas. Lebas pleaded with the French General Staff not to abandon Lille.  However, the 
French General Staff’s strategy called for them to turn their back on the Belgian frontier 
and face the Rhine.  One member of the General Staff, General Michel de Castelnau 
pointed out that for the Germans to reach Lille they would have to greatly overextend 
themselves in terms of the number of troops per a meter, stating, “If they [the Germans] 
come as far as Lille, so much the better for us!”6 On August 17, 1914, Lille became part 
of the military zone and General Albert d’Amade hence took control of the area, on 
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August 20 ordering that Lille again prepare to defend itself.7 The number of garrison 
troops stationed at Lille’s fortifications increased from 15,000 to 25,000 men on August 
21.8 Initially German invading troops disregarded Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, as they 
quickly moved south. On August 23, however, German troops advanced upon the 
Roubaix-Tourcoing railway station, blowing up the station of Mouscron, but French 
troops pushed them back and the Germans chose to continue towards Paris.9 The next 
day, August 24, a telegram arrived from France’s War Minister, Alexandre Millerand, 
granting the request of Lille’s civilian leaders that the city be declared an open city once 
again, so as not to expose it to the horrors of siege.10 General Percin disagreed with this 
decision but withdrew all troops and military supplies.11 A small German detachment 
entered Lille on September 2, but disappeared three days later.12 General d’Amade’s 
troops attempted to fight the larger German contingent heading towards Lille but the 
French troops had to fall back. The Germans re-occupied the city shortly after on 
September 6, 1914. After the first enemy airplane appeared and dropped two bombs on 
the General Post Office in Lille on September 9, French military authorities ordered all 
men between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight to leave all three cities for Dunkirk 
immediately.13 
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Meanwhile Paris remained untouched. On September 5, British and French troops 
launched an attack through a gap that opened between the First and Second German 
armies, near the Marne River, causing the Germans to retreat. This dashed German hopes 
of quick victory and led to the “race to the sea.”  Outside the tri-city area, both sides 
attempted to outflank each other as they moved northward and westward from La Bassée 
towards the northern coast, from October 16 until November 11, 1914.14 Neither side 
possessed advantage enough to exploit gaps in both fronts or find the other’s flank.  Once 
the sea was reached, both sides entrenched the fronts, leaving northern, industrial France 
in the hands of the Germans, isolated from the rest of the country. Over time, this line 
became defensively more secure with permanent trenches and fortifications, some of 
which would hold until the very last days of the war.15 Behind this line, France lost 
3,400,000 hectares of land – almost 6 percent of her territory - after the Battle of the 
Marne. In this area lived 12 percent of the country’s population and was located much of 
its iron, coal, and steel industry.16 
 The advance of German forces toward the Marne left Lille briefly free again. In 
the “race to the sea,” about 4,000 troops under Colonel Pardieu tried to defend the city 
against approximately 70,000 German troops from October 10 until October 12. On 
October 11, bombs struck Lille until seven o’clock in the evening at a rate of forty-three 
shells per minute.17 Shells destroyed 1,200 buildings, with some reduced to ruins.  
Buildings hit included the railroad station, and the Musée de Beaux-Arts, which was hit 
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by seventy-five shells on October 11, 1914.18 Over half the buildings struck were private 
homes.19 In certain cases, such as the rue de Vieux-Marché-aux-Poulets, the bombs 
destroyed entire streets.20 Such shelling forced Pardieu to surrender Lille on October 13. 
In Roubaix and Tourcoing, the shells battered some neighborhoods, but these two cities 
were less harshly shelled prior to the occupation than Lille.  Once the occupation began, 
however, the German forces looted and vandalized the twin cities to the north to the same 
extent as the regional capital.21 The taking of the city killed 200 Lillois civilians.22 The 
German capture of northern France killed 896 people.23 
 The make-up of the cities’ populations changed considerably in the weeks leading 
up to occupation. Richard Cobb notes that most Frenchmen of military age escaped by 
October 10, which he cites as an indication of confusion on the part of the German high 
command.24 This skewed the area’s demographic make-up, leaving the cities with a 
disproportionate number of women, children, and older men. Many people with the 
financial means to leave the area also did so before the invasion. Homer Folks describes 
the exodus, “[a]s the gray German flood rolled over northern France, a million people 
fled before it as before a tidal wave.”25 The citizens of these towns partially knew what to 
expect, as the Belgian population of these cities already had exploded in late August 
1914, as refugees from the German invasion fled south. The Belgians brought with them 
tales of German horrors that foreshadowed the tri-city area’s destiny. Prefect Félix 
Trépont of the Département du Nord asked all town mayors to provide financial 
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assistance to these refugees, noting that the large number of Belgian workers already 
contributed to the area’s prosperity through their hard work, and Belgians should be 
given the same assistance as Frenchmen.26 
 The British soon launched two attacks attempting to retake Lille, resulting in 
battles around La Bassée and Armentières.27 The British held no advantage, and the 
Germans successfully resisted their attack. As the tri-city area began its long sentence 
under occupation, a war of attrition – one that would be won by whoever held out the 
longest – solidified along the trenches.  A 450-mile long front from Nieuwport to the 
Swiss frontier separated Lille from Armentières by early 1915, two cities that were only 
about ten miles away from each other but on opposite sides of the trenches, and hence 
worlds apart for the next four years.28 
 
German Administration of the Occupied Zones 
 The German military during the First World War gravitated towards extremism. 
In terms of occupation, extremism meant the desire to establish perfect order and 
complete obedience in the enemy population.29  Utilizing the existing municipal 
government system, it was possible to impose a much greater degree of control over 
people in the cities of northern France as compared to occupied zones on the Eastern 
Front.30 The Germans removed French government officials from power in positions 
higher than that of the mayor. The Germans required mayors to remain in office to act as 
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conduits to pass information to the citizenry.31 This policy decapitated the French 
departmental hierarchy, with the removal of prefects and subprefects. Mayors (or other 
civil servants if the mayor had mobilized) along with a municipal commission oversaw 
the execution of orders to civilians, the organization of finances, and the payment of 
indemnities.32 
The civilians of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing suffered through an occupation, 
during which German military and administrative authorities alternated in maintaining 
their subjection. The German authorities first divided occupied France into staging areas, 
or “zones d’étapes,” under military administration. A governor was at the head of each 
major regional division and a commandant at each local headquarters.33  General von 
Heinrich commanded in Lille, Commandant Hofmann was responsible for Roubaix, and 
Commandant von Tessin was in charge of Tourcoing. Officially a civilian inspectorship, 
an Inspection des étapes des affaires économiques, was supposed to oversee economic 
affairs, but the need to use military force to carry out requisitions and forced labor 
confused the distinction between German civilian and military personnel.34 Military 
police were responsible for discipline and public order, and field police were responsible 
for gathering military information and conducting censuses. Both were present in all  
three cities.35 Despite the tight control of people’s movements, the Germans clearly had 
not developed an overall plan for administrating the cities. Rather, their administrative 
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policies developed slowly, through trial and error, and did not show any consistency until 
two years into the occupation.36 
 German occupation did have one overarching theme: isolation. The French 
civilians were not only isolated from the rest of France, but from other areas of the 
occupied zone. The Germans treated each municipality individually, making every town 
an independent commune with little interaction with neighboring areas. This 
municipalization of civilian life and authority – each town’s mayor reported directly to 
the German authorities – meant that as the occupation dragged on there was less and less 
contact between Lille and Roubaix and Tourcoing. Starting in January 1915, French 
civilians needed German regulated passes, attainable only for heavy fees, to travel outside 
one’s immediate vicinity.37  Obtaining the necessary passes to travel from Lille to the 
other two cities was both difficult and expensive. While travelers also needed passes to 
move between Roubaix and Tourcoing, the French could more easily attain these passes. 
A certain irony existed as the trams continued to run and go everywhere they did before 
the war, including the Belgian frontier, but the Germans forbade the French from riding 
the trams without a pass.38 This system also aimed to avoid the occupied area acquiring a 
regional identity.39 Each city became its own despotically ruled state.  Richard Cobb 
asserts that such municipalism was firmly rooted in the area’s history, and at the best of 
times Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing rarely cooperated with each other.40 But such 
enforced municipal autonomy reversed the work of building a centralized French state 
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and epitomized the efforts of German authorities to divide and control French citizens in 
the occupied zone.   
   In addition to the passes necessary for most travel that we have noted, the German 
authorities used their power to control every aspect of life. They took a fastidious census 
of the population early during the occupation and repeatedly updated it. German 
regulations demanded each house post on the front door a list of occupants, including 
their ages, genders, and occupations.  Identity cards with photographs were mandatory. 
The German authorities frequently issued new rules, made available to the urban 
populations through notices posted through the city and in local newspapers. Many of 
these rules were vague in nature (for example, telling people they must shovel their 
walkways in a timely manner, without clarifying what constituted a timely manner), 
adding to the stress of occupied life.41 At times, it was the more minor rules that truly 
insulted the French people.  For example, the Germans imposed Berlin time, one-hour in 
advance of Parisian time, in the occupied zone, a change meant to show complete 
German control of civilian life, rather than to allow for more hours of light to work. The 
German occupiers also placed strict curfews upon the French public, which varied over 
the course of occupation. Grusserlass, the requirement that Frenchmen had to step off the 
sidewalk and tip their hats in deference to German officers, was another much despised 
rule. 
 The taking of hostages was a technique of control the German occupiers 
employed freely.  While in a sense every Frenchmen in the occupied zone was a hostage, 
the Germans took literal hostages as well. On the first day of occupation, the Germans 
seized approximately sixty hostages in Lille, chosen from among the city’s leaders. Those 
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taken included Bishop Charot, the Prefect Félix Trépont, Mayor Charles Delesalle, 
deputy mayors, and a couple members of the Chamber of Deputies.42 Ten men at a time 
spent the night at the Citadel under German supervision. Starting in 1915 the Germans 
relaxed the rules, only requiring hostages to sign a presence-sheet, but later that year they 
again forced hostages to spend the time in the Citadel. Then the rules switched to all the 
men signing in both morning and evening, until the Germans dispensed with hostage 
taking in October 1915.43 The Germans took hostages to be able to hold them 
accountable for civilian actions; this was supposed to deter major acts of resistance with 
the threat that the authorities could deport hostages to Germany or even execute them. 
Later in the war mass arrests, imprisonments, and deportations were the deterrents. Such 
issues added to the psychological trauma of occupation.44 
 An exception to the Germans’ all-encompassing control was schooling. The 
German overseers showed little interest in regulating education in the occupied zone. 
Perhaps this was because in occupying northern France, Germany only aimed to 
contribute to the success of their fighting troops: “[n]o grander goal (of annexation, or 
demonstration of organizational superiority) clouded their practical aim.”45 To the extent 
feasible, the pre-occupation education personnel remained in place.46 Furthermore, 
schools utilized the same pre-war history textbooks, which uniformly carried an extreme 
anti-German bias. The Germans ordered revisions, but with paper and ink shortages, they 
did not pursue the matter.47 The Germans spent most of their energy exploiting the area 
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for short-term benefit, rather than preparing it for long-term administration.48 Not 
surprisingly, in such an environment, the schooling of children took on a secondary 
importance to simple survival, but it did not disappear completely. By November 1914, a 
third of Lille’s schools had reopened.49 The original bombardment destroyed five schools 
in Lille, while the Germans converted two other schools into hospitals and ten more into 
troop barracks.50 Schools of higher education, including the Lycée, the École Industrielle, 
and Conservatoire resumed in 1915. While there was no permission for baccalaureate 
candidates to travel to Lille to take the required exams, the German authorities 
compromised by allowing those candidates to go to Saint-Quentin in 1915. Nevertheless, 
difficulties stemming from occupation interrupted all levels of schooling at times. During 
the winter, schools often closed for a lack of heating fuel.51 The absence of a great 
number of younger teachers mobilized in advance of the occupation left as teachers older 
men whose health began to fail. Furthermore, fewer students were able to attend school, 
either due to their need to scrounge for extra money to support their families, the 
undernourishment which sapped their health, or their conscription by German occupiers 
into labor gangs. 
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Economic Exploitation  
 Germany prepared for war with a newly updated field manual for rear areas, the 
Kriegs-Ettappen-Ordnung, or KEO.52 While it offered little guidance for a long 
occupation, it did make clear that rear zones, especially if they were enemy territory, had 
to furnish all categories of provisions to the German military.53 The occupation of 
northern France was total as the Germans brought every aspect of French civilian life 
under their control and expropriated the region’s wealth and destroyed its infrastructure.54 
Thus, German official policy fostered a situation of conflict, in which the German 
occupiers sought to extract the most out of their economically rich new territory, while 
the French living in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing did the best to counter their efforts.55 
At the same time, the KEO set the stage for individual acts of economic terror by German 
enlisted personnel. Omitting any discussion of international law, while at the same time 
encouraging subordinates to behave independently in rear areas, the KEO helped create a 
German attitude that would economically destroy the tri-city area. As Eugène Martin-
Mamy bitterly recalled in his memoir about requisitioning during the occupation, the 
Germans “were men who steal to live, and live to steal.”56 
 The plundering began with exorbitant war contributions. From Lille alone (the 
Germans charged each city separately), German authorities demanded a million francs by 
November 10, 1914, two million more by November 17, and three million more by 
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November 24.57 The Germans expected that each city pay to feed the troops billeted 
within its limits, which for Lille amounted to 10,000 francs daily at the start of the war.  
While German authorities did permit some deadline extensions when cities could not 
obtain the funds, they never reduced the amounts demanded. By the end of the war, Lille 
had paid over 184,000,000 francs to the Germans.58 These demands quickly depleted the 
cities of enough French currency for circulation in a normal fashion. Thus, the Germans 
developed vouchers to act as paper money in each city, and this system of local paper 
currency operated for the rest of the war.  It provided the Germans with an additional 
implement of control, as this currency was not routinely accepted outside the occupied 
territory, although vouchers from one occupied city would be accepted in other occupied 
towns.59 
 Requisitions of material items quickly degenerated into expropriation, as the 
Germans confiscated industrial and personal goods for not only immediate military use, 
but also exported items back to Germany as booty.60 Requisitioning depleted homes not 
just of silver, wine, and other valuable items, but furniture, linens, and other necessities 
needed for basic comfort. The machinery and raw materials of several large factories 
simply vanished on trains headed to Berlin. The Germans ordered owners of businesses, 
such as some shops and secondary industries, which employed older men and women, 
but that were of no use to the Germans, to close down and lay off their workers, adding to 
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the already considerable unemployment problem.61 While shutting down these businesses 
worsened the economy of the cities, and meant more people needed official aid to obtain 
food, the German occupiers, still thinking in the short term, requisitioned all materials of 
value from closed businesses.  The disappearance of industrial equipment was not the 
only obstacle to continued production in the occupied zone. Most able-bodied men left 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing preceding German entry, leaving industrial towns without 
young male workers. The initial bombardment of Lille destroyed some of the city’s 
largest factories, including the Wallaert and Le Blan cloth manufacturing plants and the 
Albert Dujardin steam machine workshop.62 The British blockade meant no new supplies 
of cotton, a key raw material for this manufacturing center, could enter the occupied 
area.63 Whatever production did continue needed the German authorities’ permission, and 
was to be for German use. Several industrial leaders bravely refused to produce for the 
Germans, sometimes leading to the confiscation of their entire businesses. Eugène Motte, 
Roubaix’s leading industrialist and former mayor, demonstrated great reluctance to co-
operate with the Germans, despite the large sums of money offered to him. Roubaix’s 
mayor at the time of occupation, Jean-Baptiste Lebas, spent a large portion of the war as 
a German prisoner because of his refusal to work with the Germans.64 
 Some stores, restaurants, banks, and other basic services in the cities did reopen in 
modest form shortly after the occupation. With limited supplies and funds – German 
requisitions and indemnities quickly stripped the cities of most of their consumer goods 
and hard currency – economic life hardly returned to normal. Life was more difficult in 
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Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing than in the countryside, since it was extremely difficult to 
find work (for those unwilling to work for the Germans) in the cities and food was scarce. 
Germany published reports in 1915 stating that commercial life in Lille was once again 
thriving a mere fifteen weeks after those fateful days in October 1914.65 This was far 
from the truth. German economic exploitation ravaged the region’s industry and 
economy. 
 
Labor Requirements 
The German occupiers viewed the civilian population as another commodity for 
their exploitation. At some point during the occupation, the Germans subjected almost 
every person (other than very small children) in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing to forced 
labor.  At first, the Germans attempted to recruit unemployed volunteers to dig trenches 
and work various construction jobs, but it quickly became apparent that volunteers would 
not meet the workload the German occupiers required. Thus, the Germans forced a large 
number of people to work for them locally, in the construction jobs as well as in seized 
factories or in providing sanitation services. An important element of forced labor, 
however, was also deportation. One of the harshest elements of life in occupied France 
was the constant fear of deportation.  It was common practice to deport people from the 
city to work in agricultural settings in other parts of occupied France or within Germany. 
During the invasion of 1914, the Germans deported approximately 10,000 French 
civilians to Germany, where they endured harsh conditions.66 The Germans’ motivation 
for such early examples of deportations remains unclear, but deterring resistance by 
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removing community leaders and collective punishment may have been two possible 
aims.67  Whatever other reasons the Germans had for deporting French civilians from the 
occupied zone, economic exploitation became the key motivator. Most shocking for the 
three cities’ urban population, Germans shortly extended such labor service to women as 
well as men, and soon they too lived in fear of general mobilization. Frequently civilians 
had thirty minutes notice before the Germans herded them to unknown locales. Some 
young girls were “dragged from their parents at bayonet-point, screaming and 
terrified…”68 The most infamous of these deportations occurred on Easter 1916, when 
the Germans deported twenty thousand people from Lille, a large portion of whom were 
women and young girls. The Germans sent many of these women to the countryside of 
the Ardennes and the Aisne to do heavy fieldwork.  Local villagers treated the women 
harshly; the Germans told locals that the women were “femmes à boche,” or prostitutes 
cozy with German soldiers.69 The occupiers sent some to Germany. The outcry was even 
greater against these deportations, because of the large number of people taken, and the 
relative youth of many of the women; some were as young as sixteen years old. Other 
aspects of the deportation incensed the Lillois, too. The Germans rounded up women on 
Good Friday, and subjected even the youngest girls to forced gynecological exams.70 
While the French government’s white book portrayed the Easter deportation as cruel and 
heartless, it certainly served real German needs.71 It alleviated a real and growing labor 
shortage in Germany while at the same time helping empty major French cities filled with 
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unemployed, hungry populations. Presumably, too, such tactics served to keep occupied 
populations pacified by demonstrating German mastership. 
 While this treatment of women outraged much of the world, less noticed was the 
deportation of men to work camps in Germany. While deportations occurred prior to 
1916, German labor policy for the occupied territories moved from a focus upon 
recruiting volunteers from the occupied zones to one of forced labor in late August 1916 
when German Field Marshal and Chief of Staff Paul von Hindenburg and his 
quartermaster general Erich Ludendorff took over the Third Army Supreme Command.72 
In 1916, the Germans formed the ZAB (Zivil Arbeiter Bataillonen) or forced civilian 
labor battalions. Known among the French as the brassards rouges for the red armbands 
workers had to wear, this “uniform” demonstrated that they were a conscripted army of 
civilian workers.73 Many of the people doing this hard labor were young men not of age 
to mobilize in 1914.74 The German occupiers deported men forced into the ZAB to labor 
camps in the occupied territory. The Germans chose the men from lists of unemployed 
that the mayor provided, often under duress. When this did not provide enough workers, 
the Germans simply rounded men up in the street. These workers endured extremely 
harsh living and working conditions even by the standards of occupied France; they were 
often near the frontline and always without adequate shelter or food. Those unlucky 
enough to be deported to Germany faced a day and a half journey made in overcrowded 
cattle-cars without access to food or washrooms.  Once at the camps, life was harsh. 
Helen McPhail does not overstate the situation when she notes, “…these conditions were 
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a dreadful forerunner of later decades in other countries’ gulags and concentration 
camps.”75 While estimates exist for how many men Germans kept at different camps at 
different times, the constant rotation of men between camps (to avoid any bonding with 
the local people and because their bodies simply wore out) makes it difficult to estimate 
how many men served in labor gangs both in Germany and occupied France along the 
frontline. Estimates of around 100,000 seem plausible.76 A large number of French 
people from the occupied zone worked as forced labor in Germany and France until the 
summer of 1917. From this point until the end of the war, forced labor and deportation 
still occurred in the occupied areas on a smaller scale, with the Germans reverting to a 
policy of recruiting volunteers.77  While French civilians in the occupied zone lived in 
constant fear of deportation, it is worthwhile to note that despite the severe hardship 
caused by deportations, they were not an expression of a grand ideological scheme to 
empty northern France of its native people.78 
 Much of the work demanded by the Germans was contrary to the Hague 
Convention that stipulated no civilian is supposed to be forced to work in the war effort 
against his or her own country. Violating international law seemed to concern the 
German high command little, as on the subject General Ludendorff stated, “all social 
misgivings or reservations deriving from international law must be ignored.”79 While one 
could argue almost all work fell into this category, whether it was harvesting food for 
German soldiers, weaving cloth at a German-seized factory that would end up either as 
uniforms or sandbags, or working in German-seized mines bringing up coal for the 
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enemy, some work was blatantly in violation of the Convention. French civilians repaired 
railway lines and fortifications and made barbed wire entanglements and mantraps.80 The 
knowledge that they were helping the enemy plagued many people in occupied France. 
One person wrote, “We are forced to construct trenches to kill our fathers, our bothers, 
our cousins.”81  It is not surprising that such radicalized exploitation fuelled great hatred 
amongst the occupied French population for the Germans. Intertwined with the misery 
caused by forced labor was the constant hunger most French civilians experienced under 
occupation. 
 
Food Shortages 
 Northern France was a highly industrialized and densely populated area cut off 
from both export markets and imported raw materials. Simply feeding the population 
became extremely difficult in this situation. Technically, the local commandants’ duties 
included feeding the poor and reacting promptly to civilian complaints.82 Instead, the 
occupiers seized over 80 percent of the 1914 harvest to feed German troops stationed in 
France and civilians back in Germany, ensuring there was not enough food even for those 
French people who could afford to pay.83 Within the German leadership, feelings on this 
topic varied only slightly. The Prussian finance minister commented in September 1914 
that “it’s better that the Belgians starve than that we do.”84 Bethmann’s counter position 
that “Germany had naturally assumed the duty of satisfying the most pressing needs of 
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the population … as far as this can be reconciled with our own needs” was hardly a 
strong defense for making sure people in occupied Belgium and France were well fed.85     
As prices soared with depleted supplies in occupied France, cost became a form 
of rationing, leaving only a limited portion of the population able to purchase needed 
food.  By 1915, the German authorities in each city established rations for the French 
population – 150 grams of rye and 250 grams of potatoes per day, and 150 grams of meat 
per week.86 These rations dropped throughout the war.87 The caloric intake of the average 
city dweller was much below that required for a healthy existence.  By October 1917, the 
average Lillois survived on a diet of 1400 calories, 800 less than the minimum daily 
requirement for an adult; caloric intake was perhaps slightly higher in Roubaix and 
Tourcoing.88 Eugène Martin-Mamy noted that by the winter of 1917 people showed signs 
of a lack of food, the streets filled with yellow faces, hollow and sickly from nutritional 
deprivation.89 
 Doctor Albert Calmette, a physician and director of the Pasteur Institute of Lille, 
remained in Lille during the occupation, and was a leading source on the healthfulness of 
occupied France.90 He notes, “…Food rations distributed to the population were much 
below the normal needs of young people.  Bread was scarce and of bad quality.  There 
was little rice, beans, or corn, and very small amounts of sugar, lard, and canned meat.  
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For more than a year before the end of the war, there were no potatoes and no fresh 
meats.  Butter and eggs were to be had only by the very rich.”91 The consequences of this 
food shortage were obvious: Doctor Calmette believed the most serious effect was to 
arrest the growth of the juvenile population.  Fourteen-year old children looked to be ten 
years old, and the majority of eighteen-year old girls were only as developed as average 
thirteen-year olds during normal times.92 Due in part to a lack of food, disease ravaged 
the cities.  Dysentery, scurvy, tuberculosis and other diseases related directly to a lack of 
food were common in all three cities.  A typhoid fever outbreak overtook Lille in 
December 1915, but German authorities, through tight control of travel and sanitation 
measures, kept it from spreading to Roubaix and Tourcoing. The people of the cities lived 
in a weakened state. As Helen McPhail writes, “[T]he need for food brought degradation 
to everyone, no matter what their peace-time status…”93 
The Germans allowed outside agencies to help counteract the negative effects of 
their aggressive exploitation of the area’s food supply. The efforts of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium (C.R.B.) kept many people from succumbing to malnutrition and 
disease. Officially founded on October 22, 1914, Herbert Hoover’s relief organization 
started by aiding occupied Belgium and extended assistance to occupied France in March 
1915.94 All foodstuffs supplied by the C.R.B. were meant for the civilian population, 
unlike food produced in the environs of the cities, to which the Germans claimed first 
right. The Commission for Relief in Belgium was an amazing organization that acted 
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more like an independent state than anything else; to secure and transport food to the 
needy in the occupied zone, the C.R.B. not only raised and spent vast amounts of money, 
it created its own shipping and distribution network to reach the occupied zones.95 The 
C.R.B. raised funds, bought, shipped, and imported the food, and a local body, the 
Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France (C.A.N.F.) oversaw local distribution. Local 
C.A.N.F. boards set daily rations, and households could purchase goods once a week at a 
fixed price. They also provided free ration cards to those without means to pay. When 
supplies failed to meet basic needs, it was the local boards’ responsibility to see that 
hospitals, children, and charities received priority for scant resources.  
Despite its remarkable efforts, the C.R.B. was unable to provide a constant supply 
of all foods. The items available varied considerably over time and location.96 Frequently 
citizens of the three cities lacked necessities. For example in Lille during January 1916 
potatoes, butter, eggs, and milk were all unavailable, vegetables were extremely scarce, 
and there were insufficient quantities of bread.97 Part of the problem was simply attaining 
and shipping supplies to the occupied zones. Sadly, another problem was that many of the 
Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France’s local boards proved to be corrupt, keeping 
supplies for themselves and friends or selling them to black market brokers. When this 
occurred local staff turned people away from C.R.B. stores despite valid ration cards and 
money, simply telling them supplies were exhausted.98 Despite these problems, the 
C.R.B. provided food that kept the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing from dying 
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of starvation in large numbers. A New York Times article from spring 1917 quotes an 
escaped Englishman from Roubaix, who reported that the city exhausted its food supply 
and was almost wholly dependent on the Commission.  “Without it, all the people would 
have starved.”99 
 
Resistance and Repression of Resistance 
 How did people respond to the pitilessness of occupation, what Andreas Laska 
terms, “hard and pure Germanification?”100 Open rebellion against German forces in the 
cities was rare. Perhaps widespread agitation did not occur because practically everyone 
in the Nord concentrated his or her efforts on obtaining food.  Most people were also 
fearful of German reprisal for any acts of disobedience, which was certain to be swift and 
harsh. As Isabel Hull discusses in Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the 
Practices of War in Imperial Germany, the Imperial German military repeatedly resorted 
to tremendous violence and destruction in excess of Germany’s own security 
requirements and even contrary to military effectiveness.101 
Some people defied the Germans by doing as little for them as possible without 
facing arrest. Forced labor frequently met with resistance – people refusing to comply.  
The Germans always responded to such resistance with fines, imprisonment, and 
deportation, followed by even severer conditions and harder work. People did not work 
against their own country willingly. Disturbances broke out in Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing over the issue of sewing sandbags to protect German trenches.  The German 
authorities quickly squashed such resistance, with taking more hostages and more 
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extreme forced labor practices.102 A brave few partook in even great resistance in the 
form of covert activity that undermined the German authorities.  
 Resistance sometimes took the form of hiding allied soldiers and helping them out 
of the occupied zone or sending messages to British and French armies by releasing 
carrier pigeons, making signals, ringing bells, or using radio transmitters.103 All these 
activities carried the risk of the death penalty. A number of British and French soldiers 
found themselves stranded behind the German lines once the war of movement ceased 
and would be the subject of heroic local repatriation efforts by French and Belgian 
citizens, such as Edith Cavell. General von Heinrich, the German governor of Lille, made 
it clear that those who protected and hid soldiers after December 4, 1914 faced the death 
penalty.  
 History remembers the most famous resisters as the Jacquet Committee, named 
after Eugène Jacquet.  Several men and a few women worked together to form a regular 
escape network to aid soldiers trapped in the occupied zone. They provided food, money, 
shelter, and forged passes for men whom they hid from the German occupiers until they 
could sneak them across the Belgian border. Once in Belgium, escaping soldiers still had 
a harrowing journey ahead of them, which often involved showing German sentries 
forged identity cards, sneaking past other sentries at night, and crawling under wire 
fences.104  After successfully aiding dozens of military age men, the Germans arrested the 
group and placed them on trial.  The Germans knew a covert group was aiding people’s 
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escape and in July 1916, the military closed off Lille for a detailed search and German 
military police arrested approximately 200 people.105 The four leaders of the group, 
Eugène Jacquet, Ernest Deconinck, Georges Maertens, and Sylvère Verhulst, faced 
insurmountable evidence, including the diary of an escaped British pilot named Robert 
Mapplebeck, who taunted the Lille Governor Heinrich with flyovers and dropping notes 
to him.  Despite Jacquet’s claim that he worked alone, all four received death sentences 
and died by firing squad. As we shall see later in the chapter exploring the clandestine 
press, other brave French civilians resisted the German mandate against disseminating 
any information not pre-approved by occupation authorities. 
 Another national war hero, Louise de Bettignies, began her career as a secret 
agent by volunteering with the Red Cross, carrying letters from her hometown of Lille to 
unoccupied France.106 The British Intelligence Service, impressed with success, created 
for her the false name of Alice Dubois and she, along with a Roubaix woman named 
Leonie Vanhoutte – alias Charlotte – began collecting information for them in February 
1915.107  The two women, utilizing Bettignies’s church connections, created the “Alice 
network” of two hundred agents and gathered information important to the war effort, 
including items on the locations of artillery batteries, munitions depots, and troop 
concentration, and then secretly crossed the Dutch border to deliver the intelligence.108 In 
October 1915, the Germans captured both women, who bravely refused to provide the 
Germans with information, protecting their agents from arrest. In prison Bettignies 
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continued to resist, as she refused to do any work that would have aided the German war 
effort, an act which earned her solitary confinement, where privations and poor medical 
care led to her death in September 1918.109 After the war, the people of Lille worked to 
secure her place in history, which included a monument in honor in Lille.  In 1924, 
Antoine Redier published the well-known text La guerre des femmes: Histoire de Louise 
de Bettignies et ses compagnes, which detailed the activities of the Alice network .110 
 
Conclusion 
 No history of northern France’s occupation would be complete without 
mentioning the January 1916 explosion of the Lille ammunition storehouse in the city 
ramparts.  The blast wounded or killed many people, both German and French, and it 
rendered a large area uninhabitable. Both the Germans and French suffered and the cause 
of the explosion was never conclusively discovered.  Briefly the tragedy brought both 
sides together; both sides marched in the funeral procession for the dead together and 
they grieved together.  However, the Germans assumed espionage and blamed the 
French. The Germans seized glass supplies to replace windows for the occupying forces 
from people who were left with extremely inadequate shelter during the harshest winter 
months.  Perhaps this event captures the essence of the German occupation of Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing: everybody suffered, but the French always suffered more. 
 The war’s total physical damage to the occupied territories was overwhelming. 
During the course of the war, military action destroyed or damaged 360,000 buildings in 
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the Département de Nord.111 As the Germans retreated from Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing in October 1918, the German high command ordered their troops to destroy 
everything in the area, leaving behind only a wasteland for the enemy to take back.  As 
Alan Kramer notes, these actions, that included stripping museums of their artifacts, 
could by not by any stretch of the imagination be justified as a military necessity; it was 
simply pillage and destruction without purpose.112 Liberated Lille’s population was 
110,000, only half of its prewar 220,000.113 Not surprisingly, most occupied populations 
interpreted their lives as living on the front, where they were doing daily battle with the 
enemy, even though their relationship with the enemy varied slightly.114 Despite the fact 
that the Germans committed most of the extreme violence in the early months of 
occupation and in the last years of the war the two sides tentatively moved closer to each 
other and formed some personal relationships, the resentment and fear always remained, 
as every urban dweller had to face hunger, potential imprisonment, deportation, and 
forced labor.   
The siege that the occupation represented to the people of Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing began October 1914 and lasted until October 1918.  For almost 1500 days, the 
German military and civilian authorities persecuted civilians, seeing them both as 
“human requisitions” that could be used to strengthen the German position, and 
opponents to be treated much like enemy soldiers. Surviving in such a situation was 
extremely difficult – towards the end of the war approximately 80 percent of the urban 
population relied upon charities to survive. Helen McPhail summarized the situation by 
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stating, “Most people survived on a personal dogged resolve, concern for family and 
neighbors, and a scorn for the occupying forces which infuriated the more perceptive and 
sensitive among their German overlords.”115 The people of the tri-city area never got used 
to occupation.  All three cities, but Lille in particular, were very close to the battle line.  
As Vernon Kellogg noted, the people, daily seeing English scout fliers and hearing 
English cannons always felt close to freedom.116 He further laments, “Two things, the 
difficulty about food and the feeling of the nearness to rescue, have kept them in more 
restlessness and perhaps intractable state than the inhabitants of other parts of the 
occupied territory.”117  Herbert Hoover’s analysis of life in occupied France was similar 
to Alan Kramer’s, “…[it] can be seen from all aspects as a vast concentration camp…”118 
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Chapter Three: 
Impartial News: The First Casualty of War 
  
Sophisticated government intervention into the media began with the First World 
War. All of the combatant nations utilized the main media source of the period – 
newspapers – to influence their citizens’ morale. In France and Germany, newspapers 
became a vital tool used to circulate propaganda, as the warring nations realized they had 
to fight a psychological war simultaneously to the military one.1 Such measures were 
necessary, as the French  (and German) people needed to be fortified for further 
sacrifices, and this would not have been possible if they had known what actually was 
happening on the Western Front.2 In both countries, government control of the media had 
two interwoven facets: censorship of information and the dissemination of propaganda. 
Both elements of government control worked together to alter greatly newspaper content 
during the war.  Censorship can limit information but it can only help form opinions to a 
certain extent.  To drive public opinion, governments entered into the realm of 
propaganda. Propaganda is only effective if the public’s access to the unadulterated 
version of the truth is restricted; hence newspapers also had to be censored of other 
information to enable propaganda to be effective.3 Phillip Knightley describes the results, 
“And so began the great conspiracy.  More deliberate lies were told than in any other 
period of history and the whole apparatus of the state went into action to suppress the 
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truth.”4 This chapter examines how the French and German governments utilized their 
nations’ presses to stimulate their people’s support for the war. This overview includes an 
examination of the various government and military bureaucracies created to control the 
press, how this control altered the character and content of newspapers, newspaper 
editors’ responses to government control, and how these systems compared to news 
manipulation in occupied France. First, this chapter provides working definitions of 
censorship and propaganda. 
 
Definitions of Censorship and Propaganda 
 In the simplest terms, censorship is the control of information and ideas. The 
American Library Association provides a slightly narrower definition of censorship that 
explains the aims of the French and German governments during the First World War.  
The ALA defines censorship as “the suppression of ideas and information that certain 
persons – individuals, groups or government officials – find objectionable or 
dangerous.”5 Defining propaganda is slightly more problematic as many different 
definitions of the word exist. Philip Taylor, in his foreword to The Encyclopedia of 
Propaganda, captures the basic essence of propaganda; it “involves saying some things 
and avoiding saying others.  Propaganda arranges arguments and impressions to achieve 
specific aims.”6 This dissertation employs the slightly more complex definition created 
by Jacques Ellul in the 1970s. He defined propaganda as “a set of methods employed by 
an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its 
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actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological 
manipulations and incorporated in an organization.”7 This definition applies to the efforts 
of the French and German governments because it allows for passive participation goals, 
like simply not rioting about food shortages or not hindering conscription procedures.  
The lines can blur between censorship and propaganda, as censorship can frequently be 
an integral part of a propaganda campaign. Propaganda need not contain lies. It can report 
events accurately, but ignore or exclude other information to alter perceptions. World 
War I propaganda transformed news providing biased interpretations of events and 
reporting it as if it were impartial.  
 Information theorists explain how propaganda via newspapers reaches its 
audience in terms of the standard communication model of a sender relaying a message to 
the addressee, who decodes it based on a shared linguistic and cultural foundation.8 This 
model aptly describes the relationship between the French and German presses and their 
respective home fronts. However, this model does not allow for the subcommunicative 
intercourses created by the sociocultural circumstances in which the message is emitted9, 
which can undermine the senders’ trustworthiness. In the case of occupied France 
receiving the majority of its news via German-controlled newspapers, the sociocultural 
circumstances included the German occupier’s desire to create a defeatist attitude 
amongst the French population. The readers’ knowledge of German intents colored their 
interpretations of news presented, making people in occupied France less susceptible to 
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propaganda in newspapers than readers in the rest of France and Germany. To be 
effective, propaganda must be creditable in the environment in which it is projected. 
 
French Control of the Press 
 The Gazette de France, appearing in 1631, was the country’s first newspaper and 
marked the start of France’s active press. For most of its history, the French press 
operated under strict government control, enjoying only brief moments of greater 
freedom until the Third Republic. A new press law then permitted close to complete 
liberty of expression, causing the number of daily and weekly newspapers in the country 
to double by 1900.10 This translated to 240 newspapers in Paris alone – more than any 
other city in the world – with 2,160 newspapers in the rest of the country.11 These 
newspapers sold numerous copies.  In 1870, the Parisian dailies enjoyed a circulation of a 
million issues daily – by 1910 that number rose to five million.12 By 1914, France had a 
flourishing newspaper culture.  Paris was home to fifty-seven daily newspapers, and the 
provinces contributed two hundred forty-two more. Waning in influence but still present 
were newspapers controlled by political parties or people with clear political views who 
utilized their newspapers to broadcast their viewpoints.  Aimed at a larger audience were 
newspapers that offered both local and world news without any obvious political slant. 
These newspapers resembled the modern mass-circulation American newspaper of the 
time.13 
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 Two other factors helped the newspaper boon. First, the 1860s saw the 
introduction of high-speed rotary presses in France. Newspapers became smaller in 
physical size, more diverse in content, and less expensive to both produce and purchase, 
based upon the tabloidal Le Petit Journal model. Second, the growth of cities, the popular 
press, and universal military service made French society more culturally homogeneous, 
and while France remained mostly rural, urban culture was widely diffused.14 Hence, the 
cultural infrastructure needed for wartime propaganda already existed, even if obstacles 
created by the Great War negatively affected the newspaper industry, and froze 
expansion of the press. Publishers faced their staffs’ mobilization to fight and a shortage 
of raw materials. Economic conditions also affected the French press; thirty Parisian 
daily newspapers folded during the first few months of the war.15 
 The French Assembly’s declaration of a state of siege in August 1914 activated 
the grand and intricate machinery of censorship that shaped the French press during the 
war. Regina Sweeney notes, “The immediate and relatively smooth imposition of the 
machine reflected not only the current government’s wish to eliminate all subversive 
activity but also a collective memory of how the censoring mechanism had worked.”16 
France established a comprehensive bureaucracy aimed at controlling public opinion 
through the press. Even before the outbreak of fighting, the French Ministry of War 
distrusted the French press, finding its overall tone irresponsible and sensational.  This 
cynicism toward the press developed out of the “Sedan disaster” of September 2, 1870, 
when German forces captured 83,000 French troops, including Napoleon III, in the 
                                                 
14
 Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau, and Becker, 53. 
15
 Laska, 110. 
16
 Regina Sweeney, “La pudique Anastasie: Wartime Censorship and French Bourgeois Morality,” in 
World War I and the Cultures of Modernity, Douglas Mackaman and Michael Mays, eds. (Jackson, MS: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2003), 5. 
  
72
 
Ardennes department because they knew the French army’s plans from reading them in 
Le Temps.17   Military leaders simply believed the war was too important to trust to 
journalists; they were only to act as conduits to relay information. This distrust 
demonstrated itself in the fact that none of the top military men – including Joseph Joffre, 
Henri-Philippe Pétain, and Ferdinand Foch – ever gave interviews.18 
 The principles of censorship pre-existed the outbreak of war and the law of 5 
August 1914 simply strengthened them by prohibiting the publication of non-official 
military information. Prior to this law was the law of 8 August 1849 that permitted 
military authorities to disallow all publications that might excite or encourage disorder. 
The law of 29 July 1881 noted that the aforementioned publications included the 
newspaper press; hence, military authorities had the right to ban newspapers that might 
upset public order or have a negative influence on morale.19 The French parliament 
passed the Law of August 5, 1914 prior to adjourning. The law disallowed information 
published about: 1) troop and ship movements; 2) operations or mobilization; 3) number 
and composition of units; 4) lists of men not called up; 5) lists of men killed, wounded, or 
taken prisoner; 6) details about armaments and operations to move provisions; 7) sanitary 
operations; 8) changes in high command; 9) any news concerning military or diplomatic 
operations that might favor the enemy and have a negative influence on the morale or the 
army or the population.20 The broad definition of the last category meant censors could 
invoke it to make any news article they wished disappear. As early as August 1914 
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General Joffre declared almost all information as news of a military nature, and 
consequently subject to restriction.  
The French military envisioned the Agence Havas as playing an important official 
role in news distribution, similar to Reuters’ position in England. Reuters, the British 
press agency, was a patriotic force during the war. Starting in the nineteenth century, 
Reuters proved loyal in its coverage of any wars involving British troops. Under the 
leadership of F.W. Dickinson, its chief editor during the Great War, the agency 
reconciled patriotism with journalistic objectivity.  It never quoted information from 
German communiqués that carried news negative to British endeavors, and gave 
countenance to anti-German propaganda, although the agency couched it in terms of 
speculation, rather than confirming it as truth.21  
In pre-war France, the Agence Havas dominated news service.   Havas gained 
control early in the Third Republic, and by the late 1800s reached agreements with 
foreign agencies, most notably Reuters and Wolff, to share information and divide the 
world into geographic areas, regard by the group as each agency’s exclusive market, with 
Havas receiving France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal.22 The French military wanted the 
French press to take war reports solely from Agence Havas, which would only provide 
such information as the military deemed acceptable. The military wanted to both censor 
Havas reports and disallow any critical comment of the war.  The Agence Havas’s 
management, while enthusiastic supporters of the war effort, were unwilling to accept 
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such an extreme relationship, so while Havas was a useful tool for the French military to 
release stories, it did not become the sole conduit of information for newspapers.23  
Havas was still central to the government control of news as it was a part of the larger 
Messageries Hachette Company, which handled the distribution of most French 
newspapers, particularly in the capital.24 
Utilizing law and control of distribution, the French government and military 
created an immense bureaucratic system to control and utilize the press in two manners.  
They began by censoring newspapers, preventing publication of information they did not 
want circulated, and grew to also influence newspapers to publish stories that authorities 
believed would sustain morale. The overall wartime propaganda /censorship machinery 
grew quickly and arbitrarily, often making the two arms of media control difficult to 
differentiate.    
 
Censorship 
 A rather convoluted system of censorship developed in France. Ross Collins 
described it as the “two-headed censorship” system.  Two ministries, the War Ministry 
and Interior Ministry jointly controlled the censorship apparatus. The War Ministry 
oversaw the Bureau de la presse, which supervised Paris publications and directed 
censorship commissions throughout the rest of France. Under the Interior Ministry were 
additional, provisional censorship commissions, located in prefectures and sub-
prefectures, composed of military officers reporting to a regional military commander 
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and civilian censors chosen by the prefect.25 Such close monitoring of the French press 
took an army of censors, which included a staff of hundreds, with a censorship bureau in 
every major French city.26 Military censors oversaw censorship of military and 
diplomatic news, while the civilians covered the rest. The Ministry of the Interior’s 
civilian censors focused upon articles covering domestic politics. Domestic politics 
quickly became a category under which any news critical of the authorities or potentially 
damaging to public morale fell. The military / civilian division of censorship labor 
showed signs of weakness in the provinces, as military and civilian censors did not 
always agree on what should be allowed published. Problems arose in 1915 and 
disagreements lingered for two years until 1917, when the military eliminated all civilian 
authority on censorship commissions.27 
General Joseph Joffre denied reporters access to the front and provided no 
communiqués for over a month at the start of the war.  Hence, early in the war French 
editors, needing to fill their newspapers with information the public demanded, borrowed 
from foreign newspapers and focused and expanded upon any detail of information they 
managed to attain. By the end of August 1914, the French military command began 
issuing daily communiqués and in October 1914, the French high command formed the 
Service d’Information. Based in Chantilly under the direction of journalist André 
Tardieu, it prepared positive stories from the front and distributed them to the press. This 
created a press that felt relatively informed. However, of these daily communiqués issued 
by the French army, Phillip Knightley writes, “Th[ey] were crisp, beautifully written, and 
punctually presented, but, unfortunately, they were closer to fiction than to fact, and 
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while Germany’s best armies were crashing through Belgium these communiqués 
continued to report French army advances on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier as if it would 
be only a matter of weeks before the Allies were in Berlin.”28 Therefore, while French 
newspapers’ reporting on political aspects of the war may have differed, their reporting of 
battles and German and French military behavior were effectively indistinguishable as 
they all relied on the same military communiqués.29 As Jean-Jacques Becker notes, 
whether a reader consulted L’Humanité, the organ of the Socialist Party, or the L’Echo de 
Paris, a right-wing, militarist and Catholic newspaper, that reader learned of poor 
German morale, German cruelty, as they were compared to the strength of the French 
military cause.30 
 During that first month of war, the press appeared to support unanimously the 
censorship guidelines and accepted the Bureau de la presse as necessary.31 The press even 
formed the Commission de la presse under the leadership of Jean Dupuy, the publisher of 
France’s largest daily newspaper, Le Petit Parisen, on August 13, 1914, to act as a liaison 
between the media and the government. This act was not surprising, as prior to the war, 
the press suggested censorship guidelines, perhaps as part of the “first emotional flush of 
Union sacrée.”32 Newspaper editors allowed censors continual access  
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to their proof sheets33, giving government censors the ability to slash any items deemed 
offensive.  While the newspaper editors “allowed” these censors access, it should be 
noted that the censors had the authority to close without trial any newspapers they 
deemed to run truly offensive material.34 This encouraged newspapers to self-regulate. 
Editors accepted censorship because they believed the war would be brief, and censorship 
would only affect matters of military and diplomatic news.  Furthermore, the government 
never discussed punishments for publishing news unacceptable to it, and it surprised the 
media that the government, rather than the legislature, interpreted the press laws. As it 
quickly became clear that the government planned to interpret the law in a severe way, 
censoring any criticism of its actions, newspaper editors quickly became disenchanted 
with what they rightfully saw as political censorship.35 
The reaction of the French press was mixed.  Despite the strict regulations placed 
upon them, many in the French press did not chaff under governmental control.  Quite to 
the contrary, the Union sacrée moved them and they agreed to most terms. Many editors 
did commit the small rebellious act of leaving black spaces in newspapers to show where 
censored news items would have been. While censors preferred not to leave such blanks, 
they did appear throughout the war. For example, in 1918, the year that saw the most 
information censored in Le Petit Provençal, ninety-five blanks appeared in that paper.36 
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Despite the large number of censored news stories, there were never any articles 
completely opposed to the war effort published in French newspapers during the war.37 
It took only a little over a month after the press law passed for a newspaper to be 
suspended.  The first well-documented case of the government suspending a newspaper 
was that of Georges Clemenceau’s L’Homme Libre.  Clemenceau, outraged at the 
unhygienic conditions of trains returning from the front with wounded soldiers, wrote an 
article denouncing the trains.  A sympathetic censor by the name of Marius Richard 
allowed the paper to publish the article, leading to the suspension.38 Clemenceau tried to 
keep publishing during the suspension, renaming his paper L’Homme Enchaîné, but 
censors recognized the name swap. Clemenceau became the leading anti-censorship 
voice of the French press, and hence his newspapers became the largest target for 
censorship. Interestingly, when Clemenceau became prime minister in October 1917 he 
continued the government’s control of the press.39 
Clemenceau was not alone in his anger over censorship.  By 1915, their fury over 
political censorship seemly unified French journalists. The political editor of Le Petit 
Provençal wrote in the June 23, 1915, issue of his paper, “The entire industry is going to 
end up in unanimous revolt if the good sense and fairness of the government does not 
decide to put an end to this abuse.”40 Gustave Hervé, editor La Guerre sociale, pointed 
out that censorship had underpinned the likes of dictators and monarchs. Franc-Nohan of 
the Echo de Paris suggested that at least one aim of censorship was to help the military 
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High Command avoid embarrassment. Alfred Capus of the Academié française wrote in 
Le Figaro that censorship taken too far could undermine the very liberties France was 
founded upon.41 Capus also lamented in the pages of Le Figaro, “Providing one does not 
mention the authorities, the government, politics, registered companies, banks, the 
wounded, German atrocities, or the postal services one may print anything freely with the 
blessings of two or three censors.”42   
 Censored articles from that period have not been preserved, so history does not 
know every item that was expunged prior to newspapers going to press.  However, we do 
know that censors cut certain stories, such as those about British pits closing down for a 
lack of miners, and German submarines carrying out successful missions.43 The French 
government told censors to block almost all news related to the Russian Revolution, as 
one of France’s major allies experienced a leadership overhaul.  Censors disallowed 
critical comments about the French cause, as well as any stories about the favorable 
treatment of French prisoners of war. Furthermore, censors forbid French newspapers to 
publish German communiqués.44 There could also be no reference to peace efforts: 
censors eliminated coverage of President Wilson’s speech in which he referred to himself 
as a “champion of world peace.”45  When Catholic newspapers within France attempted 
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to publish Pope Benedict’s prayer for peace, censors ordered those issues seized.46 
Censors also expurgated articles espousing excessive optimism. For example, reports 
proclaiming the return of government from Bordeaux to Paris in 1914 as a sign that the 
tide was about to turn never appeared in print, for the military did not want to create 
short-term expectations that could not be met.  Rather, “censors preferred to encourage an 
atmosphere of resigned acceptance of a conflict that must inevitably continue for some 
considerable time…”47 Not surprisingly, different newspapers had different types of 
articles cut by the censors.  Censored articles from Le Temps tended to be reporting 
diplomatic news, which made sense as the newspaper boasted a large corps of 
international reporters relaying numerous diplomatic stories. La Guerre sociale, with a 
politically passionate editor, saw numerous articles reporting upon French politics 
censored.48 
 Over time the censor’s grip on the French press tightened, not due to the press 
taking more liberties, but rather in response to new ministerial instructions. As early as 
September 1914, Minister of War Alexandre Millerand greatly extended censors’ 
prerogatives, to blatantly include political censorship.49 On September 30, 1915, the 
government published a twenty-eight page confidential book, known as Circular No. 
1,000, which attempted to answer any question a diligent censor could ask.  An example 
of directives includes not extolling the value of African troops to the detriment of other 
troops and allowing moderate criticism on the function of censorship to go to publication 
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but never articles attacking a particular censor.50 The French cabinet quickly took offense 
at the military direction of political censorship, and had responsibility for said censorship 
transferred to prefectorial authorities, but this did nothing to lessen the censors’ control 
over the media.51 Amazingly, the government denied political censorship occurred, 
stating that all censorship fell under the articles of the Law of August 5, 1914. But 
censorship, a form of news management scholars define as negative control, was 
supplemented by what they call positive control of news, that is propaganda. 
 
Propaganda 
 The French system of censorship developed immediately; its network of 
propaganda evolved more slowly. Like the censoring bureaucracy, both military and 
civilian arms of the government worked – at times at odds and customarily without any 
inter-agency cohesiveness – to produce propaganda. In certain cases, propaganda was a 
planned end, and in other cases it simply flowed out of systemic censorship. 
 The military Service d’information was primarily concerned with providing 
censored communiqués that would be the sole source of combat information for French 
newspapers. Many would argue that propaganda production might not have been its main 
objective, but the S.I.’s public relations campaign did verge into that domain. It prepared 
positive stories from the front and distributed them to the press. Tardieu wrote a great 
deal of the news released by the army himself, but he also created a system of officer-
correspondents stationed with French armies on the Western Front. In 1915, these officer-
correspondents published numerous human-interest stories in French newspapers while 
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ignoring the horrifying truths of life in the trenches.52 These stories went beyond 
censorship, creating a false description of trench life for readers on the home front. The 
system broke down however, whenever combat occurred. The journalists were soldiers 
first, and hence during battles – when the home front most wanted information – they 
were busy fighting rather than writing. For example, when the Germans attacked the 
Verdun fortifications in February 1916, no soldiers were available to write and counter-
act the terrifying rumors circulating on the home front. The army quickly invoked a new 
plan: it created a small group of soldier-journalists whose duties entailed only covering 
the war. These reporters were the only ones covering battles for French newspapers 
because the military disallowed civilian correspondents at the front.53 These military 
journalists provided the only French coverage of Verdun for four months and created an 
image of French resistance at Verdun that encouraged the civilian population with their 
sanitized version of events.54 By all assessments, these reporters provided French 
newspapers with well-crafted articles and proved to be solid writers, but their military-
approved articles hardly produced the unbiased reporting independent journalists would 
have provided.   
Despite the relative success of the Service d’information, the military reduced its 
journalistic activity toward the end of 1916. Then on May 14, 1917, the French high 
command complained to the Service d’information that French newspapers were 
covering more British operations than French ones because the newspaper editors seemed 
to prefer to copy articles from British newspapers than to print material sent to them by 
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the Service d’information.55 The French military decided to allow civilian journalists 
access to the front for the first time.56 The S.I. took this complaint and negation of its 
function to claim a greater propaganda role.  The Service d’information split into two 
divisions, one that kept its old name and one that became the Bureau d’information 
militaire.  Both sections expanded beyond simply writing articles to also producing 
photography, films, briefings to reporters, radio transmissions, daily communiqués, and 
even starting an army newspaper, the Bulletin des Armées.57 All of these sources 
portrayed war events as the military high command wished the home front to see them. 
Despite the dominance of the military, the French civilian government did 
contribute to the distribution of propaganda. In October 1915, Aristide Briand became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he promptly began plans for a central propaganda office. 
In January 1916, the French government established the Maison de la presse in Paris. 
With funding attained from a stash of twenty-five million gold francs from secret service 
funds,58 it became the agency for the management of propaganda, slowly merging all 
other small organizations into its fold. This organization aimed to help not only the 
French press, but also the world media understand the war from the French point of view. 
It contained four offices: the diplomatic department, the military department, the 
department of translation and analysis of the foreign press, and the propaganda 
department.  The propaganda department contained three sub-sections, dealing with allied 
countries, neutral countries, and general ideas. Philippe Berthelot was in charge of the 
entire operation.  By 1917, the Maison de la Presse was the clearinghouse for all the 
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government’s propaganda efforts, nationally, but mainly internationally. While the 
Bureau de la presse continued to function, in a surprise case of civilian-military 
cooperation, the military channeled most its information through the Maison. Working in 
conjunction with army headquarters, known as the Grand Quartier Général (GQG), the 
Bureau also relayed captured German diaries and letters of propaganda value to the 
papers.59 While the Masion de la presse provided military news, the Bureau de la presse 
circulated more political information. When Clemenceau took power in October 1917, he 
placed the Section militaire under the Minister of War. Clouding the divisions between 
negative and positive control, the Maison also began responding to journalists’ questions 
about censorship.60 
The efforts of these agencies meant that the press created a distorted picture of the 
war. The journalists over-romanticized the war, provided optimistic reviews of military 
operations, and glamorized French soldiers while demeaning German fighters.61 Soldiers 
home on leave were shocked at the false ideas civilians had from reading the newspapers. 
The term bourrage-de-crâne described the lies and exaggerations many readers believed 
filled the newspapers of the First World War. In his study of Parisian dailies during the 
first few months of the war, Ross Collins established five categories or types of such 
propaganda. The first type includes patriotic items, extolling the glory and justness of the 
French cause and its purifying effect on the national spirit.  The inspiration for such 
articles was the pre-war writings of young conservatives, such as Charles Maurras and 
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Maurice Barrès and others associated with of the group Action française.62 The second 
form of propaganda described the French troops in exaggeratingly heroic terms.  Such 
coverage described the brave poilus, fearing neither bullets nor shells, enjoying both easy 
victories over a pusillanimous enemy and the somewhat pleasant life of comradeship in 
the trenches.63 Such coverage angered many troops as it minimized the difficulty of their 
experience. The third category of propaganda focused upon defamation of the Germans, 
including accusations of atrocities and slurs on their character and culture. Collins simply 
calls the fourth type of propaganda outrageous lies, including the numerous false 
statements reported in French newspapers during the war.  He notes that bold falsehoods, 
such as, “Cossacks Marching to Berlin,” “Kaiser dying,” and “French troops routing 
Germans,” frequently appeared in the form of headlines.64  The final category of 
misleading information demonstrates how the lines between censorship and propaganda 
blurred during the war, for this fifth type was missing information.  Propaganda in the 
form of what was not reported, namely bad news for the French war effort, or censorship.  
Keeping negative information from readers was as important as exaggerating good news. 
Prior to Collins’s work, Jean-Jacques Becker identified six reoccurring topics printed in 
the French press: the French spirit as a combination of panache and a Spartan work ethic; 
German immorality; German spitefulness and ruthlessness; the pre-eminence of French 
weaponry; the superiority of French soldiers; and Russian potency.65 The findings of 
these two men reveal the nature of the majority of news stories published in French 
newspapers during the war. 
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While this type of coverage reflected the omnipresent influence of military and 
civilian censorship and propaganda efforts, the newspaper editors coveted news to 
publish that would sell their papers. The greatness of France fighting an evil enemy sold 
newspapers. Sordid, explicit news also sold newspapers; hence, the French press was 
eager to include atrocity propaganda.  As James Moran Read notes, “they seized the 
opportunity to publish sensational murder stories, accompanied by all the lurid details, 
without being accused of pandering to the lower instincts of the crowd.”66 Indeed, both 
sides in the war committed numerous atrocities, but fewer actual atrocities were 
committed than the average newspaper reader would have thought by 1919.67 The 
overuse of atrocity stories had a disheartening effect. When Henri Barby of Paris’s Le 
Journal accurately reported the atrocities that the Turks committed against the 
Armenians, the story was lost among all the false and exaggerated propaganda that was 
filling newspapers at the time.68  
The authors of Histoire générale de la presse française assert that the war 
reduced French newspapers to mediocrity.69  Newspapers, did however, succeed for the 
most part in reassuring the home front, albeit through concealment of the direness of the 
national situation.70  The French non-combatant population wanted to be convinced of the 
righteousness of the French cause and to be assured of an eventual victory. Hence, it was 
ready to believe the propaganda present in French papers, even if common sense would 
have made it reject it at other times.71 
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German Control of the Press 
 Wilhelmine Germany had a rich newspaper culture, with over 3,600 newspapers 
published within the country, but newspaper producers did not enjoy the freedom to 
publish uninhibited. 72 An 1874 press law assured a certain amount of press freedom, but 
it still permitted government restraints that continued to limit the press.73 Article 68 of the 
1871 German constitution put the press into war service, and a treason law of June 3, 
1914 outlined the government’s right to censor printed material.74 The Prussian law of 
siege of 1851 also applied to the German press during wartime. Implemented the first day 
of German mobilization during the First World War, it granted astonishing powers to the 
commanding generals of each of the twenty-six military districts of the Reich, that 
German military interpreted to include its control over what newspapers published.75 An 
interesting peculiarity of German journalism also shaped the nature of German war 
coverage. Whereas in France, several newspapers’ political slant defined them, in 
Germany, some newspapers were controlled, or even completely owned by the 
government. In the case of both countries, audiences of these newspapers were aware of 
the relationship of politics and the papers. 
 On July 31, 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II declared a “state of siege,” which lasted until 
November 1918. It suspended the “right to express opinion freely be word, print, or 
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picture.”76 It placed executive authority in the hands of the commanders of the twenty-six 
military districts, who answered only to the Kaiser, as they monitored political activity, 
and censored the press, mail, and public meetings.77 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg 
issued twenty-six prohibitions to the press, “to prevent unreliable information from 
reaching the public.”78 He justified the drastic action with the fear that newspapers would 
publish sensitive military information. Control of censorship became the purview of the 
military. During the first months of the First World War, district military commanders 
assumed control over the domestic administration of Germany, which included issuing 
directives for the local press. Almost all domestic issues were deemed of military 
importance, as almost all news might either relate to the economic war effort, hearten 
Germany’s enemies, and conversely dishearten Germans, undermine the populace’s faith 
in their government, or in other ways destroy the country’s wartime solidarity.79 
 If the French military could only rely upon the Agence Havas to disseminate 
French propaganda within limits, the German military could expect the Wolff news 
agency to publish whatever they wanted.  Established in Berlin in 1849 by Dr. Bernhard 
Wolff, it was the source of world news reports for German newspapers. It began as the 
Berlin Telegraphische Anstalt, distributing commercial information until 1855, when it 
also entered the general news field.  In 1865, it joined with the Continental Telegraphen 
Compagnie, and gained Prussian governmental support, becoming a quasi-official news 
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service.80 Until 1859 the Wolff, Havas, and Reuters agencies shared information and after 
1870 were all part of the alliance of news agencies referred to as the “ring combination.” 
Each agency had territory in which they had exclusive rights to distribution; Wolff’s 
included the German empire, Austria-Hungary, and much of northern and southern 
Europe.81 Despite acting and been treated like a major international news player, Wolff 
never kept pace with Reuters or Havas in terms of having correspondents throughout the 
world.  Wolff never had journalists outside its territories beyond those in a few major 
world capitals. The spirit of cooperation between the services, upon which Wolff relied 
for news outside its area, slowly diminished, however, as the war approached, and the 
Wolff agency became a propagator of the German government’s agenda.82 While the 
Wolff agency garnered almost all its news from military sources, newspapers could run 
articles provided by Wolff or cite the agency as a source and make it appear that it was 
news relatively independent of the military.  
 
German Censorship 
 In February 1915, the German military created Oberzensursteille, or the Central 
Office of Censorship. Eight months later, the military moved it under the 
Kriegspresseamt, or War Press Office, overseen by Lieutenant-Colonel Erhard 
Deutelmoser.  In turn, the Information and Espionage Bureau, known as IIIb and 
controlled by Commander Walter Nicolai, controlled this office.83 These agencies only 
allowed newspapers to publish military news given as bare statements by the 
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Kriegpresseamt, which convened with editors three times a week at the Reichstag.84 
Numerous people filtered news before it reached the press. Field units submitted reports 
to staff headquarters on the Eastern and Western Fronts, and the reports were then 
forwarded to general staff headquarters in Berlin, where the army’s press department 
sanitized them prior to making the information available to newspapers at these thrice-
weekly conferences.85 As the German military forbid their country’s journalists from 
coming near the front, these meetings were the only source of battlefield news. The 
General Staff instructed the officer conducting the press conferences to remember one 
point: the key element is not the accuracy of the news presented but the effect it will have 
on the reading population.86 A corps of officer correspondents, overseen by the 
Kriegpresseamt, provided the bulk of information most military communiqués were 
based upon.87 Newspapers throughout German published identical reports of battlefield 
operations.88 Not surprisingly, disheartening news did not have a place in these reports.  
 Even with complete control of combat news, the military still deemed it necessary 
to censor numerous articles. Censored news pieces included those concerning food 
shortages, casualty lists, notices of death, and peace demonstrations. In all areas, the only 
leniency allowed in voicing dissent was at the local level; officials who oversaw 
municipal rationing could be criticized for food shortages, but never military or civilian 
leaders in Berlin.89 Germany, like France, had newspapers bent on challenging the 
government, with the newspaper of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Vorwärts, being 
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comparable to France’s L’Humanité, the organ of the French Socialist Party (SFIO). Both 
suffered from their respective censors’ pens numerous times. 
 Despite tight military control, inconsistency plagued German censorship efforts 
until 1917 when centralization of the different press offices occurred. Until that point, 
newspapers received direction from both the aforementioned military censors, and also 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information bureau, the Nachrichtenabteilung, controlled 
by Otto Hammann, and the Prussian Interior Minister’s press bureau.90 Even then, the 
power held by local military commanders to decide what area newspapers could publish 
allowed variation in items censored.91 Censorship was most stringent in Berlin, the 
Rhineland, and Westphalia, areas under the control of the Third and Seventh Army 
Corps, while regulations tended to be relatively more lax in Bavaria.92 These differences 
stemmed from the federal nature of Germany, leading to deputy commanding generals in 
different military districts interpreting censorship directives differently.  The result was 
that Germany did a far less satisfactory job than France (which could utilize its historic 
centralization of state functions) to control the flow of information consistently through 
the country. In Germany, local editors attempted to make sense of the reports they 
received, often injecting contentious issues of domestic and foreign policy that local 
censors may have allowed but that the military did not intend to be included.93 
 In general, military censorship created an information chasm between a minority 
of well-informed policymakers and the majority of civilians and military personnel, who 
only know what censored newspapers relayed.  However, censorship of newspapers did 
                                                 
90
 Laska, 104. 
91
 Eberhard Demm, “Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary  
History 28 (January 1993):164-5. 
92
 Chickering, 49. 
93
 Ibid., 48. 
  
92
 
not prevent all domestic knowledge of war news. War postcards proliferated and often 
escaped the notice of censors, disseminating images of the war to millions of people back 
in Germany.94 Even though no German domestic newspaper reported a single German 
defeat until 1918, these reports did not fool the home front into believing this was the 
case.95 The deprivations of their daily lives and the number of men killed at the front 
(even if not reported in the papers) made obvious to German readers how poorly the war 
was going. In their general history of the twentieth century, Geoffrey Bruun and Victor 
Mametey note, “the ultimate defeat of the Central Powers was greatly aided by the 
breakdown of morale on their home fronts…”96 
 
German Propaganda 
 The German government honed its ability to manipulate media before 1914, as it 
utilized newspapers to propagate and bolster its ambitious military and naval programs.97 
Charles Roetter believes, however, that prior to the war Germany did not have anything 
close to a coordinated propaganda effort. Even in August 1914, the German leadership 
felt the rightfulness of their cause was so self-evident it did not need any justification. 
Furthermore, they believed the war would not become lengthy enough to justify such 
efforts. It was only with the German disaster at the Marne and with it the prospect of a 
long war, that the Foreign Office began producing propaganda material in a haphazard 
fashion. This was not suitably coordinated with other official bodies, including the 
military, which late in 1914 developed an extensive press service to report military 
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operations, carry out propaganda, and control what newspapers reached soldiers at the 
front.98  
 Newspaper editors in Germany – like France – were expected not only to limit 
negative news, but also to ensure their papers had a patriotic tone.99 In early 1915, the 
Imperial Ministry of War provided the German press with the following 
recommendations: 1) do not question the national sentiment or determination of any 
German because it injures the impression of German unity; 2) disseminate the idea that 
German victory will liberate Europe and other areas from Russian despotism and English 
hegemony; 3) harsh language may be used to describe the enemy but belittling the enemy 
is not dignified; 4) neither the Chancellor, Kaiser, or military leaders can be criticized but 
deserve our confidence.100 For further guidance, the Oberzensursteille had a process for 
generating “positive press,” attitudes in, the Berliner Pressekenferenzen, or Berlin Press 
Conferences, during which military censors provided detailed instructions to the press on 
how to treat different questions raised by the war.101 The Kriegpresseamt also made 
attempts at blatant propaganda.  It prepared and distributed periodicals, subsidized pro-
German pamphlets, and  sponsored books that advanced the German point of view. 
 The over-arching theme of German propaganda was to justify the German war 
effort by showing that Russia mobilized first, the French invaded German territory, and 
above all that the spiteful British wanted to destroy an economic rival whose commercial 
and naval superiority was looming.102 The military also encouraged newspapers to 
remember and report the “spirit of 1914,” so named for the first week of August, 1914, 
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when the German people were moved by feelings of patriotism that caused them to 
embrace the war and inspired feelings of fraternity and community. Later the “spirit of 
1914,” – including its expression in German newspapers – was invoked as both an 
experience and a goal, as a “holy memory” and a vision of a “utopian future” that would 
exist when Germany won the war.103 
 German propaganda attempts never quite matched the success of those of the 
French.  Thanks in large part to the French (and British) media much of the world 
believed that the Germans were the aggressors.  Few newspaper editors in France thought 
twice about utilizing ethnic slurs, referring to the Germans as “Huns” or “Boche”; the 
Germans’ witty epithet of the Allies being the “All-Lies,” never caught on in the same 
manner.104 While Germany may have lamented the atrocities French newspapers accused 
it of, it did not mean that the German government did not encourage its own country’s 
papers to print similar stories about the British and French. These stories shocked the 
German people, but in the battle for world public opinion, the French wielded a great deal 
more power.105 For example, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a leading Berlin 
daily from 1861 till 1918, which had been the official organ of Bismarck’s government, 
reported on December 1, 1914, that Gurkha and Sikh troops (fighting for the British) 
liked to sneak across the battle lines at night and slit German throats and drink their 
blood.106 For much of the war there were no foreign soldiers on German soil apart from a 
small part of Alsace, so German propagandists could not claim Allied soldiers were 
committing atrocities on civilians like those of which the Germans stood accused in 
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Belgium and northern France.  The only counter propaganda they could produce was to 
present a positive image of German soldiers.  Most of their propaganda was defensive in 
nature, hence less successful. The exception to this rule: the German military frequently 
focused upon the actions of Belgian franc-tireurs, utilizing this imaginary threat to turn 
their invading army into victims. 
 Another example of Germany’s unsuccessful defensive propaganda surrounded 
the deportation of people from their homes in occupied France around Easter 1916. The 
situation, as we have seen, was horrible enough to demand unexaggerated outrage, but 
the French press manipulated it into the sacrilegious mistreatment of girls and young 
women.  The German military tried to respond through German newspapers.  In the 
August 1, 1916, issue of the semiofficial Kölnische Zeitung it was remarked that not a 
single deported worker lost his life (a statement open to interpretation), while English 
shells and bombs killed dozens of French and Belgians in the occupied zone. The August 
25, 1916, issue elaborated on occupied France, suggesting that, “The French should be 
thankful that the Germans and not the English were in northern France.  If one could 
judge by the Boer War, the whole population would be sitting behind barbed wire, were 
the English in the place of the Germans.”107     
 The German propaganda machine also handled the Edith Cavell case poorly.  The 
Germans executed Edith Cavell, a British nurse in a hospital in Brussels, on October 12, 
1915, after she admitted to helping Allied servicemen escape the occupied zone, an act 
widely known to be punishable by death. The French and British media praised Cavell as 
a martyr and violently denounced the Germans as vile women-killers in their media.  The 
German rebuttal in their media was feeble; they complained that Edith Cavell was an 
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enemy citizen committing acts she knew were punishable by death, but made little of the 
fact that the French had already executed one woman for the same offense and were to 
put to death another eight for capital offenses during the course of the war.108 
 
The Press in the Occupied Zone 
 Newspapers in northern France in the few months between the outbreak of war 
and occupation particularly felt the effects of war.  On August 3, 1914, the editors of the 
main regional papers, including L’Echo du Nord, La Dépêche de Lille, La Croix du Nord, 
Le Réveil du Nord, and Le Progrès du Nord placed their newspapers at the service of the 
civilian and military authorities. Others ceased publication entirely.109 The newspapers 
that continued publishing represented greatly varying outlooks - from the republican 
L’Echo du Nord and Le Progrès du Nord, to the clerical Le Croix du Nord, and the 
bourgeois Catholic La Dépêche de Lille, to the socialist Le Réveil du Nord - but they all 
followed the government wartime line. Indeed, on October 9, 1914, during the midst of a 
successful German attack on the capital of Flanders, Le Progrès du Nord reported the 
situation as “in general, excellent,” and the same day Le Révil du Nord stated that the 
enemy was retreating south of Arras.110 The people of northern France quickly felt the 
repercussions of French media restrictions. Trying to avoid panic in the northern cities, 
the government ordered newspapers to say nothing of the August 20,1914, German 
occupation of Brussels. Citizens of northern France found this out only when Belgian 
refugees arrived in French towns on August 24, telling of the horrors they had 
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experienced and creating a sense of panic in their region.111 Deprived of accurate news in 
their own press, citizens of northern France soon were subjected to the press of the 
occupier. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain what news was available and 
through what newspapers during the occupation. As we shall see, the German-authorized 
newspapers in occupied France provided a great deal of information, but with it came a 
view of life as the Germans wished the French to see it, including who was to blame for 
the war.112 Censors allowed different news within Germany and areas occupied by their 
forces.  For example, in occupied areas and neutral countries, newspapers published 
stories of Entente forces’ cruelty toward wounded German soldiers to anger people and to 
cause them to question their own nation’s military. Such stories did not appear in German 
newspapers, for fear they would disquiet families with young men at the front.113 To 
these stories of Entente atrocities, German propaganda in occupied enemy countries 
added stories designed to encourage defeatism and despair.  Thus, we will find in the 
press in occupied France the certainty of German victory, news of disaffection among the 
Entente powers due to divergent war aims, and of nationalist and revolutionary 
movements within the British and Russian empires.114 
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Conclusion 
 News management was necessary in both wartime Germany and France, as it was 
in the interest of security as well as public morale. Through neutral countries or captured 
soldiers, or even spies, published news could easily find its way into enemy hands.115 
However, keeping details of military operations out of the public sphere immediately 
descended into censorship of all sorts of information and the insertion in to the press of 
propaganda. Propaganda was effective during the war thanks to the relative 
unpreparedness of its receivers.  Average newspaper readers in Paris or Berlin hardly 
knew what the word “propaganda” meant; they had no other sources analyzing the 
propaganda published in newspapers and elsewhere.116 They were willing to believe 
wartime propaganda that “stripped the enemy of any vestiges of humanity and appeared 
to confirm the worst suspicions and fears of the prewar era.”117 While Germany may have 
been the country with the authoritarian traditions, it was France that most efficiently 
controlled an omnipresent and organized press. 
 France established a comprehensive bureaucracy aimed at controlling public 
opinion through the press.  French government and military leaders believed this system 
of censorship and propaganda as central to the country’s ability to sustain moral through 
the war.118 In newspapers as dissimilar as L’Humanité (the newspaper of the Socialist 
Party) and the Echo de Paris (a militarist and Catholic right-wing paper), parallel 
accounts of poor German morale, German cruelty, and shoddy German equipment 
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prevailed.119 Regaining Alsace and Lorraine was a paramount theme, often supplemented 
with versions of a post-war France annexing all the territories on the left bank of the 
Rhine.120 Depoliticizing the war and ensuring a pro-war stance was not enough for 
French authorities. The war provided occasion to continue earlier efforts to disseminate 
middle-class values of clean language, a discriminating sense of humor, and proper 
behavior, at the expense of a working-class culture. “The goal of civilian morale dictated 
attention to morality.”121 Despite the resources the French poured into creating 
propaganda, historians’ opinions on the success of the program are mixed.  Leonard 
Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker contend that the French 
censorship/ propaganda apparatus never became a truly creative force that could give 
meaning to the war.122 Instead, they note it was journalists, teachers, actors, popular 
singers, photographers, painters, designers, industrialists, and others that defined war 
culture in France, not the government.123 However, other countries appreciated and 
admired the complexity of the French propaganda system.  In April 1917, the French 
press control accepted Americans onto its staff, teaching them the French techniques of 
propaganda dissemination.124 For the most part, however, the French censors achieved 
their aim of calming public opinion by cutting all disturbing news, while convincing 
people there was no alternative to the continuation of the war; the ends appear to have 
justified the means.125   
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 Germany’s leaders – both civilian and military – agreed that winning the war 
depended upon civilian unity and the will to fight on. Hence, they saw manipulating 
public opinion through censorship and propaganda on the home front as paramount to the 
war cause.126 Many have argued that the German lack of success in maintaining home 
front morale was a contributing factor to them losing the war. Richard Bessel notes that 
German mobilization during World War I occurred in three distinct but interrelated areas: 
the military, the economy, and the spirit. Mobilization was most successful in the first, 
less in the second, and least in the third.127 While initial efforts to mobilize the spirit, 
consisting of public displays of war enthusiasm, were successful, newspapers could not 
keep up the war zeal as everyday privations – namely food shortages – dominated the 
lives of those in Germany from 1916 on.128 
 In German-occupied France, other problems handicapped German efforts. When 
the public’s interests diverge from that of the ruling class, and when they have their own 
independent sources of information, the official line (propagated in the media) may be 
widely doubted.129 In occupied France independent sources of information were 
infrequently available but the divergence between the public’s interests and that of the 
German occupiers was so great as to mean that the effect of propaganda in the occupied 
zones was much less than on the French and German home fronts. In all these places, 
however, the average person did not truly understand what was going on with the war 
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and, as Pierre Sarddella notes, “without news man would find himself incommensurably 
diminished.”130 
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Chapter Four: 
The Bulletin de Lille 
 
Acting upon a demand from the German authorities, and always under their 
control, the Lille municipality published the Bulletin de Lille on Sundays and Thursdays 
for the four years of occupation, beginning November 15, 1914. Although controlled by 
the Germans, some people in Lille welcomed this usually two paged, double-sided 
newspaper as the only voice – however distorted – of the city.1  German authorities 
closely supervised the editor, Paul Cornille, a fact never hidden from the reading public 
as every edition carried the subtitle “published under the control of German authorities.”  
The paper’s content suggests that the occupying Germans did not intend the Bulletin to be 
a forceful propaganda tool like the Gazette des Ardennes.  Instead, it was an implement 
of control and exploitation.  Often its main purpose appeared simply to inform the city’s 
populace of the voluminous series of new laws and ordinances enacted by the German 
authorities, to facilitate the exploitation of materials from the area, and to distribute 
information about shared concerns, such as public health issues.  However, the manner in 
which the newspaper conveyed this information appeared meant to instill fear in the 
population, even when appearing innocuous, making the paper a part of a system 
described by historians as “a true reign of terror.”2   
 To garner an understanding of the information the paper published and its 
reception by Lille readers, means examining how the German authorities utilized the 
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Bulletin de Lille to inform the population of the rules and regulations of occupation and 
how they used it as an apparatus to facilitate requisitions and the economic exploitation 
of the area. It is also important to examine the local affairs not directly under German 
control that the occupiers allowed published in the paper. While the Bulletin may not 
have been principally an instrument of propaganda like the Gazette des Ardennes, 
German control ensured that some attempts at changing public opinion found a place this 
paper.  
  
Informing the Population of the Wretchedness of Occupation 
 Goethe noted of his countrymen, “If there has to be a choice between injustice 
and disorder, the German prefers injustice.”3  To this end, the Germans in occupied 
France often resorted to a policy of Schrecklichkeit, or frightfulness, as they aimed to 
scare the civil population into absolute submission with the least possible diversion of 
German military strength.4  The policy of Schrecklichkeit manifested itself time and time 
again in the recurring section of the Bulletin de Lille entitled “Acts of German 
Authority.”5 Starting with the first edition of the paper and continuing until the April 12, 
1917, issue, “Acts of German Authority” appeared in over eighty-five percent of the 
issues of the paper, and always in the lead-story position frequently dominating the front 
page.6 This section dictated the tone of the newspaper and overwhelmed any editorial 
character the paper may have possessed. The first edition noted the German military 
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authorities’ desire to see published, by the municipality, a newspaper that contained 
official information such as proclamations, notices, and conferences of commanders, 
during which the Germans briefed French leaders on new orders.7  The first section of the 
first edition set the tone for the paper. It included a list of hostages to be taken, a demand 
of a 5,000 francs guarantee against hostile action, a proclamation of forbidden acts - some 
punishable by death, - and an invitation to the lillois not to force the occupying army to 
damage even more of their beautiful city and suburbs by being hostile towards German 
troops, placing the responsibility for destruction on the people. Such a proclamation 
created a tenor of dread, noting that when the Germans could not identify those guilty of 
an infraction, they would punish the population as a whole.8  
 Other decrees and ordinances under the heading “Acts of German Authority” 
established among other policies, requirements for passes for French civilians to travel 
outside the city-center, specific hours during which each person must be inside their 
home, and providing board to German soldiers. Other regulations prohibited the flying of 
balloons or pigeons, selling goods on the street, communicating with those outside the 
occupied zone with the exception of prisoners of war, or having in one’s possession arms, 
radios, clandestine newspapers, or any other objects the Germans saw as potentially 
dangerous.9  The information was often redundant as the German authorities felt the need 
to reiterate regulations, making their rule seem all pervading. In the December 19, 1915, 
December 23, 1915, and June 25, 1916, issues of the newspaper, the German authorities 
offered, “to refresh” the memories of the occupied people, reiterating practically the 
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whole litany of their regulations.10  There was a certain macabre humor to the recapping 
of laws in December 19, 1915, issue, as the list of offenses punishable by death appeared 
as a two-part series, to be continued in the next issue.  If, as Michael Nolan suggests, the 
French saw in Germans what they feared most about modernity, namely regimentation 
and anti-individualism, the heavy-handedness of their emphasis on regulations must have 
confirmed their collective fright.11   
The recurring nature of proclamations, ordinances, and decrees did not mean that 
readers could safely skip reading them, as the occupying forces sometimes arbitrarily 
changed the rules and regulations. A quick survey of five proclamations, representative of 
dozens more, offers evidence of how the German occupiers created fear, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, by capriciously adjusting regulations and expecting the 
people to be aware of them because of their publication in the Bulletin de Lille and 
various posters displayed around the city.  After having set strict curfews early in the 
occupation, the German authorities surprisingly demonstrated a more lenient attitude and 
announced in the Thursday June 3, 1915, issue of the paper that the Germans extended 
curfew to 10pm for the summer months.12  This small concession came with a caveat; the 
new curfew was a privilege, and the occupying authorities would take away if the 
occupied people abused it.  Take it away the occupying forces quickly did, as just nine 
editions later the lead proclamation declared that from July 1 until July 14 all non-
Germans in occupied France must stay inside their homes between the times of 6pm and 
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5am, with those caught outside risking prison sentences.13  To further rub salt in the city’s 
collective wound, the proclamation did allow for restaurants and stores to stay open later 
than curfew, presumably for the benefit of the German occupiers.  Unlike many of the 
other proclamations, the German authorities explained their actions in this one, noting 
that they felt forced to take these measures (which also included disallowing any more 
passes for travel west of the city) because French laborers refused to work in accordance 
with German military demands.  German retribution included not only sentencing the 
supposed ringleader of this labor resistance to death, but also punishing the whole city.  
For thirteen issues, no mention of curfews appeared in the newspaper. Then a notice 
appeared in the August 19, 1915, issue, noting the expiration of the 6pm curfew and 
setting the new time to 10pm.14 The status of the curfew between July 14, which the 
original decree stated as its own expiratory date, and the August 19 announcement of the 
end of the earlier curfew remained unclear. This curfew remained in place until late 
autumn when the Germans reset it for the winter months.15  Surely, such instances of 
contradictory information in the paper added to the sense of fear as uncertainty 
surrounded what acts would bring down the wrath of the German authorities.  
If creating uncertainty was one of the Bulletin de Lille’s methods of invoking fear 
in the population, it must have provoked especially great apprehension in readers in late 
September 1915.  The September 26, 1915, issue of the paper informed readers that the 
Germans sentenced to death four people for hiding British pilots and aiding their 
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escape.16   The next issue included a notice that all passes already given out were no 
longer valid starting that day and that the Germans planned to issue no new passes.17  
Unlike the last example where the earlier curfew was clearly indicated as retribution for 
the workers’ actions, the German occupiers drew no link between the crime of harboring 
enemy soldiers and the voiding of passes within the pages of the newspaper.  The perhaps 
intentional ambiguity of the reasoning behind the new pass law must have added to the 
state of fear.  The Bulletin de Lille also created uncertainly as it provided information 
with very short notice or even a few days after the fact.  Dozens of illustrations can be 
found of the paper providing pertinent information a day or two late.  For example, on 
Sunday April 2, 1916, the people of Lille read that all permits to circulate with a 
harnessed horse expired two days earlier and people had to request a renewal before the 
Germans issued a new permit.18  The Sunday October 1, 1916, issue of the paper told 
people to move their clocks forward an hour on September 30, 1916. The newspaper also 
reported that starting that very day the curfew reset to 9pm from 11pm.19 While these 
proclamations were often posted throughout the city, many an instance of panic must 
have occurred when people found out they had committed punishable acts because they 
were not aware of rule changes. 
 The only level of French government left intact during the occupation was the 
municipal level, in Lille under the auspices of Mayor Delesalle, elected in 1914 before 
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the German invasion.20  Richard Cobb notes that the municipalization of civilian 
authority and the regional polarization that ensued was feasible because municipal 
loyalties remained stronger in northern France than anywhere else in the country.21  
However, the role of the mayor could not have been an easy one. The Byzantine position 
of Mayor Delesalle was evident in the pages of the Bulletin de Lille.  Often times German 
regulations were prefaced with the introduction that the Germans informed the mayor of 
the following request / requirement / change.22  Furthermore, another regular section of 
the paper, “Notices from City Hall,” demonstrated how the German occupying authorities 
exploited the mayor.  While this section did include information about local affairs not 
directly related to the German spheres of influence, a great deal of space was dedicated to 
repeating, if in a kinder, gentler, tone, the demands of the German authorities.  For 
example, the Germans left it to the mayor’s office to announce their decision that any 
bicycle owners not currently employed needed to report to the German authorities for 
work.23  One week later, the notice from the mayor’s office cited municipal code to 
invoke people to keep the streets clean and safe from black ice, a minor fixation of the 
occupying authorities.24  German authorities also frequently used the mayor’s voice on 
the subject of identity cards.  The occupying authorities regularly repeated decrees 
requiring all non-German adults in Lille to carry identity cards, but they left the gentle 
reminders and instructions on how to obtain the cards to the mayor’s office, which the 
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Bulletin’s staff included in several issues.25  From an administrative standpoint, 
employing the mayor’s office to provide such services must have proven convenient. 
Beyond this expediency, linking the mayor’s office so closely to the occupation within 
the pages of the Bulletin de Lille gave the impression not only that German control was 
all pervading, but also that at some level the city leaders might to begun to acquiesce to 
the occupiers’ authority. While the concept of collusion with the enemy existed before 
the Second World War, the term “collaboration” originated in Vichy France.  When 
Marshal Pétain met with Hitler in 1940 at Montoire, he announced he was setting off 
along the “path of collaboration.”26 Historians now apply the concept to similar situations 
throughout the twentieth century.27 Stanley Hoffmann made the distinction between 
“involuntary collaboration” and “voluntary collaboration.”28 The German occupiers may 
have wanted to create the appearance of collaboration with the leadership in city hall, and 
attempted to create such an appearance by forcing it to reiterate many of their demands. 
However, the people of Lille respected their civic leaders and understood any 
collaboration that occurred was of the involuntary variety. 
 From early in the occupation, the German authorities required census reports on 
the number of horses, dogs, and other domesticated animals owned by those under their 
control.29  The Sunday November 14, 1915, issue of the Bulletin informed people that the 
census of horses, chickens, mules, and donkeys would occur monthly, and the newspaper 
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provided people with a detailed chart of when they were supposed to report to the 
German office responsible, the Festungs-Fuhrpark.30  The regulation of people was no 
less.  The top half of the front page of the Thursday September 2, 1915, Bulletin 
announced the undertaking of a general census of the population.31  Reinforced by its 
discussion in the city-hall section of the paper, the census was to be of the whole 
population except Germans and German allies, and was to include a listing of each 
person’s profession and all their properties.32 When by the end of December not everyone 
filled-out the necessary paperwork or complied with the decree to post their information 
on the front doors of their homes, the tone of the Governor’s decree became harsher, 
threatening those who did not meet these terms with a fine of 3,000 marks “or worse.”33  
All these serve as examples of how the Germans used the Bulletin de Lille on a regular 
basis to give updates on what information they required from people, making it a useful 
instrument for keeping close track of the occupied. 
 Surprisingly, the Germans did not use this newspaper to the extent one would 
expect in their demands for forced labor.  As Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette 
Becker note in 14-18: Understanding the Great War, the Germans were quick to 
conscript men, women, and older children to repair railway lines, roads, and 
fortifications.34 This was in violation of The Hague Convention’s stipulation that nobody 
be forced to work for the war effort against his own country.  Some workers refused to 
work for the Germans in early July 1915, citing The Hague Conventions.  The Germans 
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replied in the Bulletin de Lille that this reading of the Convention was completely wrong, 
alluding to Article 52, stating that working for the enemy was acceptable as long as the 
actions were not explicitly against their own country.35 Article 52 states in part that 
“Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be demanded from communes nor 
inhabitants, except for the needs of the army of occupation.  They shall be in proportion 
to the resources of the country.36 
This was the first reference found in the paper to the occupiers’ right to require 
work from the French, and they based their position on logic, rather than fear.  An 
agricultural labor shortage existed in the countryside by 1916, coupled with 
unemployment in the cities, leading to German attempts to recruit farm workers from the 
cities.  When this failed, the Germans resorted to conscription.37  In May 1916, the 
Germans transported 25,000 men and women to Germany from the occupied zone, 
having given these people an hour and a half to pack their belongings, a fact easily 
overlooked from reading the Bulletin de Lille.38   However, by July 2, 1916, the German 
need for workers had led to harsh work requests in the paper.  The lead piece in that day’s 
paper stated “We demand the following: For people of both sexes to do agricultural 
work.”39 The pay for men was to be 2.5 francs a day and women were to receive 1.5 
francs a day, with room and board included.   
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Later on that same year the Germans tried a different approach to gain workers.  
The lead section screamed “Unemployed! You will find permanent work in different 
fields and services in Lille.”40  While references to the need for workers appeared 
intermittent throughout the publication of the paper, the use of double terminology about 
volunteers and employment opportunities, sometimes tied to the German occupying 
forces and sometimes not, makes it difficult to determine which references were related 
to the harsh system of forced work that characterized much of life in the occupied zone.41  
There were frequent demands for various groups (usually men of a certain age, but also 
women) to report at a certain time to German authorities, but the Bulletin de Lille does 
not reveal which of these calls led to deportations and which were just random checks or 
demonstrations of their control.  The only indication in the Bulletin that the menace of 
deportations was nearing an end was an announcement from city hall that the mayor 
received word to that effect and hence the Germans now permitted the changing 
addresses within Lille (the Germans forbade this during the period of deportations.)42 It is 
bewildering that Germans authorities did not emphasize the peril of deportations in the 
Bulletin de Lille when it was such a central facet of what Martin Gilbert called the all-
pervasive tyranny of occupation.43     
Perhaps the most blatant attempt by the Germans to instill fear and obedience in 
the occupied population through the newspaper came in the form of the regular sub-
column to “Acts of German Authority,” entitled “German Military Justice.”  This section 
detailed who the Germans deemed to be in violation of their rules and regulations and the 
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punishments for these infractions.  For example, on Sunday, August 1, 1915, numerous 
people received sentences for violating twenty-one different rules, including an eleven 
year-old girl sentenced to two months in jail for hurling insults at Germans.44  Other 
violations cited that day included inciting hostility towards Germans, drawing plans of 
the fort without permission, hiding arms and helping to hide arms, carrying illicit 
correspondence, keeping pigeons, assisting in desertion, hiding French soldiers, and using 
fake passes.45  In this issue of the Bulletin de Lille, it appears the aim was to intimidate by 
the sheer volume of people sentenced, for crimes both large and small.  The Thursday, 
August 17, 1916, edition included another long list of sentences; this list demonstrated 
that the Germans were not going to turn a blind eye to even smaller offenses, as every 
punishment was either a fine or jail term of thirty days or less.46  In an earlier issue the 
“German Military Justice” section was much shorter but fear inspiring.  It reported that 
the German occupiers executed Belgian student Léon Trulin that morning at the Citadel, 
after condemning him for spying.47 The Governor, who at that time was General Von 
Heinrich, signed the section for that day, remarking “take this as a warning.”48  Equally 
bone chilling, was the “German Military Justice” of Thursday, August 31, 1916.  Readers 
discovered that the Dean Jean-Baptiste Leclerq of Saint-Christopher church in 
neighboring Tourcoing publicly stated to his parishioners that they did not have to 
comply with German metal requisition demands.  As a result, he received ten years 
solitary confinement, and the Germans had already transported him to Germany to begin 
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serving his sentence.49 One parishioner remembered Leclerq’s first sermon after the 
German occupation, describing him as a saintly man, a brave man, because he defied the 
Germans and did not mince his words in doing so.50 During his sermon, Leclerq stated 
that whatever happened, no one must work for the Germans or do anything at all to help 
them.51 
A feeling of helplessness permeated the article as the Germans already deported 
Dean Jean-Baptiste Leclerq.  The newspaper’s report of other major sentences handed 
down by the Kommandantur several days after their implementation, probably only 
added to a feeling of helplessness for the French.  And certainly the prominence of 
Leclerq, an only have further reinforced this sentiment. 
Announcements of German extractions of French assets began in the paper 
immediately with war contributions.  Such heavy demands reduced the mayor by the 
fourth issue of the paper to groveling in a published letter to Governor Von Heinrich, 
stating that the bank was empty, and municipal workers had to knock on every citizen’s 
door twice to raise the first 3 million francs demanded. The mayor explained that he 
would not be able to pay the next installment, and, after laying out a detailed recitation of 
what the city had already paid and suffered through, he requested a reduction.52  Von 
Heinrich’s response, printed under the mayor’s letter, was to give an extension of the 
deadline but to offer no moderation in terms of amount.53  Publishing the details of this 
communication in the Bulletin made the French representative appear weak and 
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ineffectual in the face of German might, seemingly creating an image symbolic of the 
entire occupation relationship. This image was repeated in subsequent issues, as the 
mayor pleaded to his constituents to exchange bank notes for communal vouchers as he 
tried to raise money to meet successive war contribution deadlines. These appeals 
continued for several months, slowly waning as the supply of hard currency diminished 
in the occupied zone and communal vouchers became the norm. However, German 
demands for materials never abated. 
The Thursday, October 26, 1916, issue of the Bulletin de Lille contained a 
lengthy, severely worded list of objects subject to requisition for the war. This list 
included cars, motorcycles, bikes, and all accessories for these vehicles including rubber 
in all forms and quantities. The Germans demanded oil and fat from those who had more 
than ten kilograms in stock. Wool, cotton, hemp, and other fiber materials; wick and 
thread; leather and tanned materials, electrical wire and cord; objects with industrial uses, 
such as copper, nickel, pewter, and brass, and all platinum that was not being used for 
medical purposes also made the long list.54  The German authorities were not demanding 
people relinquish these items immediately.  Rather, they were subject to requisitioning. 
This meant citizens in possession of such goods had to submit a list of them to section 
commanders. Individuals submitting such inventories became responsible for security of 
the goods and hence, they could not sell them or, if non-durable, use them, under penalty 
of five years in prison.55  The newspaper piece gave enough information to ensure the 
populace’s compliance with German wants, but its wording also left enough unstated to 
create anxiety and doubt.  Which of these items would be requisitioned and if so when 
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and how?  By requiring a list, the German authorities left the citizens of Lille in a state of 
insecurity, unsure of what the occupiers would do with this information.  The Germans 
frequently used this tactic in the Bulletin. While some requisitions printed in the paper 
were straightforward, such as the order requiring that all timber be turned into authorities 
within four days56, or all telephones and related pieces need to be given in immediately57, 
many required only a written list being handed in, leaving the actual loss of goods to a 
later date.  The paper warned car and harness owners that if they did not give a detailed 
inventory of their possessions, the Germans would confiscate them and their owners 
would be sent to prison.58 Photography equipment and alcohol were two categories of 
goods that received similar treatment in subsequent issues.59  The follow-through on 
many of these requisitions occurred in person in the form of door-to-door seizures and 
never made the pages of the Bulletin.   To read the paper without knowledge of these 
other German actions would not reveal the entirety of the system of appropriation that led 
Helen McPhail to observe, “One of the most dreaded words throughout the war in the 
north was requisition.”60 A New York Times’ journalist wrote after the war, “Their system 
of exactions and requisitions was well calculated to break the spirit as well as the purse of 
the great, ancient, and rich city.”61                     
 It is interesting to note that one element that did not play a key role in the Bulletin 
de Lille was the listing of German-held French prisoners of war.  As Charles Roetter 
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notes, the Germans ensured that the French read the Gazette des Ardennes by publishing 
lists of captured French soldiers in that newspaper, as “no French family with men folk 
serving in their country’s army could be expected to resist such bait.”62  The Bulletin de 
Lille did not utilize this same maneuver to ensure readers.  Only between January 17, 
1915, and March 21, 1915, did any issues contain prisoners of war lists.63 From that point 
until 1917, the only reference to prisoners held in Germany was a notice dictating the 
rules for sending a monthly postcard or care package to them.  Perhaps the Germans 
recognized that the Bulletin de Lille would be read without this enticement, as it was 
technically published by the municipality, and contained other items of interest, such as 
birth and death notices as well as information about food supplies, the limited local 
events still available, and even an advice column.  
 
Outside the German Purview: Other Themes in the Bulletin de Lille         
  
 The municipality published the Bulletin de Lille, albeit under heavy German 
direction, and the Germans allowed space in the paper for local affairs they deemed 
necessary or innocuous. These portions of the paper gave the Bulletin any of the 
creditability it carried with the people of Lille, and almost all of such information was 
local in nature. The small amount of news from beyond the occupied area published in 
the Bulletin appears to have been hand-selected by the Germans with a purpose, and the 
Bulletin de Lille provided only rare, and extremely controlled glimpses into the outside 
world.  An early issue of the paper reported that the bells were sounding in Lille again 
because Germans troops had won a great victory against the principle section of the 
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Russian army that was now in retreat.64 The closest event that could have caused this bell 
ringing was the Russian evacuation of Lodz; the Russians retreated thirty miles to a line 
along the Rawka and Bzura Rivers, where they created sound trenches.65 This piece 
appeared under the heading of “German Authorities’ Communiqués,” that is, as an 
official announcement probably designed to demoralize the French.  The editorial staff 
did not again so blatantly attempt to sap morale. Instead, it used international news in a 
more subtle way.  These international articles more typically took the form of reprinting 
pieces in the general body of the paper (as opposed to under “Acts of German 
Authority”) from other newspapers, giving the appearance that German censors allowed 
outside voices.  However, the newspapers most often quoted were the Gazette de 
Cologne and Bien Public, two newspapers published by the German authorities in other 
areas.  Reprints usually appeared within ten days or so of the original publication.  For 
example, the April 22, 1915, issue carried a reprint from the April 16 Gazette de 
Cologne, stating that the French government under President Viviani had agreed to 
accept bank notes issued by the occupation authorities at face value.66 This story suited 
the Germans’ needs, as they began to encourage the elderly and sick to move to 
unoccupied France. A second example, in the February 18, 1915, issue of the Bulletin de 
Lille, carried a reprint from the Bien Public, telling how bakers in Germany dealt calmly 
with the white bread shortage by making “KK” bread, made with a high percentage of 
potato wheat, barley, oats, and rice, which the German people accepted.67 This story was 
blatant propaganda. Within months of this story, wretchedness gripped the people of 
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Germany because of a lack of traditional bread.  German scientists were so desperate as 
they attempted to develop a wheat substitute that they considered not only straw, rushes, 
Icelandic moss, and animal blood (as an ersatz) but attempted to chemically treat sawdust 
and wood pulp to convert cellulose into a digestible carbohydrate.68 A dietary respite for 
the German home front diet only came with the conquest of Rumania and its stores of 
wheat.69 
The above two instances were clearly included in the Bulletin to support German 
endeavors, but another piece reprinted from the Bien Public was even more obvious in its 
intent.  An article in that newspaper included comments reprinted from a speech given in 
the Common Council of Antwerp, where a member stated that for a people who had been 
extremely free, occupation is a heavy sacrifice and a real test, but that one worsens his 
difficulties if he works against the occupying authorities.70   
The Bulletin de Lille also included the occasional article originally from non-
German controlled papers.  A story acquired from a Dutch journal told of the high-cost of 
provisions in Holland, showing how neutral countries also suffered from high prices 
thanks to the war, with the implication being the Germans did not cause all hardships.71  
Sporadic and rare pieces of international news seemed to carry no message at all, such as 
the listing of Noble Prize winners.72  However, these pieces were atypical, with the 
majority of the paper dedicated to local affairs.   
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 The Bulletin de Lille was a convenient source of local information. Readers could 
remain up to date about when and where French military allocation distribution occurred, 
and when charitable organizations provided services.73 Information regarding French 
military allocations was particulary important to the people of occupied France, as many 
people relied upon this resource and there was frequent confusion about who was eligible 
for the payments. On August 5, 1914, the French legislature created military allowances 
to provide for the dependents of mobilized soldiers in financial need.74 The law 
authorized the payment of 1.25 francs per day to needy adult dependants (wives and 
elderly parents) and a 0.5 franc supplement for each dependent child under the age of 
sixteen.75 The system was difficult for local officials to administer, even in unoccupied 
France, as civil servants attempted to keep down costs, turning away women in dire need 
of the money. The distribution of benefits gradually liberalized, until it reached most 
military wives and families, and was even expanded to non-martial “companions” and 
illegitimate children.76 Beyond military allowances, readers could also remain informed 
about what schools functioned at the primary levels and higher, and which programs still 
accepted people at the Université de Lille.77  Vaccine availability information became 
particularly important as the city faced an outbreak of typhoid fever in the winter of 
1915-1916.  
The back half of the paper always carried birth and death announcements, as well 
as a classified section with job announcements (and much more frequently people 
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looking for work) and a great deal of advertisements.  The ads provide interesting insight 
into life in occupied Lille.  People often placed ads selling personal goods as they tried to 
remain solvent.78  Several ads concentrated on hard-to-get items, such as coffee, 
cigarettes, and home-brewing systems, emphasizing the quantities available.79    
Advertisements generated by wartime conditions ran alongside signs of continued 
normalcy, such as ads for shampoos promising beautiful hair and the ever-present ad for 
pianos.80  A multitude of ads promoted various foods, highlighting the sporadic times 
when certain foods became available. 
 As Helen McPhail notes in her study, “the way in which northern France was fed 
during the occupation is an extraordinary one, involving complicated international 
politics.”81  Considering the tremendous control the Germans wielded in the occupied 
zone, it may be surprising to note that they allowed the Americano-Hispanic Commission  
(known as the Committee for the Relief of Belgium after American entry into the war) 
and its related organization, the Comité d’Alimentation de Nord de la France (C.A.N.F.) 
to exist within occupied territories. Yet, this was help that German authorities gladly 
accepted, as it both avoided depletion of their own resources and demonstrated 
benevolence to the outside world.82  From May 6, 1915, when the C.A.N.F. began to sell 
foodstuffs in Lille, it had a regular presence in the Bulletin.  Notice of what items were 
for sale, their price, locations of distribution, and quantities allowed per family were 
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regular fare in the paper.83 Bread was the central foodstuff the C.A.N.F. focused upon. 
Other frequently listed items included dried milk, soap, and produce such as kidney 
beans, rice, coffee, and cereal.  Despite their best efforts, the Americano-Hispanic 
Commission and the C.A.N.F. were the first to admit that the food supply had less variety 
than before the war, and people had to be more ingenious in using what they had.84  The 
C.A.N.F. offered cooking courses to help in this plight and published in the Bulletin 
recipes meant to guide people on how to use lesser-known foods and how to simulate 
common goods lacking in the market.  For example, olive oil was absent due to 
impediments facing Italian imports and German requisitions. Thus the April 16, 1916, 
issue included an article explaining how to turn sunflower seeds into oil, while a 
December 5, 1915, article offered ideas on how to use tomato oil in cooking instead, and 
the October 14, 1915, issue explained how a combination of lard and water could replace 
the missing olive oil.85  As meat quickly became scarce, the newspaper lauded the 
benefits of vegetarianism, and recipes based more upon vegetables played a starring 
role.86 The newspaper dedicated a great deal of space to trying to change the sensibilities 
and tastes of the people of Lille.  Several issues of the Bulletin tried to convince readers 
that rice was not “only for people of the yellow race.”87  The Lilliois read that in 
America, India, and Italy rice, rather than bread, formed the basis of people’s diet and 
they should utilize it to their advantage in the face of occupied France’s bread shortage.88  
The superiority of rice was also extolled in another issue that noted it had more albumin 
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and starch than both bread and potatoes and hence was a superior food source.89  The 
same issue ran an article entitled “Bread through the Ages,” which placed in context the 
current bread shortage in French history by making comparisons dating back to the reign 
of Charles VIII.90  Other issues introduced people to the tea flower, offered an extensive 
look at the history of the fig, a two-part series on currant drinks, and a detailed discussion 
about various cheeses that included a poem.91   
 When the Lilliois needed advice beyond what to make for dinner they could write 
into the Bulletin and perhaps see their questions answered in the “Little 
Correspondences” column of the paper.  Appearing in approximately fifteen percent of 
the issues published between March 25, 1915, and April 12, 1917, this featured article 
provided legal and moral guidance to readers.  Disputes between renters and landlords 
filled many of the articles, as the paper suggested tempering the letter of the law with an 
understanding that everybody was going through hardships during this time and 
allowances had to be made for late payments.92  As in the case with rental disputes, the 
feature often acted as a source for minor legal advice about issues the German occupiers 
carried nothing about.  A “disappointed mother” received the information that under 
French civil code she could do nothing to stop her twenty-seven year old son from 
marrying a woman of whom she did not approve.93 Usually the section avoided all 
mention of German occupation and in the only three exceptions, the newspaper staff’s 
response supported German laws.  In the August 17, 1916, issue the counsel provided to 
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one man told him that of course he could not fly a kite in public, and the article 
sarcastically reminded him that German authorities forbid all visual signals, which 
obviously included kites.94  The newspaper reminded another reader that she could not 
beat her carpets outside, and told a third person that he could not write to his parents in 
Cambrai or Saint-Quentin because that would violate the German rules against the 
exchange of letters between communes.95  The column offered guidance on using social 
services provided by the municipal government.  The newspaper staff chastised an 
anonymous reader for claiming multiple military benefits for different family members.96  
Another article explained in detail how the French government regulated military 
allocations and who had the right to claim them, noting the money was not a 
reimbursable charity. The topic of who was eligible for what benefits was also addressed 
when the paper informed a reader that welfare benefits were fundamentally local, and that 
payments to families of evacuees for their absent relatives were not authorized.97        
  Another recurring feature was “Stories of Integrity,” although it was not as 
frequent as the advice column. A typical anecdote appeared on April 20, 1916.  In this 
issue, the paper told of an unnamed man who found a five-franc note, and deposited it in 
the bank until its owner claimed it.98  The implication of this column was obvious.  In a 
time and place where almost everyone was having financial difficulties, and rationing 
fraud, and black marketeering was plaguing international relief efforts, people were 
encouraged to follow examples of honesty.  This may not have been an understated 
                                                 
94
 Ibid., August 17, 1916.  
95
 Ibid., March 1, 1917.  
96
 Ibid., August 12, 1915.  
97
 Ibid., December 28, 1916.   
98
 Ibid., April 20, 1916.  
  
125
 
maneuver, but rarely could any newspaper under German control be accused of 
subtleness. 
 
Attempts at Propaganda in the Bulletin 
 
Jürgen Wilke asserts in his study of propaganda use during the First World War 
that a lack of understanding of psychological warfare hindered German propaganda 
efforts.99 In the Bulletin de Lille, the German authorities for the most part kept their 
propaganda strategy simple – overwhelm the people of Lille with their omnipresence and 
scare them into submission.  Yet, even in following this simple plan, the German 
occupiers made a few missteps over the course of publication. 
 The cardinal rule of propaganda is never to answer enemy charges, as this only 
reinforces the original assertion.100  Alice Marquis claims that the Germans violated this 
rule throughout the war, and hence defensiveness verging on self-pity was to be the 
dominant tone in Germany’s propaganda effort.101  This breach of propaganda theory can 
be seen in several instances in the Bulletin de Lille.  As we have seen, early on in the 
occupation some workers refused to toil for the Germans, citing the Hague Convention.  
While the Germans replied with a harsh sentence for their ringleader and punishment the 
whole town, they also argued the merits of their side by referencing the Hague 
Convention, going as far as citing specific articles.  Not only was this action hypocritical 
as German military authorities held these international laws in low regard, but it also 
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gave a public platform to the original charges that they were violating the rules of war.102  
An even worse blunder of this nature was an article in the December 13, 1914, issue of 
the Bulletin, entitled “Protection of Art Work.”  Reprinted from the December 3 issue of 
the Gazette de Cologne, it refuted allegations that the Germans had seized an altar from a 
Belgian church and it was now in Berlin.  The article claimed German authorities 
respected the Hague Convention in regard to its prohibitions against the removal of 
artwork from museums or churches in occupied zones.103  This defensive tone mirrored 
domestic German coverage. To excuse the destruction of the library at Louvain, 
Kunstchronik, an internationally-read German art journal wrote, “Implicit confidence 
may be placed in our Army Command, which will never forget its duty to civilization 
even in the heat of battle.  Yet, even these duties have limit.  All possible sacrifices must 
be made for the preservation of precious legacies of the past.  But where the whole is at 
stake, their protection cannot be guaranteed.”104 The world had a justified fear that 
despite the preservationist dialogue, that the Germans were willing to destroy artwork 
and monuments if they stood to gain strategically, or appropriate artworks and take them 
back to Germany.105   
On rare occasions, too much information lessened the intimidation factor of the 
“Acts of German Authority.”  In one of the earlier demands for people to present 
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themselves for registration, German authorities explained that the aim was to gain a 
general idea of the population size and composition of Lille.106  Since this was an isolated 
incidence of German explanation, it appears to be a gaffe rather than an indication of 
trying to build a relationship on anything but fear with the people in the occupied zone.  
Such a slip also occurred in their use of the mayor’s office as a conduit.  Making the 
mayor beg for money in the pages of the Bulletin instilled an image of French weakness.  
However, when the mayor was allowed to somewhat complain about German demands, it 
emphasized their unjustness rather than French weakness.  Such was the case in the 
March 7, 1915 issue of the Bulletin, when the article entitled “Appeal for Funds” noted 
that outside the considerable amounts paid to supply the troops, the German authorities 
now demanded a contribution of a million more francs to support the civilian German 
government in Lille.107  The mayor as the French representative sounded more 
exasperated with than fearful of German rule. 
 The Bulletin de Lille failed at times as a tool of German propaganda because, as 
stated earlier, it gave too much information.  Such was the case in the March 30, 1916, 
issue when an article entitled “The Health of Lille,” informed readers that for the week of 
March 12-18 the city registered 145 deaths, while for the same week a year earlier there 
were only 72.108  Certainly the people of Lille did not need the newspaper to know the 
death rate was rising, and diseases directly or indirectly related to a lack of food (such as 
tuberculosis, dysentery, and scurvy) were claiming more and more lives.109 Nevertheless, 
it was a propaganda faux pas to allow the paper’s publishers to include a reference 
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pointing out the obvious. The occupiers directly made the same mistake again when 
under “Acts of German Authority” they included the results of their last population 
census, which included a decrease of almost 8,000 people in one year.110 The many 
occurrences of the Germans utilizing their tool of control effectively by simply following 
their simple tactic of invoking feelings of fear overshadowed these German propaganda 
missteps.  
 In 1979, Alfred Cornebise published a study of Nachrichtendienst, a German-
language paper produced by the French in the Ruhr valley when they occupied it in 
1923.111  The French were trying to control all aspects of the life of the civilian 
population while the Germans were responding with passive resistance, strikes, and 
sabotage.  The French gave considerable attention to propaganda and control of 
information, curtailing all other media in the area and using their newspaper as an organ 
of French indoctrination and cultural propaganda.112  The study identified several themes 
in the propaganda of the Nachrichtendienst, of which the most fundamental – forcing the 
occupied people to recognize that resistance was futile- can also be seen in the Bulletin de 
Lille.113  The Ruhr paper named the Germans arrested and elaborated upon their deeds. 
The impression sought was that the occupation forces were inexorable.114 The same 
strategy played out the “German Military Justice” section in almost every issue of the 
Bulletin.   
                                                 
110
 Bulletin de Lille, January 28, 1917.  
111
 Alfred Cornebise, “The Refinement of Allied Press Propaganda: The Case Study of the 
Nachrictendienst,” German Studies Review 2 (February 1979): 30-48.  
112
 Ibid., 31.  
113
 Ibid., 37.   
114
 Ibid., 36.  
  
129
 
A clever use of propaganda found in the Bulletin de Lille attempted to imply that 
the Germans were not the sole cause of misery in occupied France.  As Hew Strachan 
notes in his survey of the First World War, many of the indignities suffered in the 
occupied zone were little different from those suffered as the result of wartime necessities 
in the rest of France, but inhabitants of the occupied zone did not know that.115  The 
paper informed Lille’s readers that hardships were being felt elsewhere, in stories about 
the high cost of provisions in Holland, and through analysis that stated that while 
common goods might have been expensive, prices still were not as bad as those in Paris 
in 1870.116  By placing the current misery associated with the occupation in both an 
international and historical context, the German occupying authorities appeared to 
attempt to ease their culpability in the suffering of the people without lessening their 
appearance of domination.   If, as Richard Cobb asserts, the Germans at times believed 
Lille would eventually be included within the Reich or would become part of a satellite 
state, this was a good way to start prepping the populace for a less-abrasive 
relationship.117  
    A key focus of wartime propaganda was to drive a wedge between the allied 
nations.  The Bulletin de Lille did make sly attempts to dampen the anglophile tendencies 
other historians have found as prevalent in northern France.118  The Germans employed 
British aerial bombings to attempt an “us against them” attitude in the Bulletin.  The 
“Acts of German Authority” in the January 20, 1916, took on a much friendlier tone than 
usual.  An open letter to the people of Lille stated that a recent English aerial bombing, 
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done without aiming at targets of military importance, had caused considerable damage.  
Hence, German authorities counseled the civilian population to seek shelter from 
bombing raids in caves and to avoid fire by removing flammable materials from areas 
affected by incendiary debris.119  The April 23, 1916, “Acts of German Authority” 
attempted to lay blame for forced work deportations on the British, blaming their 
blockade for the lack of required supplies getting through, which forced the German 
authorities to deport workers in an attempt to alleviate the misery.120 Attempts at 
demonizing the British were present to an even greater degree in other newspapers 
received in the occupied zone, most notably the Gazette des Ardennes. 
 Studies of the press demonstrate that newspapers have had more effect reinforcing 
existing opinions rather than changing them, and that while minor changes in attitude 
have occasionally followed from reading papers, conversions are rare.121  Considering the 
hatred the German occupying forces were understandably facing in Lille, the Bulletin de 
Lille was not aiming for small conversions, nor did it have any chance of winning over 
people to the occupier’s viewpoint.  However, as an apparatus of control, the Bulletin 
could, over time, hope to create a feeling of helplessness and fear amongst the people of 
Lille, as in issue after issue it related Germans’ omnipresence and complete hegemony 
over their lives, to convey the futility of resisting their control of the occupied zone.  The 
paper represented as a relatively easy device to give orders to the population and hence 
facilitated the occupying forces’ ability to place demands on the whole city at once, 
whether they were to report for deportation or to step off the sidewalk and tip one’s hat in 
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deference to officers (a requirement known as Grusserlass). Beyond that, the Bulletin de 
Lille was a significant tool that emphasized the absolute control the Germans had, making 
it a powerful means of undermining French morale.   
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Chapter Five: 
The Bulletin de Roubaix 
 
 The German authorities deemed Roubaix in need of its own bi-weekly paper 
despite the city’s proximity to Lille.  Situated fifteen kilometers northeast of Lille and 
close to the Belgian border, we have seen that Roubaix became an urban center during 
the nineteenth century, with the suburbs of Wattrelos, Lys, Croix, Wasquehal, and 
Mouvaux surrounding it. The city experienced great prosperity and growth during the 
industrial revolution, led by its success in the wool industry. Its population of largely 
working class people reached approximately 120,000 by the eve of the First World War.1 
It would have been simple for the German occupiers to include Roubaix-relevant news in 
the Bulletin de Lille and publish only one paper for the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing tri-city 
area.  Indeed, for the first few years of the occupation the Bulletin de Lille was the only 
authorized locally published newspaper. However, German occupation plans included the 
municipalization of the French conquered area, and hence treated each town as a 
sovereign space, subject only to German control and demands.2 Hence, the Bulletin de 
Roubaix published its first issue on Wednesday, December 20, 1916. It published without 
interruption for almost two years, with the last issue under German control appearing on 
Wednesday, October 16, 1918. 
 The Bulletin de Roubaix usually consisted of one double-sided sheet.  Sixteen 
times during its two-year run, the paper’s editors expanded it to two double-sided 
pages. Published on Wednesdays and Saturdays, it sold for 0.05 francs an issue, or 
1.25 francs for a three-month subscription or 2.35 francs for a six-month subscription 
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until May 1, 1918, when the price doubled, with the editors blaming the cost of paper 
for the increase.  
By the start of the war, most newspapers were commercial commodities, and 
their worth stemmed not only on their capacity to report news accurately, but also to 
attract advertising due to the size and makeup of their readership.  This was not true 
for the Bulletin de Roubaix or the Bulletin de Lille.  The occupying German 
authorities demanded the creation of these newspapers to control the information the 
occupied people received; turning a profit was not the businesses’ raison d’être. 
Researching this dissertation revealed no evidence pertaining to how successful this 
newspaper was at covering its own costs, or whether the German occupiers ever 
invested money into the endeavor.  The newspaper staff was French, with Antoine 
Neumans being the editor-printer of record, but the German occupiers conceived the 
paper and the staff knew German censors would review their work. It is almost 
certainly received requisitioned printing presses and paper to begin its publication.   
The newspaper’s offices moved twice during this time period, first in April 
1917 to give the publishers more space, and again in February 1918 when 
management of the paper changed after its original manager, Madame Reboux, was 
discovered aiding the clandestine press.3 After altering its typeface in the January 3, 
1917, issue, the look of the paper remained the same, although the paper shortage did 
cause printers to use yellow or pink colored paper on rare occasions.4  The paper 
shortage greatly affected the paper; on five separate occasions early in its publication, 
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a message from the editor appeared, noting that there existed more news to report but 
that space did not allow it.5 The Bulletin de Roubaix was sold both at newsstands and 
was available for home delivery in Roubaix, Lille, and Tourcoing, although the paper 
had to remind its readers that it could not guarantee a delivery time beyond that it 
would be received the day of publication.6 The newspaper even had an auxiliary 
office in Lille with a staff to accept advertisements and notices.  This connection 
became more tenuous after October 25, 1917, when German authorities forbade 
traveling between Lille and Roubaix-Tourcoing without their special permission.7 
 The Bulletin de Roubaix’s circulation exceeded the 12,000 copies per issue 
mark by the first anniversary of the paper.8 It was still available in all three cities, 
although the newspaper devoted less and less space to advertisements and news 
originating in Lille until they all but disappeared. The publishers claimed that they 
were proud of their paper, “which had rapidly gained credence in public opinion, 
thanks to providing interesting and varied information that was useful in real life.”9 
The administrators of the paper had the limited aim of informing the populace of 
German orders, city services, food committee aid, and some news that would be of 
daily interest.10 Unlike the Bulletin de Lille, which had a menacing tone, the Bulletin 
de Roubaix appears to have truly been a vehicle the German authorities utilized to 
disseminate information, without the added aim of continuously instilling terror and 
hopelessness in the occupied people. The newspaper included recurring sections, 
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much like today’s papers. “Acts of German Authority,” appeared in 131 out of the 
191 issues published, and, when present, this article was always in the lead position.  
The “Notices from City Halls” section was in every issue but one.11 Theatre reviews 
and a sports section appeared frequently. The newspaper commonly reported upon 
civil court proceedings, which fell under various headings. Other sections included an 
advice column and a review of “Act of Decency,”12 which applauded a local person 
who returned lost items of value to their owners without demanding compensation. 
Some stories and news pieces stood alone and did not fall into any of these categories. 
Advertisements, along with birth and death announcements dominated the backside 
of the paper.  To best examine the news available to people in the occupied zone 
through the Bulletin de Roubaix, this chapter will examine these regular sections.  
 
“Acts of German Authority” to Frivolity:  
From Orders to Attempts at Distraction  
    The “Acts of German Authority” column appeared in sixty-nine percent of 
the Bulletin de Roubaix issues as compared to approximately eighty-five percent of 
the Bulletin de Lille issues.  In both papers, prohibitory decrees and German orders, 
including requisition demands and census roll calls primarily made up most of this 
section.  The notices announcing required census roll calls were frequent, requiring 
either the whole population to present themselves, or more frequently, men born 
between 1867-1900.  On some occasions, the Germans required men over the age of 
sixteen not only to present themselves, but also to present evidence of their 
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profession, suggesting those not currently employed would be forced to work for the 
Germans.13 Another census notice required the population to state where they lived 
and note any empty houses around them, warning of up to a three-year prison term if 
they did not comply.14 The line between census taking and requisition preparation 
blurred when requests included listing every animal owned by the people of 
Roubaix.15 Both newspapers at times printed such commands and notices after their 
start dates, albeit less frequently in the Bulletin de Roubaix. This happened eight 
times in the Roubaix paper, including on September 19, 1917, when an earlier curfew 
hour could have made the prior edition.16 As the Germans placed notices throughout 
the city, it is uncertain if these publication dates affected that many people, and 
whether the late notification was a conscious decision or an error made by a 
newspaper staff working under the strain of occupation.    
The tone of the demands sometimes differed in the two newspapers, with 
“Acts of German Authority” in the Bulletin de Roubaix tending to sound less 
terrorizing. At times, the difference between the two papers reflected a difference in 
the circumstances of the cities.  Thanks to the German-imposed isolation of the cities, 
Roubaix did not suffer the typhoid outbreak that afflicted Lille; hence, strict 
sanitation decrees were not as necessary in Roubaix.  For the most part, however, 
both cities endured equal torments of forced labor, food shortages, requisitioning, and 
the fear of fines or imprisonment for even minor infractions. The difference in the 
papers was not a reflection of the difference of life in the cities, but a variation in the 
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communication of information. J.P. Whitaker experienced German control of 
Roubaix until he escaped in January 1916.  He wrote of the harshness of German rule 
in Roubaix, noting that before March 1915, the German governors treated the people 
of Roubaix with tolerable leniency, but at this time began “to initiate a regime of 
stringent regulation and repression,” perhaps as a response to the British attack on 
Neuve Chapelle.17  
 That is not to contend that “Acts of German Authority” in the Bulletin de 
Roubaix read as polite pleas to follow the rules.  Most articles sinisterly 
prognosticated the fines and punishments the Germans would bestow upon those who 
did not follow their often-arbitrary rules. The German writers of the “Acts of German 
Authority” ruthlessly told readers the German occupiers would shoot them without 
any hesitation if they attempted to communicate with prisoners of war being herded 
through their towns and cities.18 Despite the regular reports of people sentenced for 
crimes - including those punished by execution - there were no reports in the Bulletin 
de Roubaix of the Germans shooting any French citizens for talking with prisoners of 
war taken through the city. One prisoner of war reported that as German soldiers 
(specifically Uhlans, German cavalry) moved him through the city, they “employed 
their lances for beating off Belgian or French women who tried to give [them] 
food.”19 
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Despite the frequent harsh tone, a benevolent quality often crept into the 
section when compared to its Bulletin de Lille counterpart. For example, a request for 
workers early in the paper’s publication lauded the rewards of the jobs, rather than 
threatening reprisals if French men and women did not come forward to fill the 
positions. Potential employees read that employment as masons, locksmiths, and 
carpenters paid well and that they could continue to live at home while working.20  
Those evacuating to unoccupied France learned what they were allowed to take with 
them, rather than having to read what they were forbidden to carry.21 Rather than 
telling people all outdoor lights were forbidden and that indoor lights had to have 
been invisible in the street, as the Bulletin de Lille did early in 1917, the Bulletin de 
Roubaix explained to its readers that the combined danger of airplane attacks and the 
need to save energy meant they should restrict lighting as much as possible.22 Another 
warning asked readers in Roubaix to immediately report to the closest authorities if 
they found any unexploded shells, and not to touch them because the danger of death 
– giving the dictate the echo of a paternal warning.23  The fatherly advice quality of 
“Acts of German Authority” appeared again when readers learned of a deadly 
accident caused by picking up a hand grenade and the German occupiers used the 
story as a warning to inform the authorities of any live ammunition.24 The Bulletin de 
Roubaix also lacked the menacing sub-column “German Military Justice,” that 
commonly dominated the Lille newspaper. The newspaper occasionally included 
sentences handed down by the German authorities, but in only one issue did criminal 
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sentences dominant the paper. In this one issue, the reporting of sentences by German 
authorities seemed clearly to have been meant to instill fear in the population.  On 
September 1, 1917, the entire front side of the paper and a portion of the flipside 
consisted of a sub-section of “Acts of German Authority,” entitled “Sentenced.”  In 
total, the article listed sixty-three people and their punishments. The least severe 
punishments included were a seven-week sentence for the unauthorized selling of a 
horse and a three-month sentence for theft.  The most spectacular cases, and perhaps 
the instigations of this ominous article, included the Abbé Jules Pinte’s receipt of a 
ten and half year sentence for possessing a telegraph, and Joseph Willot and Firmin 
Dubar receiving ten year sentences (in Dubar’s case ten years and one month) for the 
hostile act of editing and publishing an uncensored paper.25  The newspaper also 
reported upon executions of people outside of Roubaix in this section four times, 
information that clearly meant to serve as a warning.26 Such heavy-handedness was 
the exception in the Bulletin de Roubaix but the norm in the Bulletin de Lille.  The 
newspaper did not refer to the deportations of French men and women, which one 
witness described as nothing more than brutal and undisguised slave raids.27 
 In Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, German-set curfews were ever changing 
and the occupied received harsh punishments if they disobeyed these curfews. This 
regulation on daily life carried the extra insult as the Germans ordered “German 
central time,” to be used, a fact that caused extensive bitterness.28 The phrase, 
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“German central time” confronted readers of the Bulletin de Lille with every time 
reference in “Acts of German Authority.”  In the Roubaix newspaper, writers did not 
utilize this offensive term; hours within “Acts of German Authority,” specified 
“central European time,” and often the paper carried a reminder outside the “Acts of 
German Authority” section that all times indicated were “public time.”29  It is 
surprising that writers used the phrase “public time,” for it suggested that in the 
privacy of people’s homes, “French” time was still used, which would have been an 
act of defiance against the Germans.  In one issue, under “Notices from City Hall,” 
the French civil servants forced to work under the Germans, utilized the wording 
“army time”30 Different wording for the same regulations did not change their 
meaning, but it slightly lessened the propaganda message that the Germans were so 
entrenched in the occupied zone that one could never hope they would be gone.  
   German administrative policies in northern France developed haphazardly, 
often through trial and error, with an orderly system with clear traits only developing 
almost two years into the war.31  Commandants of cities and towns had leeway in 
how they governed their realms.  Hence some of the difference in styles of “Acts of 
German Authority” could be attributed to the different approaches of General von 
Heinrich in Lille and Commandant Hofmann in Roubaix. Moreover, von Heinrich 
signed the vast majority of “Acts of German Authority” in Lille, which is not 
surprising since he included orders and demands given to the civilian administration 
during his frequent Commandant’s conferences. Both von Heinrich and Hofmann 
ruled their areas punctiliously, but Hofmann did not report with the same frequency 
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smaller affairs, such as bar and café closings.32 While Hofmann was responsible for 
more declarations in the Bulletin de Roubaix than any other person, several other 
voices also emerged.  Von Tessin, the Commandant of Tourcoing, did publish 
decrees, but usually limited himself to reiterating Hofmann’s message.  However, 
over ten other German leaders also placed notices in the Roubaix newspaper, 
including not only various inspectors working under Hofmann, but military leaders 
who saw Roubaix and its surrounding areas as part of their battlefield.33  German 
military leaders also viewed Lille as part of their battlefield, but the authoritative von 
Heinrich controlled almost all contact with the civilian occupied population, 
including issuing orders in the Bulletin de Lille. 
 
Notices from City Halls 
 The column was entitled “Notices from City Halls,” (with “city hall” 
pluralized) but the majority of the information came from the Roubaix administration, 
with less frequent notices from nearby Mouvaux, Toufflers, Hem, Croix, Wattrelos, 
and Tourcoing. As in the Bulletin de Lille, this section habitually reiterated German 
demands.  An often-utilized format was to announce under this heading that city hall 
received a notice from the German authorities making the mayor responsible for 
ensuring public obedience to German regulations, such as those requiring posting lists 
of inhabitants on the front doors of homes, declaring all dogs, or not changing one’s 
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residence without permission.34 This created an impression of collaboration at times 
when the mayor co-signed notices with the commandant, such as one in January 
1918, on the distribution of hay for horses.35 Akin to public reaction to similar 
attempts by the Germany to create an impression of collaboration, the respect the 
occupied people kept for their local leaders suggests they knew it was involuntary 
collaboration.   
 Along with the birth, death, and marriage notices usually found on the back 
page of the paper, it was the news that appeared under this heading that mostly likely 
drew readers to the Bulletin de Roubaix.  Without prisoner of war lists like those in 
the Gazette des Ardennes to entice an audience, it was news about all the important 
roles the civilian government took on during the occupation that made the Roubaix 
paper indispensable to people’s lives.  Readers could regularly expect to find 
information about state allocation hand-out dates, changes in ration provisions, the 
availability of supplies such as coal and chip wood to the population, special 
distributions of goods such as vegetables, the maximum prices the Germans allowed 
merchants to charge, and pharmacists available during non-business hours.  Also 
included was news from the locally operated Comité d’Alimentation de Roubaix 
(although news from the larger Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France was 
given under its own heading).36 It is interesting to note that the only written piece in 
the Bulletin de Roubaix emanating from outside occupied France and not from 
another German-controlled paper was a letter about attempts to supply the area from 
the Comité de Ravitaillement des Villes Envahies du Nord de la France, which 
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operated out of Paris. The information in the newspaper made clear how vital the 
food supplied by the committee was to the people of Roubaix.  
As so many goods were extremely scarce during the second half of the war, 
officials often held lotteries for resources or goods.  Reading the Bulletin de Roubaix 
was a good way to find out about such drawings and if one’s number had been lucky, 
whether it was for a section of public garden space or shoes.37 The food problem was 
as severe in Roubaix as Lille.  When the German closed the Belgian-French frontier, 
the effect was to reduce to an “insignificant trickle” the profuse stream of foodstuffs 
that Roubaix imported from Belgium.38 The city became reliant upon food and 
supplies brought in by the American Relief Commission. It opened a food depot, run 
in cities such as Roubaix by local committees.  These committees issued vouchers for 
basic items, and people lined up at the depot to hopefully attain their allotted rations 
of items such as rice, lard, coffee, bread, and occasionally condensed milk, and small 
amounts of sugar.39 The newspaper informed readers of when the Commission had 
various items available, but did not hint at the corruption that plagued the system at a 
local level.  
A seven-part series running from January through March 1918 about how to 
detect fake vouchers also began under the “Notices from City Halls” banner.40 A hint 
given in the February 6, 1918, issue advised readers to accept no vouchers bearing the 
name of the commune of “Lersvin,” since no commune named Lersvin existed. The 
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newspaper also shared other critical facts, such as when water became unpotable and 
people had to boil it to ensure they would not become sick, under “Notices from City 
Halls.”41 It would not be melodramatic to state the news under this heading was vital 
to the existence of many people.     
 
Theatre, Sports, and Other Distractions 
 The Roubaisian poet Amédée Provost rather harshly described his city as a 
town “without an artistic past, without beauty, and without history.”42 The people of 
Roubaix proved Provost wrong at least on the first part by working diligently to 
continue the cultural life of the city to the extent possible. During its first year of 
publication, the Bulletin de Roubaix featured regular news under the headings 
“Theatre Chronicle,” and “Sports Chronicle.”  These sections added a flavor of 
normalcy to the otherwise survival-based focus of the paper.  Starting in the fifth 
issue of the paper readers could expect under the section-title “Roubaix Matinées,” 
theatre reviews, performance schedules, and notices for up-coming performances. 
The newspaper reported upon concerts to benefit the poor, including how much 
money they raised. A newspaper writer deemed an early event a success, both 
because of the quality of music played and because it raised over 778 francs for the 
poor.43 While a few events raised money for the committee for the aid of prisoners, 
most of the productions aided the poor, sick, children, and seniors. This was a 
continuation of pre-war charity work. A dedicated religious and patriarchal 
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bourgeoisie organized to protect working class families with a fervor that set Roubaix 
apart from other industrial cities.44 
The paper’s staff published reviews of performances in Lille by various 
charitable organizations until the German occupiers forbade travel between the two 
cities without an expensive and hard-to-obtain pass, but coverage of Roubaix events 
continued. At times coverage was quite extensive, one time even taking up 
approximately a quarter of the paper.45  Between late October 1917 and early March 
1918, only one edition carried any theatre news.46 Then on March 9, and March 13, 
1918, the newspaper included a long, two-part article on the history of theatre in 
Roubaix. Jacques du Hutin chronicled the history of theatre in Roubaix back seventy-
five years, specifically noting the city’s rich history in amateur theatre. He wrote that 
theatre was important to the working class, who toiled thirteen or fourteen hours a 
day and that during the 1860s even the mayor supported the amateur troop.47 This 
was the last time “Theatre Chronicle” appeared in the paper.48  The article seemed 
almost an homage to the theatre work described in the newspaper, which combined 
artistic lessons and performances, with the proceeds going to charity. It disappeared 
with no explanation as to whether the newspaper staff simply chose to devote the 
paper’s limited space to other information, or if theatre events stopped occurring in 
Roubaix.          
 Sports coverage followed a similar path to that of theatre coverage, although 
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editors did not formally head this material “Sports Chronicle” until the thirty-eighth 
issue. Reporting of the results of football matches (i.e. American soccer) began in the 
sixth issue of the paper. Until the ban on travel, coverage included multiple cities’ 
teams, including ones from Roubaix, such as the Racing Club de Roubaix, Lille’s the 
Étoile Club Lillois and teams from Tourcoing, including the Association Sportive 
Tourquenoise and l’Union Sportive Tourquenoise. 49 Like theatre performances, there 
could be a charitable objective to these events; at least one tournament benefited 
charity during the occupation.50 At least two of the teams, the Racing Club de 
Roubaix and the Union Sportive Tourquennoise were semi-professional teams before 
the war, playing other national teams in the Union de Sociétés Français de Sports 
Athlétiques. Established in 1895, the Racing Club de Roubaix was USFSA champion 
in 1902, 1903, 1904, 1906, and 1908.  According to the International Federation of 
Football History and Statistics, these teams had ties with teams in Britain and 
Belgium, as players moved from area to area.51 The website also notes that several 
players from these teams fought and lost their lives in the war.  It appears that the 
players that remained played local exhibition charity games.  It is possible that the 
Etoile Club Lillois was comprised of players from the two Lille-based USFSA teams, 
the Olympique Lillois and the Iris Club Lillois. It is unclear how there were enough 
men to play on these teams after so many men mobilized for war before the 
occupation, perhaps the team relied on older and younger men.52  
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 All sports news, like that of theatre, could be erratic, and it disappeared for 
forty-three installments, beginning with the May 2, 1917, issue.  Sports coverage only 
appeared three more times during the life of the Bulletin de Roubaix, with its last 
appearance being coverage of a Roubaix-Tourcoing match, on June 8, 1918.53 Such 
as the case with the theatre productions, it is unclear whether any games took place 
after this date and the newspaper simply did not cover them.    
This was not the end of all sports -and entertainment- related news pieces. 
Starting four issues after the erratic sports coverage ended, the paper began running a 
column entitled “Recreational time-passers.”54 This seven-part series discussed 
various moves in the board game of checkers, with illustrated photos to demonstrate 
them.55  Incorporating such mundane items as pretend checker matches in a paper 
whose editors frequently lamented the lack of space they had to publish news was a 
trend that developed during the second half of the paper’s run. Newspaper editors 
frequently relied upon “filler” items, written to plug news holes.56 One could imagine 
that under German occupation, when censors so freely rejected sentences and stories, 
inoffensive filler items would have been even more useful.57  The newspaper included 
a great number of non-news pieces; often of such a length and in such great frequency 
that these items’ role was to do more than fill minor gaps. From the very beginning, 
the Bulletin de Roubaix published what today’s media consumers would dismiss as 
“fluff” pieces, which did not carry any intrinsic news value. The second issue of the 
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paper included a poem about Christmas dedicated to mothers and their little 
children.58 Three issues carried the lyrics to a ballad about a woman obtaining 
supplies.59  
 One interesting trend in the publication of non-news in the newspaper was to 
highlight a certain small nearby town, neighborhood, street, or natural landmark and 
provide a brief history explaining how it got its name. This occurred seven times, 
with subjects including Barbieux Park, Tilleul and Cartigny Streets.60 Jacques du 
Hutin’s name appeared on the by-line of three of these articles, while the others 
carried no indication of authorship.  In Lille, the Germans went so far as to change the 
names of the streets and squares to reflect their authority, but chose not to in 
Roubaix.61 Allowing these articles suggests that the Germans were not trying to use 
the Bulletin de Roubaix as a propaganda weapon, but at the same time, they did not 
haphazardly choose what sites to highlight.  In the April 17, 1918, issue of the 
Bulletin de Roubaix, an article appeared by Jacque du Hutin occupying the entire 
second column of the first page.  Entitled “The Cradle of Roubaix,” the article traced 
the history of the Trichon, a large creek running through Roubaix and Tourcoing.62 
Most of the article focused upon the early history of the creek, tracing it back to 
ancient Rome.  The article noted that scholars believed four different groups of 
people lived near or utilized the Trichon, including Germanic tribes.63 This article not 
only tied the area to a time before the countries of France and German existed, it 
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implied that the French were not the only ones with historical ties to the area. 
Somewhat of a “fluff” piece, the historical information included was so general that it 
was not incorrect but also not meaningful. Another article, author unknown, stated a 
reader wrote in curious about the etymology of the name “Roubaix.”64 Again, in this 
briefer article, this time situated on the second page of the newspaper (an issue 
produced on pink paper), the history lesson dates back hundreds of years, to the 
eleventh through the thirteenth centuries.  People spelled the name of the city over 
fifteen different ways during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with Roubaix and 
Rosbacum being the most frequently utilized. By the thirteenth century the number of 
forms of the name was down to nine, with Roubaix eventually emerging as the 
accepted name.65  
 In non-occupied zones during the war, filler stories in newspapers usually 
were comprised of patriotic “fluff.” Here it seems the editors chose filler pieces 
because they were non-controversial distractions. By June 1918, it appears part of the 
newspaper’s mandate had become to distract the population from both their own 
miserable existence and the obvious signs of growing German weakness.  Five issues 
during this time carried benign scientific articles on subjects including an overview of 
the human heart and the potential for making artificial rain.66 One edition provided no 
current information beyond “Notices from City Hall,” with the remainder of the paper 
filled with articles on how to read a barometer and bird wakeup times.67 
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One run of apparently frivolous articles was a nine-part series on the 
characteristics of various shepherd dogs.68 It is worthwhile to examine this long series 
on shepherd dogs, as at first glance it appeared a rather innocuous topic. Most people 
have some warm sentiments towards dogs, and even those who do not, hardly 
consider them a controversial topic. However, in occupied Roubaix, the subject of 
dogs was contentious. Ruth Wright Kauffmann interviewed a Madame Reboux (it is 
unclear whether this was the same Madame Reboux that worked for Le Bulletin de 
Roubaix) after she escaped after living in occupied Roubaix for twenty-six months. 
Madame Reboux told of the repercussions of the German occupiers placing a forty-
franc tax on each domestic dog, “…In our part of France everyone loved his dog…the 
injustice – the impossibility; forty francs in a starving town… so we all consulted 
together and acted.  The next morning, the Germans saw floating, drowned in the 
canal, the bodies of every dog in our part of Roubaix.  And wrapped over the body of 
each dog was a French flag.”69 Under “Acts of German Authority,” the Bulletin de 
Roubaix warned readers that the Germans forbade killing one’s pet dog if they were 
unable to pay the tax.70 Furthermore, the series focused upon the group of dogs most 
associated with specific countries. In medieval Europe, regions developed local 
herding dogs to fulfill their own unique needs. With the rise of nationalism in the 
nineteenth century, it became important to some to have a respectable sheep dog 
representing one’s own nation. Noting the popularity of Scottish collies at the end of 
the nineteenth century, German dog aficionados aimed to develop their own shepherd 
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dog by combining various local types.  Two men, Max von Strephanitz and Artur 
Meyer bred the modern-day German shepherd in 1899.71 This series discussed the 
German shepherd alongside those types that inspired their breeding, including the 
English collie and Belgian sheepdog.  While dogs had a long history in northern 
France, working both alongside families and enjoying their leisure time, no one breed 
of dog was especially associated with the area.72 Moreover, this series appeared in 
June and July 1918, and in August, the war decisively turned against Germany.73 It is 
uncertain whether this series was simply meant to distract the population, or came 
from a German directive to rub salt in a citywide wound. 
Like the Bulletin de Lille, the Roubaix newspaper carried another non-news 
section, an advice column. Starting late in the summer of 1917, people wrote in with 
questions to which the editors provided answers. The newspaper’s editorial staff 
warned people that they must provide their name and address if they wanted their 
letter to be printed. Like respondents to a similar column in Lille, many people 
seemed concerned with laws regarding leases during wartime, and there was at least 
one article involving bigamy.74 During peace time bigamy was a rare crime in France, 
because it was an extremely difficult offense to commit without authorities 
discovering the crime.75  However, in periods of catastrophe, such as war, normal 
modes of communication break down, allowing potential bigamists to go unnoticed.  
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Combined with the weakening matrimonial ties and the governments’ focus upon 
other matters, war has historically been a time of increased bigamy.  
Cooking with limited supplies was also a recurring theme in “Minor 
Information Requested,” including advice on how to salvage potatoes that froze 
accidentally.76  Apparently, there also existed a heavy demand for abstruse, general 
information on topics such as the history of Titus and Romulus, how to train a parrot, 
and a description of a troubadour.77 Such trivialities may have been fabricated by 
editors to distract readers; certainly they must have irked some, as by June 1918 few 
people in Roubaix barely had enough to eat, let alone the means to be concerned with 
training an exotic pet. Along with the advice column, this information was similar to 
the women’s sections of many newspapers before the war. Such sections contained 
relationship advice, recipes, and fashion trends.78 
 “Acts of Decency” started appearing in the Bulletin de Roubaix in its tenth 
issue. Sometimes it appeared under “Acts of City Halls,” and sometimes under its 
own banner, but the type of stories featured remained constant. The moral was 
manifest: hardship is not an excuse for dishonesty, even if that dishonesty is that 
passive type of not returning found objects.  Almost every example reads like that of 
a young woman from Tourcoing who returned 700 francs she found after mass in 
church despite the fact that her husband was extremely ill and that they were 
completely without resources.79 The amounts might have varied, and sometimes the 
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lost items were ration cards, vouchers, or jewels, but the basic tale was the same.  One 
has to question the intelligence of one article that gave the name and address of a 
woman who lost her wallet with the substantial sum of 600 francs in it, and had it 
returned to her, potentially pointing out to the desperate or unscrupulous a potential 
robbery victim.   During a time of great need, “Acts of Decency” may have been an 
advertisement for the dishonest but common behavior of robbery. While this may 
have been a risk posed by the regular column, the public lauding of honest people 
seemed intended to encourage integrity during a time when morality became a 
malleable concept. If one’s conscience was not enough to ensure honesty, perhaps the 
possibility of brief celebrity might encourage decency, as the names and addresses of 
the good samaritans graced the newspaper’s pages.  Juxtaposed against these stories, 
crime was a crucial concentration of the paper, as its regular feature, the “Judicial 
Chronicle,” demonstrated.  
 
Civilian Court Coverage 
 The first “Judicial Chronicle” appeared in the twentieth issue of the Bulletin 
de Roubaix and from that point on it was a common segment of the paper.  It 
contained highlights from the Correctional Tribunal of Lille. Before the war broke 
out, the French judicial system consisted of a comprehensive court system at various 
levels, embodying the goal of the revolutionaries of 1789 of easy accessibility to 
justice for most French citizens.80 In the national criminal court system, (as opposed 
to the civil court system, or specialized courts, including labor, commercial and social 
security courts) there were several hundred police courts (tribunaux de police) that 
                                                 
80
 William Safran, The French Polity, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1985), 232-233. 
  
154
 
heard cases that in Anglo-American procedure would be classified misdemeanors and 
over a hundred higher courts (tribunaux correctionnnels) that heard felonies that 
merited a prison sentence of less than a decade.81  The Correctional Tribunal of Lille 
was one of the latter courts, and heard important criminal cases for the area, including 
Roubaix and Tourcoing.  Timothy Pooley notes, in time of prosperity it mattered little 
to the cities of Roubaix and Tourcoing that the Préfecture, Palais de Justice, the 
Cathedral, and University were all in Lille, with the other two cities relying 
exclusively economic vocations.82 Occupation made having these regional institutions 
in Lille problematic for the people of Tourcoing and Roubaix.  
At first, the reports of the Correctional Tribunal’s activities in the Bulletin de 
Roubaix were somewhat current.  For example, the March 14, 1917, issue carried 
cases heard on March 3, 1917.  However, the newspaper soon fell behind, and by the 
end of November 1917, the newspaper was only reporting on cases from July 1917.83 
Eventually the paper skipped four months worth of incident reports to become more 
up to date.84 It appears that the editors of the Bulletin de Roubaix especially selected 
cases concerning people from the area. Thus, the newspaper published the 
condemnations of residents of Roubaix and Tourcoing in the March and April 1917 
issues.85   
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      Most of the published cases centered upon people charged with cheating their 
fellow citizens when selling wares, people defrauding the aid systems, child, and 
spousal abuse, and stealing. For example one woman in Roubaix stood accused of 
selling fake cleaning products, another with selling adulterated milk, and a third 
woman in Lille received a fifty franc fine for adding flour to extend the mustard she 
sold.86 The penalty for taking undeserved military allocations was much greater, as 
one person earned a three-month prison sentence for their deception.87 The newspaper 
paid special attention to cases dealing with the mistreatment of children, such as the 
one of the Tourcoing woman sentenced to six months in jail for abusing her 
children.88 An eyewitness wrote at the time that, despite the temptations of crime, 
which were great for the mostly idle and needy population of Roubaix, there were 
very few civilian offenses against either French or German law committed by the 
inhabitants of Roubaix.89 Witaker suggested the “bridled savagery of the German 
gendarmeries” provided the people of Roubaix the inducement to keep within the 
law,90 perhaps even extending to French matters. 
 It is clear that people read the “Judicial Chronicle,” and looked down their 
collective noses at the persons making the lives of their fellow citizens of the 
occupied zone harder through dishonest acts.  On four separate occasions blurbs 
under the heading “Namesakes” appeared, stating that a person mentioned in 
connection to a court case was not a relative of a local family.  For example, Edmond 
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van Lede, a painter and tapestry maker, wanted everyone to know that he was no 
relation to the van Lede condemned by the correctional tribunal of Lille.91  In another 
example a woman whose name only sound liked that of a convicted man wanted to 
put an end to the confusion that she was a relation of someone who had stolen 
harvested food.92 These responses to the crime reporting section of the paper suggest 
that readers believed this part of the Bulletin de Roubaix was a credible source of 
information. The activities of the Correctional Tribunal of Lille were a rare example 
of Frenchmen exerting control over their own community.  It made fiscal sense for 
the German occupiers to require the French court system to continue to oversee 
relatively minor infractions.  However, it is surprising that German censors allowed 
the editors of the Bulletin de Roubaix to publish the Correctional Tribunal’s 
decisions, as this practice undermined the image the Germans wanted to create of 
themselves being the sole source of authority in the occupied zone. 
 Very late into the newspaper’s publication, it began to carry additional crime 
reports under the titles “Local Chronicle,” and “Roubaix Justice of the Peace.”  The 
“Local Chronicle,” which appeared in all but four editions between July and October 
1918, told of crimes committed, as opposed to stories of people arrested and 
sentenced. In one article, the writer told of vegetables stolen from someone’s 
backyard garden.93 It is surprising that the German controllers allowed this section in 
the paper, as it revealed that people were committing crimes, including violations of 
the German-imposed curfew, and those crimes were going unsolved. These few 
articles undermined the appearance of the omnipotent German authority that the rest 
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of the paper attempted to convey. 
 The “Roubaix Justice of the Peace,” was not a successful endeavor for the 
newspaper.  Appearing only twice in its pages, the first article told of a disagreement 
between two neighbors and the damages that the court declared one side deserved.94 
The second installment had to provide a clarification for the first after one of the 
neighbors filed a complaint with the newspaper about the misrepresentation of the 
events. The role of the justice of the peace was to arbitrate disagreements before they 
escalated and became the purview of a civil or special court. These two late additions 
to the newspaper did not replace coverage from the Lille Tribunal but ran alongside 
it, making the Bulletin de Roubaix very heavy with news of crime and retribution, but 
giving the impression that the Germans did not control every aspect of communal life.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Bulletin de Roubaix did not provide a great deal of information and news 
about the current state of political and military affairs in Roubaix or in the larger 
world outside the occupied zone of France.  If a hypothetical Roubaisian remained 
truly sheltered within their home, with only the Bulletin de Roubaix as a source of 
information, that person would not even have known the Germans were showing 
signs of losing the war prior to the very last edition of the paper, printed November 
16, 1918, a month after the last German-controlled issue was published. The tone of 
complete German domination remained until the last German-published issue, in 
which the editors had to acknowledge that Allied troops had bombed Lille, Roubaix, 
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and Tourcoing.95 However, the people of Roubaix knew that the end was fast 
approaching for their German occupiers.  As Philip Gibbs reported for the New York 
Times in October 1918, the Germans could not hide from the civilians that their 
system of control was breaking up as “their horses became so thin and starved that 
even in the streets of Lille they used to drop dead …[the German soldiers] became 
pinched and pallid.96 Reporting in the Bulletin de Roubaix did not reflect the 
Germans’ weakening position. Readers knew the paper did not reflect the truth of 
what was happening in their city.  
Very little news from outside the occupied zone permeated the Bulletin de 
Roubaix’s pages.  While this newspaper attempted to fill the void left by local, rather 
than national newspapers, the lack of reference to international events is noteworthy. 
Other than news of executions in German-occupied Belgium, the number of articles 
providing news of the war numbered less that five.  Readers, for example, learned of 
the German and Austrian victory against the Italians on the Isunzo that was part of the 
Italian collapse in the Battle of Caporetto during the fall of 1917 and of the peace 
talks in Brest-Litovsk that would lead to the Russians exiting the war.97 The 
information and tone in these examples correspond with the coverage the events 
received in La Gazette des Ardennes. The newspaper vaunted the Russian exit from 
the war with such jubilation as to sound like victory for the Germans was certain, 
while not mentioning the American entrance into the war. The article described the 
Austro-German success in crossing the Isonzo River and taking the town of 
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Caporetto, but did not include their use of gas shells to achieve it.98 The article did not 
have to exaggerate the Italian divisions’ breakdown. Other than these two articles 
clearly aimed at illustrating German dominance in the war, the newspaper included 
no stories about battles or diplomatic activities. Early in the publishing of the paper, 
one article estimated and discussed the free French harvest and another discussed the 
treatment of French prisoners of war held in Germany.99 Both these stories were 
reprints of articles from German-controlled papers in other occupied zones, although 
the French harvest article was originally from the Journal Officiel de Paris.100 A few 
obituaries of important French figures in unoccupied France, such as the musician 
Claude Debussy, also made rare appearances in the Bulletin de Roubaix.101 However, 
this dissertation’s contention that more news filtered into occupied France than 
formerly supposed, does not rest on what information was available through this 
particular paper – other sources support this assertion.  
 The Bulletin de Roubaix played a limited but important role in informing its 
isolated readers. It notified them of the German authorities’ ever-changing rules and 
regulations and what help was available to them in the form of rations and 
allocations.  It did not consistently attempt to terrorize and demoralize the populace as 
the Bulletin de Lille did, but rather at times tried to distract people with 
inconsequential articles on things such as the habits of swallows.102 For a long while 
the paper did serve as a tenuous connection between Lille and Roubaix.  This 
newspaper suggests the disconnection and isolation between Roubaix – Tourcoing 
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and Lille was not as great as sometimes imagined. Le Bulletin de Roubaix maintained 
an office in Lille, and provided free home delivery in that city when readers requested 
a three-month subscription.103 The paper published the tramway timetable until the 
Germans invoked rules making travel between the two cities extremely difficult and 
included news about the theatre in Lille for a while. Some news from the bigger city 
also came also through in the form of advertisements and tidbits of news in the 
Judicial Chronicle. Indeed the Bulletin de Roubaix appeared to provide a somewhat 
modest connection to the outside world. Of course, one must remember the 
newspaper portrayed life in occupied Roubaix and Tourcoing as the German 
occupiers wanted people to see it. 
                                                 
103
 Ibid., January 20, 1917, and February 10, 1917. 
  
161
 
Chapter Six: 
La Gazette des Ardennes 
 
People in occupied France received the largest percentage of their news from La 
Gazette des Ardennes. Published from November 1, 1914, through October 21, 1918, La 
Gazette provided regular, voluminous, in-depth coverage of the war and international 
affairs several times a week. An advertisement for the newspaper proclaimed that it 
carried official communiqués from Britain, France, and Germany, as well as the names of 
prisoners of war held in Germany and regional news from different areas of the occupied 
zone. It claimed to provide “all daily news concerning the European war.”1 The paper 
was widely read.  At its height, the publishers claimed a circulation of 175,000 per issue.2  
Deborah Buffton notes that this was a dramatic decline in circulation compared to pre-
war newspapers.  In the tri-city area, numerous newspapers enjoyed a wide circulation 
just before the war, with L’Echo du Nord alone selling over 180,000 copies per day.3 
However, she also explains this did not mean La Gazette des Ardennes was relatively 
ignored by the occupied populace.  Some people may have avoided the newspaper due to 
a distrust of news through German sources, but people also shared copies of the paper 
due to financial considerations, leading to a higher level of readership than circulation 
numbers suggest. The paper cost 5 centimes, or 10 centimes with prisoner of war lists. It 
became available in the tri-city region around December 1914, with many places to buy it 
in the cities, including bookstores and post offices. By mid-1915, an official German 
                                                 
1
 “toutes les nouvelles du jour concernant la guerre européenne.” La Gazette des Ardennes, May 21, 1917. 
2
 While the Germans made a majority of the issues available in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, La Gazette 
was also available in smaller occupied towns, and even intermittently to prisoners of war. 
3
 Buffton, 7-8. 
  
162
 
ordinance prohibited the reading of any newspaper except the Gazette des Ardennes, 
Bulletin de Lille, or the Bulletin de Roubaix.4 
La Gazette des Ardennes celebrated its one-year anniversary by reminding its 
readers that the German authorities’ kindness created this newspaper to bring them truth 
and justice in a time characterized by misinformation.5 While the occupied population 
read this paper, they did not believe it to be a beacon of truth in a world of lies. To the 
contrary, one reader noted that to understand what was really happening in the war, the 
truth had to be “discerned” from La Gazette des Ardennes.6 People read it with 
resignation. Articles were longer and hence allowed more leeway for the insertion of 
propaganda in La Gazette des Ardennes as compared to Le Bulletin de Lille and Le 
Bulletin de Roubaix. Unlike these other newspapers, which included a great deal of non-
news pieces, hard news pieces comprised most of La Gazette des Ardennes. Describing it 
as “Boche poison,” one reader stated that the paper’s raison d’être was to compromise 
the spirit of the invaded and to detach them from the rest of France. He stated, however, 
that no one was being intoxicated, and the crass message of the paper instead inspired a 
spirit of sacrifice among the occupied.7 The French in the occupied zone had such a low 
opinion of the occupying Germans, a fact the Germans themselves admitted in the pages 
of Liller Kriegszeitung, that it is not surprising that a newspaper produced by the 
Germans was not respected.8   Thus, the aim of the newspaper, to reduce French hostility 
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and prepare northern France for a future characterized by close ties to Germany, was an 
ambitious one.9 
After a brief overview of the administration and the mechanics of the publication 
of La Gazette des Ardennes, this chapter examines what information this newspaper 
provided to the people of Lille, starting December 27, 1914, and shortly thereafter the 
people of Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Essentially the Gazette des Ardennes provided its 
readers five categories of news: 1) war news, including information from the battlefront, 
lists of prisoners and the dead, and submarine and zeppelin activity; 2) news about 
unoccupied France; 3) negative information about Germany’s enemies; 4) information 
revealing an obsession with the Parisian press; 5) positive news about Germany. These 
five themes, along with an examination of serials and advertisements in the newspaper 
reveal that a great deal of information was available through this paper, but almost all of 
it came with a dose of bias. 
 
 
Administration and Publication 
 
La Gazette des Ardennes was a military enterprise, under Section IIIb of the 
general staff, and its head, Colonel Walter Nicolai.10 Captain Fritz H. Schnitzer directed 
the newspaper, but he was not a journalist and quickly sought a journalist as editor of the 
newspaper. After two failed attempts utilizing amateur journalists, Gaspari and 
Teschemacer, the newspaper found its permanent editor, René Prévot. Prévot, the Paris 
correspondent for the German newspaper Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, was born in 
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Alsace but became a naturalized German and married an Austrian woman.11 He wrote 
French fluently while fully supporting German war aims.12 He was an excellent editor. 
One French reader living through the occupation described the newspaper as carefully 
edited, hence perhaps reinforcing the impression that Germany would eventually win the 
war. 13 
The newspaper referred to the editorial staff but never offered names, whether to 
conceal the Germanic identity of most of its staff, or to protect the few French 
collaborators.  The newspaper publishers attempted to recruit French journalists, most 
often with little success. Some French prisoners held in German camps agreed to write 
for the paper, such as sub-lieutenant Roger Hervé, who wrote three articles advocating 
French pacifism.  In 1919, the French military sentenced him to death for treason, along 
with two others, for writing these articles, a sentence later lessened to twenty years forced 
labor.14 Prévot asked local commanders and municipal commissions to find potential 
journalists among the occupied people. Most Frenchmen refused, and the few that did 
write for the newspaper usually chose to write under pseudonyms. Interestingly, three 
reporters whose identities post-war authorities determined faced charges of gathering 
evidence for the enemy after the war.15 
The Germans easily obtained the printing equipment needed to publish La Gazette 
des Ardennes: they confiscated it from the Révil du Nord.16 The German editors obtained 
paper first by requisitioning it from closed down French printers, and then through 
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membership in a German confederation for the distribution of printing paper.17 The look 
and frequency of publication of La Gazette des Ardennes changed during its lifespan. It 
started as a small newspaper, measuring 26cm by 36cm, but starting in April 1915, it 
changed to the “more French look” of 44cm by 56cm. La Gazette featured a four-column 
format until 1918, when it changed to six columns. From November 1914 until March 
1915, the paper published only on Saturdays.  In April 1915, publishers added a 
Wednesday edition.  In October 1915, the paper started publishing on Tuesdays, 
Thursdays, and Saturdays.  By April 1916, it became a four-day a week publication, 
adding Sundays to the rotation.  Finally, in January 1918, the paper began publishing 
every day except Mondays. The publishers of La Gazette des Ardennes produced three 
different editions of the paper.  There was the regular newspaper that went from once a 
week at its inception to six times a week by 1918, a weekly recap version containing the 
major articles of the past seven days, and an illustrated version.18 The illustrated version, 
offered a few times a month, was a beautiful publication, extravagantly illustrated with 
photographs of both shelled French villages and pristine German landscapes.  Helen 
McPhail remarked that the underlying message was unstated but clear: Germany was 
clean and beautiful, while France was suffering at the hands of interfering allies.19 
Propaganda distribution was the main purpose of the newspaper, but the Germans also 
expected it to make money.  At first, it was not profitable, instead relying upon funding 
from Section IIIb.  However, in 1916, it began restricting the number of free copies given 
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away and left lying around and later the paper added advertising. By 1917, the newspaper 
began showing a profit.20 
 
War News 
Official communiqués were the single greatest source of war news in La Gazette 
des Ardennes. German communiqués offered a great quantity of detailed information; the 
question from occupied French point of view was simply could they be trusted.   An 
example of a German communiqué from 1915 informed readers that en route to Saint-
Julien-Ypres, the Germans continued their attack and progress, capturing three British 
officers, sixty soldiers, and one machine gun.21 This communiqué demonstrated the 
German propaganda technique of focusing upon details rather than the larger picture that 
was less flattering to them. This capturing of three British officers, sixty soldiers, and one 
machine gun was a small part of the Second Battle of Ypres, a significant offensive that 
occurred from April 22 until May 25, 1915. La Gazette reported the German successes of 
late April in late May, with detailed articles leaving out only one major detail: the 
German use of poisonous gas in the attacks. As battles such as this one lasted for weeks 
and caused tens of thousands of casualties on both sides, each side could find discreet 
victories within the larger campaign to focus upon. Another official bulletin in the same 
newspaper reported an earlier German success near Ypres on April 22, 1915, during 
which the Germans took 110 officers and 5,450 men prisoner.22 In general, coverage of 
fighting at Ypres was delayed but extensive.  The German military aim was to flatten out 
the Ypres salient and cause serious setbacks for the Allies before the Germans transferred 
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a large number of their men to the Eastern Front for a planned Gorlice-Tarnow offensive 
against the Russians. While the above-mentioned two communiqués were accurate in 
terms of the scanty information they provided, they neglected to mention the Germans 
utilized poison gas to gain the advantage in fighting the Second Battle of Ypres. The 
Germans used commercial gas cylinders to release substantial amounts of deadly chlorine 
gas into the enemy’s trenches.23 On April 22, 1915, German troops near Ypres opened 
6,000 cylinders and released 168 tons of chlorine gas, which wafted into French lines 
held by Algerian troops.24 In avoiding the topic of gas, the editors of La Gazette des 
Ardennes did not have to share with its readers that the German army had violated the 
1907 Hague Convention, which banned the use of asphyxiating gases.25 As well, the 
editors of La Gazette also chose not to inform readers that this success surprised the 
Germans, who were not prepared for it, and lacked sufficient reserves to exploit the 
breakthrough the use of gas allowed.26  
French communiqués printed in La Gazette reported of successes or failures in a 
certain area in more general terms, usually without offering specifics. War bulletins at 
times simply read “nothing to report,” giving the impression that no information was 
omitted. All powers’ communiqués contained no neutral language.  Hence, both the 
authors of German and French bulletins referred to themselves as “us” or “we” and the 
other side as “the enemy.” The newspaper included French communiqués reporting lesser 
victories. For example, the May 24, 1915, issue reported that the French handed their 
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enemies a loss as they took several trenches in front of Iletsas.27 On the surface, this 
communiqué seemed to report a relatively minor French victory.  In fact, the taking of 
trenches near Iletsas occurred during the last days of the Second Battle of Ypres, after the 
Germans utilized gas.  The French forces regrouped after the gas attacks to take these 
trenches, a truly significant event.  Of course the editors of La Gazette des Ardennes 
never provided context to French victories, and could not have done so in this case 
without reporting the use of poison gas by the Germans.   
In the March 15, 1915, issue, the newspaper included four pages devoted to the 
winter battle in Champagne. Remembered to history as the First Battle of Champagne, 
the battle was an allied offensive in the Champagne and Artois regions aimed at pushing 
back the vast pocket of German lines bulging into central France between Reims and 
Verdun.  The editors of La Gazette relished General Joffre’s lack of success as he 
attacked the area between Reims and Verdun. By all accounts, this battle, which lasted 
from December 20, 1914 until March 17, 1915, was a complete failure for the French.  
France gained only a few unimportant hamlets during this battle, but lost a great number 
of men.28  Two pages worth of French communiqués demonstrated how French publicists 
focused upon small victories while ignoring the lack of major progress. As the French 
military and media also utilized censorship to contour news for the French home front, 
the editors of La Gazette placed French propaganda on display. 
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A report from autumn of that year noted that despite a violent counter-attack in 
Champagne, the French held their position.29 This skirmish was part of the Second Battle 
of Champagne, which raged from September 25, 1915 until October 16, 1915. This battle 
General Joffre’s planned “great attack” that aimed to exploit the numerical advantaged 
afforded the Allies by the German decision to concentrate their forces against the 
Russians in 1915 as the Allied forces outnumbered the Germans by eighteen divisions to 
seven divisions along the Champagne front.30 The French aims were to rupture the 
German front, severing their supply lines around Attigny and Douai, and thereby forcing 
a German withdrawal from the Noyon sailent and provide relief to the hard-pressed 
Russians as the Germans moved troops back to the Western Front to respond.31 The 
French did secure a small salient against the German Third Army at Perthes Woods and 
British troops pushed the Germans back to secondary positions east of Loos.  However, 
these small gains came at the cost of huge British and French losses in terms of men, and 
as the fighting continued and German reserves began to reach the battle, the French 
offensive stalled.32 The offensive gained approximately fifteen square miles, penetrating 
two and a half miles into German-held territories at some points.  This advance cost 
144,000 French casualties, with the Germans sustaining 85,000 casualties.33 Almost a 
month before that French communiqué appearing in the newspaper, La Gazette des 
Ardennes featured a front-page map of the Second Battle of Champagne, demonstrating 
French and British gains and losses. A crude, hand-drawn map, correctly demonstrated 
the area gained by the French, but the note underneath made it clear the true cost of 
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gaining that land.  The editors reported that by September 30, 1915, the French had 
gained twenty-four kilometers of land, but at a cost of 100,000 soldiers lives.34 French 
casualties at Champagne in September and October 1915 reached 143,000.35 In this 
instance, the news for the French was bad enough that the editors of La Gazette des 
Ardennes could simply report the truth and expect that without embellishment it was 
enough to demoralize people in the occupied zone. 
 As in the coverage of the Second Battle of Champagne, French communiqués 
were frequently a few days older than German ones, and they were not exact replicas of 
what the French military emitted. The publishers claimed that they wanted to print French 
and German communiqués from the same day alongside each other, but the French 
communiqués arrived too late, hence they used translated neutral communiqués, but even 
those could only be published a few days later.36  
Coverage of the Verdun fighting began in late February 1916.  Extensive 
reporting ran from mid-March 1916 through the first week of April. At least four issues 
included coverage beyond war bulletins in another article entitled, “War Happenings: 
Around Verdun.”37 This early coverage focused upon the success of the German attack 
against the western face of the salient.  As German efforts petered out towards the end of 
June, so did La Gazettes des Ardennes’s coverage.  As Andreas Laksa notes, the last few 
references to Verdun could only focus upon failed French attacks, rather than proclaim 
German success.38 Readers of La Gazette learned of early German successes, but not how 
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at the end of the slaughter, the battle lines were close to their starting point.39 No mention 
appeared in the newspaper explaining how the French forces held their own because 
General Pétain made improvements for conditions of the troops, which rallied French 
morale. The number of French soldiers killed made the pages of the newspaper.  
However, the fact that during this battle, which historian William Martin notes has come 
to represent an act of European fratricide, an almost equal number of Germans died or 
went missing did not.40     
Not surprisingly, the other great battle of 1916- the Somme – received less 
coverage than Verdun (Verdun began as a German offensive, the Somme was a British 
and French offensive).41 Indeed, the within the pages of La Gazette it was always referred 
to as “the great allied offensive.” Coverage focused upon the brutality and aggressiveness 
of the British (and at times French). Treatment of other battles usually included a tally of 
area and prisoners taken, deaths and injuries.  Somme coverage provided little of this, 
interestingly, considering that the Allies casualty rate was high, with 90,000 Frenchmen 
killed or wounded during the first month of fighting alone.42 More than a month before 
the Somme battles ended in November 1916, coverage all but disappeared. In describing 
all media coverage of the Somme, historian Martin Gilbert demonstrates that reporting in 
La Gazette des Ardennes was not out of line with other areas.  He writes that the detail of 
the agony and misery were to a great degree withheld from the public everywhere and 
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when it was reported, “Every bloody encounter was portrayed as a victory, every terrified 
combatant as a hero…”43 
The editors delayed providing news of the German offensive of March 21, 1918, 
because the newspaper’s controllers wanted to present it as a fait accompli, with coverage 
beginning March 28, 1918.44  Coverage of the offensive (when it was going well for the 
Germans) included detailed maps and data about prisoners taken. While historians would 
later claim the Second Battle of the Marne turned the tide of war as initiative was wrested 
from the Germans, newspaper coverage focused again upon specific German successes, 
blurring the truth of the larger picture. 45  
Eastern Front coverage was extensive. Until the Russian exit from the war, its 
military failures were fodder for the Gazette. In particular, it frequently reported the large 
number of Russian prisoners taken.46 On a few occasions, La Gazette provided graphs to 
illustrate German successes on the Western Front. One map, superimposed with a bar 
graph, compared the square miles of enemy territory conquered by each warring nation. 
The amount of German soil held by France was insignificant compared to French and 
Belgian land held by the Germans.47 Another chart, this time accompanied by drawings, 
visually declared the portion of French industry in German hands, which included 90% of 
the country’s iron, 85.7% of its brute steel, and 43% of its total industry.48 La Gazette des 
Ardennes also provided information that was not news, but useful to understanding the 
war.  Towards the end of 1915, it began offering detailed maps, such as a relief map of 
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southern Serbia, which would help readers understand key elements of the war.49 Such 
information was relevant but smacked of propaganda due to the selection of maps. The 
relief map of southern Serbia is case in point as the newspaper editors published it within 
a month of Bulgaria joining the Central Powers attack on Serbia on October 11, 1915.  At 
the outbreak of the war, the Bulgarian government declared neutrality and both sides 
offered it incentives to join the war on their sides, as Bulgaria’s army was a sizable force 
and the country occupied a strategic position in the Balkans.50 By the summer of 1915, it 
appeared that Germany was in the stronger military position, and King Ferdinand and 
Premier Radoslavov of Bulgaria decided to enter the war on Germany’s side.51 When 
Bulgaria entered the war, many assumed it meant that Germany would win the war 
within months. The map was a complementary piece to several articles lauding 
Bulgaria’s entry into the war on Germany’s side, which many saw as a major foreign 
policy failure for France and a coup for Germany.52   La Gazette also published maps 
whose potential for bias lay within the information included and excluded, especially 
during the last year of the war.  These maps were often of German offensives, showing 
German gains at their height and not juxtaposed against maps of French gains.53 
Lists of captured, injured, and dead French soldiers permeated La Gazette des 
Ardennes and the newspaper’s staff utilized them as powerful propaganda.  The 
newspaper editors presented these lists as information that the French government was 
withholding from its people, information that the German government shared because it 
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understood the hardship of civilians who did not know if a loved one was injured, 
captured, or even alive.54 The paper claimed it was “French vanity” that would not allow 
the French government to admit it had lost 250,000 soldiers as German POWs.55 While 
this statement inaccurately depicted the French government’s actions as unusually 
deceitful – all the warring nations treated prisoner of war numbers as confidential 
information – the 250,000 French prisoner of war number appears very close to accurate, 
as by early 1915 the Germans held 245,000 French prisoners.56 Journalists in one issue 
accused France of literally trying to hide the large number of the injured – both in terms 
of reporting them and allowing them to receive treatment in the normal military medical 
system.57 The French military had faced criticism of their care for wounded soldiers 
before, from no less a source than the country’s future leader. Senator Georges 
Clemenceau disparaged the shortcomings of the French military medical system in the 
newspaper he edited (l’Homme enchaîné) after he observed injured soldiers left untreated 
on a railroad train.58 However, it was during the war that the French army developed the 
triage system of casualty clearance that is still the basis for the treatment of wounded in 
military and disaster situations today, leading to vast improvements in survival rates as 
compared to the Crimean War.59 Leaders in both countries deemed such news about 
prisoners of war and wounded soldiers damaging to home morale, hence German 
newspapers did not print such information about German soldiers.  By including such 
information in the Gazette, its editors could claim to be providing a service, while at the 
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same time inserting demoralizing information.  The newspaper’s circulation increased 
dramatically when it began printing the names of French prisoners of war and their 
locations.60 The Gazette printed over 500 lists of captured French soldiers’ names, 
supplemented by other lists, such as “French soldiers killed at Gallipoli,” and “French 
killed by friendly fire.”61 Extremely painful for readers, these lists proved unreliable at 
times.  As Deborah Buffton notes, many a reader found a relative’s name on the prisoner 
of war or dead list, only to find out later he was alive and free.62 If editors sought to shape 
French opinion with casualty lists, they had the same goal in their news of the sea war. 
German pride in their submarine capabilities revealed itself almost daily in the 
pages of La Gazette des Ardennes. The author of one article examined the morality of 
submarine warfare; unsurprisingly he concluded that submarine attacks were indeed a 
valid form of warfare.63 At first most submarine news came under the sub-section, 
“Diverse News,” but by 1917 a sub-section devoted entirely to submarine action became 
a frequent feature. Its author told proudly of German submarine activity around Liverpool 
and even off the coast of North America.64 Monthly recaps tallied German submarine 
successes. For example, the June 26, 1918, issue noted that in the month of May German 
subs sank 614,000 tons of Entente ships.65 This number was most likely an exaggeration, 
harking back to the apex of submarine success in April 1917.  During that month, 
German submarines destroyed 155 British vessels, equaling 516,394 tons, with mines 
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sinking fourteen ships equaling 28,888 tons.66 The editors of La Gazette proclaimed with 
satisfaction that German submarines destroyed enough tonnage carrying supplies to affect 
the English bread supply.67 This was not hyperbole; Britain came within six weeks of 
starvation. The United States Ambassador to Britain, Walter Page, commenting on the 
German submarine attacks on the British food supply, stated, “what we are witnessing is 
the defeat of Britain.”68 However, Allied shipping losses fell dramatically by the end of 
1917 and continued to fall during 1918, making this statement outdated and no longer 
true.  A fall in Allied shipping losses and higher submarine losses were a direct result of 
the Allies adopting a convoy system of grouping ships together, which offered great 
protection as escorts could counter-attack against submarines.69 La Gazette des Ardennes’ 
coverage of submarine action did not reflect this decline in its success, as the 
newspaper’s editors were still reporting submarine attacks as late as September 18, 
1918.70 
Zeppelin attacks were also a popular focus of La Gazette des Ardennes. Readers 
read up-to-date reports of aerial attacks on both London and Paris.71 Most of the coverage 
of zeppelin raids occurred in February through April 1916, with one article noting current 
British defense systems could not curtail zeppelins.72 The fifty-one German zeppelin 
raids on England did instill fear in the British civilian population, killing 1400 people, 
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and wounding 5000 more.73 While the British defense system was unable at first to deal 
with the air raids, it quickly developed effective antiaircraft defenses, including 
incendiary bullets that rendered zeppelin raids ineffective and expensive.74 Not 
surprisingly, the editors of La Gazette chose not to report the waning success of zeppelin 
raids, but mention of zeppelin attacks did taper off, as opposed to submarine coverage.  
Such regular reports of submarine and zeppelin attacks would do little to ingratiate the 
Germans to the French in the occupied zone, but surely aimed to propagate the message 
that Germany would win the war. 
 
News about Unoccupied France 
 La Gazette des Ardennes contained news from unoccupied France in most issues, 
frequently under a section entitled, “French News.” This is somewhat surprising since the 
Germans endeavored to isolate occupied France and create in it a sense of separateness 
from the rest of France.75  However, some of the news reported followed this agenda of 
making unoccupied France, particularly Paris, seem alien.  One article entitled, “A 
Parisian Night,” depicted Parisian society, especially its upper echelons, as treating war 
like an abstraction.76 While at a grand party, guests lament the tragedy of war while 
supping on fine food and drinking wine.  The editors in including such a scene clearly 
aimed to raise the ire of those suffering in occupied France.  
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Not surprisingly, most of the news coming out of unoccupied France printed in La 
Gazette des Ardennes was bad.  Short blurbs of bad news often appeared in the paper, 
such as one about a fire ravaging the Moulin Rouge, and another about Crédit Lyonnais 
lowering its dividends.77  The newspaper also included several articles proclaiming 
France in the clutches of various calamities. One alleged that a population crisis 
stemming from low marriage and birthrates was exacerbated by the loss of life on the 
battlefield, and was leading France down the dangerous road to depopulation.78 Coupled 
with the additional loss of population in occupied territory, one article declared the 
French race in crisis.79 According to the paper, France was also in the middle of an 
agricultural crisis and a transportation crisis.80 The editors of La Gazette blamed the 
agricultural crisis on the French government not setting regulations for either food 
production or consumption. Indeed, the editors of La Gazette were relatively accurate in 
this long article, with the propaganda element being the claims of German governmental 
success in regulating food. The French government hesitated in enacting controls over 
prices and supplies, and this combined with German occupation of some of the most 
productive farmland, did leave the country unprepared for the long conflict.81 The article 
did not mention that the French populace was not facing starvation; the French 
government instead purchased large quantities of cereals from foreign markets to deal 
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with the deficits.82 A lack of carts and wagons to move merchandise unloaded from ships 
and resultant backlog at French docks was the transportation crisis discussed in the pages 
of La Gazette. The German-controlled newspaper cited an article by Marcel Cachin (a 
SFIO member, elected to the Chamber of Deputies, who rallied to the war cause) as its 
source.  While getting goods off the docks was a legitimate problem for the French 
government, the story also demonstrated that goods were still flowing into France, and 
French censors allowed a domestic newspaper to publish the article from which the 
editors of La Gazette lifted the piece.  
Of all the crises, it was coverage of the economic crisis in unoccupied France that 
received the most newspaper space.  In late 1915 and early 1916 the newspaper began 
reporting how expensive life was in France; by mid-1917 it was declaring France as 
unable to escape an economic crisis.83 Life indeed had become more vastly more 
expensive; the cost of living in Paris increased approximately 300 percent between 1914 
and 1918.84 There is no question that the war represented a huge shock to the French 
economy. However, the timing of La Gazette’s article about an economic crisis seems 
off. France’s GDP decreased sharply, but then it stabilized at a slightly higher level in 
1916 and 1917, suggesting the economy was finding a new war-time equilibrium.85 
Overall, people in Paris were pessimistic and nervous, La Gazette told readers.86 
Parisians’ greatest concern was the economic situation, even more so than the actual war.  
However, Jean-Jacques Becker suggests that they were more concerned with the cost of 
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living than battles because of their supreme confidence that France was on the correct 
side and would ultimately defeat Germany and its partners.87  While most of the facts 
stated in these reports resembled the truth, the extent to which they were belabored, and 
the exclusion of almost all positive news out of the rest of France created an 
exaggeratedly gloomy caricature of unoccupied France’s well-being.    
France’s political difficulties also received keen attention in the newspaper. 
Political scandals, such as the Desclaux Affair, were great fodder for La Gazette des 
Ardennes to prove how poorly things were going in the rest of France.88 The Desclaux 
graft case was the perfect propaganda story for La Gazette.  In January 1915, the French 
government accused Colonel François Desclaux, a member of the Radical-Socialist 
government and former chief secretary to Finance Minster Joseph Caillaux, of stealing 
army supplies, and he received a sentence of seven years solitary confinement.89 Despite 
the Union sacrée, military leaders at times accused the Radical-Socialist party of being 
defeatists, and the French media suggested that the Desclaux case smacked of treason as 
it undermined the military. La Gazette utilized the story to demonstrate that not everyone 
in unoccupied France believed France could win the war.   
No less than five substantial articles celebrated Declassé’s (a man known for his 
anti-German sentiments) resignation.90 Théophile Declassé served in Viviani’s ministry 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Declassé helped convince Italy to entry the war on the 
side of the Allies, gaining him infamy in Germany. A former ambassador to Russia, he 
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supported Russian annexation of Constantinople and the Straits, which greatly 
undermined any chance of Bulgaria entered the war on France’s side. Declassé’s foreign 
policy failure led to his resignation, which he offered on October 12, 1915, after Entente 
forces entered Salonika.91 The writers of the articles in La Gazette wrote that they did not 
want to discuss the internal politics of belligerent countries, but that the Declassé case 
demonstrated that dissension within French leadership.92  
Another political scandal the paper covered, this time in three long articles, 
including one entitled, “The Mistake,” was the French government’s refusal to issue 
passports to French socialists wishing to attend the Stockholm Conference.93 La Gazette 
utilized yet another story, the vilification and arrest of Malvy to cast the French 
government as authoritarian and to demonstrate internal dissension within the French 
leadership as defeatism grew.94 Starting in 1914, Georges Clemenceau began criticizing 
Louis-Jean Malvy, Minister of the Interior, for laxity towards defeatism. Despite these 
protests, Malvy remained in position until August 31, 1917.  In the winter of that year, 
Commander-in-Chief Robert Nivellle advised Malvy to take action against antiwar 
activity on the home front. Many military officers, conservative newspapermen, and 
government officials blamed Malvy for the disastrous spring offensive, citing internal 
defeatists as the cause.95 Clemenceau criticized Malvy for having left unfettered the 
publication of the pro-German newspaper, Le Bonnet Rouge while being unduly 
influenced by its editor, Almereyda. A nine-month trial by the Senate dismissed treason 
charges against Malvy but found him guilty of negligence and banished him from France 
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for five years.96 In May 1918, La Gazette’s editors furthered pushed the concept that the 
French government was trying to silence any voices questioning the French war effort in 
its coverage of the Bonnet Rouge trials. The Bonnet Rouge was a socialist and 
Germanophile newspaper in France, which the government shut down in 1917, and 
whose directors faced trial for treason after its editor committed suicide in jail. During the 
trial, one witness testified to the similarity between the policy pursued by the Bonnet 
Rouge and that of the Gazette des Ardennes.97 It was found that the newspaper leaders 
were in the pay of the Germans and those left received sentences of five years hard 
labor.98 La Gazette des Ardennes’s reporters, while relaying in great detail the facts of the 
trial, made the defendants appear sympathetic, and stressed that the French government 
silenced the newspaper for promoting peace and having differing views from the 
government.99      
 In case all this horrible news coming out of Paris was not to enough to alienate 
readers from the rest of their country, La Gazette des Ardennes reported to them that 
those evacuated from the occupied zone received poor treatment once they reached 
unoccupied France.100 Sadly, this statement was true in many cases, as civilians in 
unoccupied France discriminated against refugees repatriated from the Nord, whom they 
saw as taking jobs from locals (despite a labor shortage), and called “Huns from the 
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Nord.”101 The newspaper informed readers that their suffering was not for some 
humanitarian cause, but France’s uncontrollable desire for revenge and regaining Alsace-
Lorraine.102 La Gazette even provided a few editorial pieces delving into what it meant to 
be French; of course, its editors’ answers were never ones to fill a French patriot’s heart 
with joy.  In “Is France Democratic,” and “The Balance Sheet of Republicanism and 
Parliamentism,” La Gazette des Ardennes described France as flawed to its very core.103 
 
A Negative View of Other Allies 
 Almost all news about France’s allies beyond that contained in communiqués 
constituted propaganda aimed at demonstrating Allied problems or exploring the malice 
of their military and government authorities. La Gazette des Ardennes’ editors fed readers 
a constant diet of anti-British propaganda. They wrote that if they were in control of the 
war, they would seek peace with France while continuing the war with their true enemy, 
Britain.104  The propaganda against Britain was not of the subtle kind that would be 
difficult to distinguish. The newspaper frequently insinuated that Britain wanted to annex 
Calais. The editors noted that before writing about the British desire to commandeer 
Calais they reflected for a long time, fearing that readers would believe they were trying 
to create hatred among the French for the British.105 By June 1915, the editors appeared 
to have lost all qualms about creating such fears.  In an article entitled, “France the day 
after the war,” they reported that during the next winter campaign England planned to 
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take Calais, Boulogne, and Dunkerque with plans of keeping these areas after the war.106 
In other articles editors claimed that England was conserving its forces, in order to fight 
to the last Frenchman.107 This last statement touches upon the very essence of good 
propaganda, as it takes a grain of truth and grossly distorts its meaning to Germany’s 
advantage. The small British professional army, comprised of 160,000 soldiers, was 
devastated by fighting in the early months of the war.108 By the end of 1914, voluntary 
enlistments meant that half a million men were undergoing training to fight, but there was 
a delay due to that training during which the French bore the major burden of the war in 
terms of manpower. This concept of the British fighting to the last Frenchmen was so 
powerful that the Germans would reutilize this exact phrase again during the Second 
World War.109 
During the four years of its publication, La Gazette des Ardennes’ editors 
“educated” readers on the long-term enmity that had existed between England and 
France. The newspaper included reports on long-resolved disputes, including the incident 
at Fashoda and Anglo-French antagonism in the Orient.110 It harked back to battles over 
Louisiana, Canada, the Indies, and Egypt to demonstrate that the two countries were 
historic enemies.  Editors advised readers that Britain duped France into believing it was 
acting out of idealism in fighting the current war while power and colonial annexation 
were its only true concerns.111 The paper frequently cited England’s woes with Ireland to 
demonstrate the British lust for territory and its repercussions. From March 1916 until 
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July 1918, several articles detailed unrest in Ireland and that country’s desire to break 
away from British control. By July 1918, the newspaper declared Ireland a crisis.112 The 
British Parliament had enacted the Irish Home Rule bill in September 1914, hoping to 
make Ireland a non-issue during the war.  However, Ulster Unionists and British 
conservatives secured the concurrent suspension of the bill for the duration of the war. 
Ireland, without ever facing conscription, contributed 200,000 troops to the British 
military.113 However, during the second half of the war anger with the suspension of 
Home Rule led to such great dissent – which quite frequently turned violent, such as with 
the Easter Rising of nationalists in 1916 – that British troops had to be garrisoned in 
Ireland to keep the peace. La Gazette’s editors provided a fairly accurate overview of the 
situation in Ireland, giving the impression that the once mighty Britain now faced serious 
problems on every front, and all its own doing.114 One editorial explained what the world 
truly needed was continental solidarity against “the island.”115 
 La Gazette des Ardennes referenced both Russia and the United States. Andreas 
Laska notes that until Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, La Gazette des Ardennes 
paid little heed to it.116  The few references made were to the horrible conditions in the 
mammoth country.  The paper reported on its financial woes, its authoritarian 
government, its ministerial crisis, and the poor quality of life in St. Petersburg.117 The 
ministerial crisis generated particularly interesting coverage, as it utilized Foreign 
Minister Sergei Sazonov’s pending dismissal to demonstrate the cost of Russia and 
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France’s poor choices in the Balkans.118 The article compared him to Declassé, and the 
page with the article just happened to also carry a map of Serbia. The article was a tad 
premature however, as his actual dismissal only took place seven months later when he 
angered the Tsarina by asking the Tsar to consider Polish independence after the war. La 
Gazette also covered the Russian revolution, with at least four articles carrying the title, 
“Russian crisis.”119 Editors accused the Allies of having not supported the obviously just 
Russian Revolution.120  
The American coverage in La Gazette des Ardennes changed dramatically after 
the United States entered the war on the Allied side. While the newspaper did not attempt 
to create animosity in its readers toward the United States, it did alter its opinion of the 
country.  Prior to its entrance into the war, the staff of La Gazette des Ardennes portrayed 
the United States as a wise neutral, sometimes featuring articles by pro-German 
Americans.121 Before the United States entered the war, it was a country deserving of 
respect; afterward it simply became a capitalist machine concerned only with continuing 
to sell its steel to the England.122 America, the powerful up-and-coming force, became the 
“American mirage” in the pages of the newspaper.123 The paper reported American 
military failures. Interestingly, the paper did not exploit the friction that existed between 
the Allies and the United States, as much to the chagrin of the French and British leaders, 
the United States insisted on maintaining a separate force on the battlefield, and refused 
to simply be a replacement reservoir for the Allied armies. 
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 La Gazette des Ardennes frequently focused upon what it deemed the Allies’ 
unchivalrous wartime conduct. It claimed the French mistreated prisoners of war 
deported to Africa.124 The paper also accused the French government of officially lying 
when it publicly stated that Germany sold war booty.125 In editorials, the paper accused 
the British of even more heinous actions. Claims of unacceptable British behavior 
included allegations that the English violated Swedish neutrality by boarding one of their 
ships without warning, and that an English naval ship sunk an innocent German fishing 
boat.126 La Gazette characterized the British as hypocritical in their anger over the 
execution of Miss Cavell, as they had executed females purported to be German spies.127 
This claim is an interesting one, as history only famously remembers the French 
execution of Mata Hari.128 On April 2, 1916, the paper made its most outrageous claim 
when it published the charge that the British were trying to exterminate the German 
people. The article stated that an American citizen claimed Winston Churchill stated that 
the aim of the war was to exterminate the German people, which would happen within 
months because “German manhood is rapidly disappearing.”129 The unnamed source 
continued on to state that Churchill believed the German people would cease to exist 
because most the men of martial age would have been killed in battle. People in France, 
Germany, and Great Britain feared what such a huge loss of young men would mean to 
their countries’ future population growth. This story implied the major battles, which cost 
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hundreds of thousands of lives, were not for some greater victory, but part of an evil 
British plan. 
 
Obsession with the Parisian Press 
The editors of La Gazette des Ardennes obsessed over the French press publishing 
false news about the German occupation, a fact that reveals itself in most issues of the 
newspaper. This fixation must have appeared all the more surreal to its readership 
considering La Gazette’s relationship with the truth. La Gazette claimed the Parisian 
press was trying to turn the world against Germany by printing lies, then distributing its 
papers abroad or sharing articles with other newspapers in other countries.130 Almost all 
the accusations thrown at the Parisian press in the paper were variations on a theme: you 
tell lies.  The paper described the situation as, “it is not the French people, but the press, 
that tells these lies that are both malicious and ridiculous at the same time, lies that the 
population of the German occupied provinces must recognize as such.”131 The paper 
admitted that the Parisian press’s job included cultivating patriotism amongst its readers, 
but that the animosity it spewed crossed the line to lies.132 It declared that the French 
press simply followed the official orders of the government and military without any 
legitimate concern for the public.133 The result was “Brainwashing, A French 
Specialty.”134 It appeared that La Gazette attempted to create contempt for the intellectual 
caste in unoccupied France, in particular for newspaper editors and journalists. Indeed, 
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the author of the article noted that one could not judge the French people from its 
press.135 French soldiers lamenting the war were one of the few French sources that could 
be trusted, according to the paper.136 Of course, one could only trust soldiers’ writings 
found in La Gazette (which were usually written by prisoners of war trying to garner 
better treatment) because the French media faked soldiers’ letters.137 Sometimes the 
writers of La Gazette hurled accusations at specific newspapers- frequently the Petit 
Parisien - other times their scorn extended to all papers in unoccupied France, not just 
those published in the capital.138 
Specific points on which the La Gazette des Ardennes took issue with the French 
press included what its editors saw as the false reporting of a widespread famine in 
Germany. La Gazette’s editors may have disagreed with French accounts of food supplies 
in Germany, but in general, they were accurate. The British blockade led to a twenty-five 
percent decline in domestic agricultural production and thus to serious shortages in the 
food supply, and the undernourishment of the German population.139 In the turnip winter” 
of 1916-1917, when German diets relied on turnips to take the place of potatoes and 
bread, food shortages led to increased infant mortality and stunted growth in children.140 
La Gazette’s editors were also furious with accusations that the Germans were 
committing atrocities, including stealing artistic treasures from occupied zones.141 In 
general terms, the paper claimed that the French press consistently lessened the 
importance of enemy successes, hence not providing people with an accurate description 
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of the war.142 This distain for the French press did not stop La Gazette des Ardennes from 
printing blurbs from it in almost every issue under the headings “In France” and “Mirror 
on the French Press.”  The snippets chosen, however, always focused upon negative news 
for the French, or were edited to appear that way. While the Parisian press was La 
Gazette des Ardennes’ focus, the paper’s staff also lambasted other countries’ media at 
times.  For example, the paper explained that before the occupation, the Belgian press 
created fear amongst its populace, causing them to flee their homes, leading to greater 
hardship early during the occupation.143 
 
Positive News about Germany 
La Gazette des Ardennes literally had a captive audience. While it was highly 
unlikely that readers in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing were going to become 
Germanophiles, the newspaper attempted to convince them that Germans were not all 
that bad. In doing so, the newspaper’s editors sometimes rewrote history.  One article 
contended that Germans were not a militaristic people; for example, imperial France 
forced the war of 1870-1871 upon Germany, rather than Germany wanting war.144 Laska 
notes that the paper portrayed German soldiers not as barbarians, but mobilized 
students.145 The paper also attempted to demonstrate German circumspection and 
thoughtfulness when it came to war.  In editorials such as “Militarism,” and “An 
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Examination of Consciousness,” the paper revealed that while the Germans were certain 
of their righteousness, they too hated the effects of war.146 
 The Germany described in La Gazette was militarily strong.  One report noted 
that German lines on the Eastern Front were impregnable, while another showed the 
German occupation of Warsaw.147 La Gazette printed in their entirety at least six 
speeches by the Chancellor to the Reichstag, allowing readers to the feel the full force of 
German nationalism.148 Compared to the nervous people of Paris, the paper portrayed 
Germans on the home front as calm, having placed great faith in their soldiers.149 If 
editors portrayed France as facing an economic crisis, they rendered Germany as on the 
cusp of great economic expansion.  A multi-part series, “German Economic Expansion as 
Seen by a Frenchman,” detailed this expansion.150  Future economic strength of Germany 
lay in three main factors, according to the article; 1) the German character traits of being 
hardworking, methodical, intelligent, physically strong, and among the lower classes, 
obedient; 2) their future population growth; 3) the form of politics, in which the middle 
classes work hard at other endeavors and leave running the nation to a select group.151 
The article also lauded Germany’s institutions and bureaucracies, whether it was 
technical institutes preparing future industrial management, business schools, or 
Germany’s system of embassies, which utilized economic specialists.152 
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 La Gazette des Ardennes frequently invoked the approval of neutrals as proof of 
German justness.  The paper included neutral opinion either as an article written 
specifically for the paper by a neutral or as articles taken from other newspapers. Most 
frequently, La Gazette cited Swiss and Dutch sources. Typical articles of this sort 
included, “British Imperialism judged by a Swiss,” and “On the Ocean,” taken from the 
Nieuve Courant of the Hague, which argued that Germany was the true naval power, not 
England.153 The message appears to have been that readers could believe what these 
articles stated since they came from neutral, supposedly trustworthy sources.  Of course, 
the fact that said articles had been handpicked by La Gazette was not lost on readers. 
 
Serials and Advertisements 
Serial stories and advertisements did not constitute news received in the occupied 
zone, but they did provide some diversion in an area generally deprived of new reading 
material. Over fifty serial stories appeared in La Gazette des Ardennes during the war. 
Most serial stories appear to fit the informational trends that we have identified in the 
pages of La Gazette. Some stories were anti-British.  The paper’s editors frequently 
selected pieces by notable French authors to represent this anti-English sentiment.  The 
first serial that ran in the newspaper was Guy de Maupassant’s “Our English Neighbors.”  
The three-part short story mocks English culture, describing the people as horrible 
singers, with unfriendly priests, and women looking as if preserved in vinegar.154 The 
newspaper editors penned a three-part series, “What Would Victor Hugo Think of the 
War?”  Their answer was he would be shocked to think Europe’s two most important 
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nations, France and Germany, would be pitted against each other; after all, Germany is 
the continent’s heart, while France is its head.155 A two-part report by Max Osborn 
detailed the damage done to Douai by British shells.156 
Another article by de Maupassant, “The Prisoners,” portrayed a respectful 
relationship forming between a decent German soldier and a young French woman he 
meets as German troops moved across France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-
71, demonstrating the common humanity of the two people.157 Another French writer 
who had pieces featured in the paper was, rather surprisingly, the patriotic member of 
L’Academie Française, Alfred Capus. The short story, entitled “Une Dette” was one of 
Capus’s earlier works, and did not touch upon Franco-German relations.   
The newspaper provided an audience to some lesser-known  and foreign writers 
as well: the full text of  Swiss writer Joseph Bertourieux’s “The Victory,” was published 
over ten issues from May 26, 1917, through June 24, 1917. Marcel Nadaud’s “The Flying 
Poilu: A Story of Aerial Warfare,” was published as well.158 Others were historical 
pieces, such as Alphonse Daudet’s four-part piece on the siege of Berlin and an unsigned 
three-part series on Napoleon at Saint Helena.159 Karl May’s “The Corsaire,” unfolded as 
a fifteen-part series in 1918. While most stories related to war, some were pure 
entertainment, such as Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Rue Morgue,” which ran in nine parts 
during January and February 1916.  As Deborah Buffton notes, such stories offered “a 
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brief respite from the grim realities of daily life” and made the paper a slightly more 
appealing product to readers.160 
Advertisements first appeared in La Gazette des Ardennes in early 1918.  These 
advertisements were different from those found in Le Bulletin de Lille and Le Bulletin de 
Roubaix.  The local newspapers featured a combination of classified ads and 
advertisement by local businesses. Almost all the advertisements placed in La Gazette 
were for items unavailable in the occupied zone even if the people did have the money to 
purchase them. German companies, such as the Benz and Daimler car companies, 
purchased most of the ad space. While they perhaps believed German soldiers were likely 
to read the newspaper and would be a potential future market, most likely companies who 
did business with the military knew buying ads was a great way to keep their largest 
client happy. Some advertisements, such as those for the car companies, also provided a 
visual propaganda boost.  In ads for both automotive companies, sleek cars appeared 
alongside German airplanes, suggesting the power of both. 
 
Conclusion 
Almost all sources, both contemporary and historic, agree that this newspaper had 
no real success as a propaganda tool – people simply disregarded the message and took 
whatever facts they could from it. It is doubtful readers believed any stories expressing 
opinions on who was winning the war, such as the one that, in the summer of 1915, stated 
that Germany was prepared for another winter campaign unlike France.161 The 
propaganda in La Gazette des Ardennes was palpable: every issue read like a political 
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blog trying to convince people of Germany’s justness and might while encouraging a 
defeatist attitude amongst its readers in the occupied zone. This led many Frenchmen in 
the occupied zone to refer to the newspaper as the Gazette des Menteurs.162  As one 
American contemporary wrote, “Although [La Gazette des Ardennes] is diabolically 
cleverly done, … it would take a stronger agent than the devil himself to inspire faith in 
the Germans among their victims.”163 Without a doubt, the people in occupied France 
were skeptical of German-controlled media sources, and skeptical people believe their 
skepticism makes them immune to persuasion.164 While the readers realized La Gazette 
des Ardennes’ editors published biased messages that may not have provided complete 
protection from being slightly influenced. It would be difficult to definitely say what role 
La Gazette played in the rising and falling morale of the French people in the occupied 
zone. That most people in the occupied zone claimed not to trust it as a source of 
information is certain. 
Despite the manipulation of news, whether through editing or selection of pieces, 
or publication of clearly biased articles, this newspaper did provide people in Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing with a great deal of information. La Gazette offered readers 
updates on battles, news from France, and the rest of the world.  Readers could easily 
extract news out of La Gazette, provided they took it with the proverbial grain of salt. 
It is worth noting that people in unoccupied France were not receiving unbiased 
news either.  Their news was simply chock-full of French propaganda, rather than 
German propaganda.  While still edited and censored, it was done to create feelings of 
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hope rather than despair. Of course readers everywhere during the war were left 
wondering what news was not being included – a sensation that surely was the root cause 
behind so many lamentations in the occupied zone about the lack of news.  Most likely 
Marshall McLuhan’s statement “the medium is the message” was true in the case of La 
Gazette des Ardennes.  Even relatively positive news allowed in via war communiqués 
seemed tainted by the medium.  Conversely, perhaps even negative news received 
through the clandestine press or dropped papers may have been seen as positive.  
Although La Gazette was the most consistent source of news for the people of the 
occupied zone, they hated it.  The newspaper Le Progrès du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais 
celebrated the “death” of the La Gazette with great glee.165 
                                                 
165
 Buffton, 198.  
 
  
197
 
Chapter Seven: 
 
German Imported Belgian Papers 1: 
 
La Belgique 
 
  
Belgium shared northern France’s unfortunate fate of falling under German 
occupation early during the First World War.  By December 1914, ninety percent of 
Belgium was under German control – a situation that would last more than fifty months 
for the seven million who had to learn to live with the harsh repression of occupation.1 
During the first days of the occupation, Belgium’s press was unable to function, and any 
available reports came from German press correspondents and army combat 
correspondents that traveled with the invading armies.2 German authorities completely 
quashed the Belgian press within the first weeks of occupation and subjected it to severe 
censorship.3 While most Belgian newspapers rejected German terms and simply ceased 
publication, some papers did reappear under strict German regulation. Sophie de 
Schaepdrijver notes that the Belgians referred to these newspapers as the emboché press – 
meaning media infested by the boche, an unflattering slang term for the Germans.4 
Newspapers that reappeared after being “carefully expurgated and falsified by a rigorous 
censorship” included Le Quotidien, Le Bruxellois, L’Echo de Bruxelles, Les Dernières 
Nouvelles, La Belge, La Belgique, La Patrie, and L’Avenir.5 The Belgian populace 
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regarded with suspicion such papers but still read them due to the difficulty in attaining 
news. For varying lengths of time, the German occupiers chose to import three of the 
German-overseen Belgian papers into occupied France. 
 Abbé August Leman, writing shortly after the war ended, remembered that the 
German occupiers imported two Belgian newspapers into Lille during the first months of 
occupation, La Belgique from Brussels and Le Bien Public from Ghent.6 However, the 
German authorities soon deemed the two newspapers unreliable implements of 
occupation and forbade them in occupied France after February 1915. Le Bruxellois, a 
much less independent newspaper than the aforementioned ones, was available in the 
cities of occupied France throughout most of the war.  The Germans advertised Le 
Bruxellois alongside the Gazette des Ardennes in the locally produced French 
newspapers, such as the Bulletin de Roubaix.  The German occupiers’ propaganda varied 
between the areas they controlled; hence these imported Belgian newspapers provided 
unique information as compared to the local German-controlled newspapers, supplying 
international news, news of the war through communiqués, and insight into the lives of 
others living under German occupation. 
 La Belgique began publication under German control on Thursday November 5, 
1914, run by two Belgian stockbrokers of German origin, Josse Moressée and Martin 
Ghesquière.7 Jean Massart insists that no existing Belgian newspapers agreed to publish 
under German control, and that newspapers such as La Belgique were different entities, 
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simply utilizing pre-war names.8  Usually a daily two-page paper, it was sometimes 
expanded to three or four pages and quickly became occupied Belgium’s most widely 
read newspaper.9  The first eight issues of the paper carried identical lead articles, 
defending the editorial staff’s decision to produce a censored paper. The staff maintained 
that the people were being deprived of their needed “daily intellectual ration,”10 and had 
hence turned to black market foreign newspapers and taking extracts from papers that 
have been greatly changed or almost invented.11 While the police attempted to find the 
authors of these invented pieces of news, the article continued, La Belgique would 
provide the people of Brussels a newspaper they could read with confidence, despite the 
moral issue of working under German censors.12 German censorship did greatly affect 
both the content and the tone of the newspaper. The German Governor of occupied 
Belgium, Oscar von der Lancken-Wakenitz, described La Belgique as the Belgian 
newspaper most ready to cooperate with the Germans, while trying to create an image of 
maintaining its Belgian character and independence from the Germans.13 However, 
unlike the Bulletin de Lille or Bulletin de Roubaix, there were news sources present in La 
Belgique that were not purely German. The diffusion of this “outside” information in 
occupied France allowed its people greater knowledge of occurrences outside their 
territory than historians usually acknowledge. Therefore, it is important to examine what 
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news penetrated occupied France via La Belgique and in what form. The newspaper 
published official communiqués from both the Allies and Central Powers, albeit heavily 
censored or altered. The Germans allowed some news from a non-German perspective in 
the paper, conceivably to create the illusion that La Belgique was a relatively independent 
newspaper. Minor pieces of good news for the British or French made it into the 
newspaper, but rarely positive news with major ramifications. Perhaps the Germans 
thought that readers would believe this was unbiased news, and that these minor reports 
were the only good news for the Allies.  At times, however, people working for the 
newspaper, motivated by humor or patriotism, slipped by German censors the odd tidbit 
the Germans would not have chosen to print.     
A recurring article that counted how many days the war had raged provided recent 
battle developments and analysis of current war events in addition to the communiqués. 
Even beyond these articles and war analysis, international news not directly tied to the 
war was a common feature in this newspaper. For the few months that German 
authorities allowed it into occupied France, La Belgique provided news of what was 
going on in both occupied France (but was not commonly known) and the rest of France, 
from which the German zone was so painfully cut off. It also allowed its readers in 
occupied France to gain insight into suffering that was going on elsewhere in Europe 
because of the war, and also to learn the places where the situation was not as dire.     
 
Official Communiqués  
Due to the timeframe that this newspaper was for sale in occupied France, it 
makes sense to focus upon its coverage of the First Battle of Ypres. Any Lilllois who 
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read the third issue of La Belgique surely was thrilled to learn from a two-day old Paris 
communiqué that in spite of violent German attacks the Allies had made good progress in 
the Ypres region.14 It is extremely interesting that German censors allowed this 
communiqué to pass, as it is an example of French propaganda.  On October 31, 1914, 
the Germans captured Gheluvett at noon, and this briefly appeared to be the turning point 
in the first Battle of Ypres, as the town’s fall broke the BEF’s line and created the 
possibility of a devastating flank attack.15 However, a counterattack forced the Germans 
back and reestablished the British line. Over the next two days, the Germans captured the 
strategic ridges at Messines and Wytschaele, causing the British and French to withdraw 
from these ridges and concentrate their forces on the defense of Ypres.16 Revealing the 
French positive spin on this situation may have been valuable to the German authorities if 
readers in the occupied cities had any way on knowing what was actually happening in 
Ypres and the surrounding area.  With distrust of the Germans and confidence in any 
positive news seeping in from other sources, it is unlikely the readership of Lille, 
Roubaix, or Tourcoing would have doubted the French communiqué. 
 Readers’ renewed sense of hope might have been quickly diluted however, upon 
reading the Berlin communiqué reporting that the Germans repulsed British and French 
attacks near Nieuport without any difficulty.17 The German controlled newspaper omitted 
to report that water tactically unleashed by the Belgians by opening the sluice gates of the 
coastal dikes forced the Germans to withdraw from the area between Dixmude and 
Nieuport, allowing the Belgian King Albert to keep a portion of his country out of 
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German hands.18 Every issue of La Belgique issued between November 5, 1914 and 
February 26, 1915, (the date that the paper stopped being available in France; the First 
Battle of Ypres ended in mid-November, 1914) featured a section entitled “Official 
Communiqués.”19 In most issues, this section contained on average twenty to twenty-five 
blurbs, ranging in length from a sentence to a paragraph. In most editions, approximately 
the same number of communiqués from the Allied and German sides was printed.  This 
general trend did have exceptions, however – on November 8, 1914, the paper included 
triple the number of communiqués from the Germans and Austrians, but on February 8, 
printed four Allied pieces and only one communiqué from Germany.20  The quality (in 
terms of detail and relevance) and topics of the communiqués were approximately 
equivalent from both sides, with the only notable difference being that Allied reports 
were often more outdated by two-to-three days as compared to German and Austrian 
reports.  
La Belgique included communiqués from many of the countries fighting in the 
war. Beyond the frequent statements out of Paris, London, Petrograd, Berlin, and Vienna, 
the newspaper included communiqués from Delhi, Pretoria, Constantinople, Budapest, 
Tokyo, Copenhagen (in neutral Denmark), Kapstadt (South Africa), Cetinje 
(Montenegro), and Nisch (Serbia).21 Some communiqués originated from Bordeaux when 
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the French government temporarily moved there from Paris, but they were relatively few 
in number.22  
 Despite the variety of governments whose communiqués appeared in the 
newspaper, the majority of dispatches originated from France, Britain, Russia, Germany, 
and to a lesser extent, Austria. Robert Desmond, in his study of World War I journalism, 
Windows on the World: World News Reporting 1900-1920, claims that the preponderance 
of war coverage was concentrated on the Western Front of Belgium and France, while 
coverage was less intensive on the Eastern Front.23  This does not hold true for coverage 
in La Belgique. While it is true more news in the form of “Official Communiqués” came 
from the Western Front, the difference between the amount of news from the Western 
Eastern and Fronts was not that great considering how directly affected the lives of the 
readers of La Belgique were by fighting in France and Belgium.  When combined with 
news in the “This Day in War” section (to be discussed subsequently) the Eastern Front 
received a great deal of attention in this newspaper. One could speculate that this was 
because the war on the Eastern Front was proving relatively more successful for 
Germany, although the paper also included news of Russian success.  What matters for 
this dissertation, however, is that between November 1914 and February 1915, occupied 
France received news from official communiqués from both major fronts of the war. 
  Some of the French communiqués were military communiqués while others 
originated from the Havas agency.  The content and style varied little between the two 
sources. This is not surprisingly, as, in actuality, all French news from the front came 
from the same source: the French military. This information was often-time misleading, 
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made only the more disingenuous in La Belgique by German censors, who edited the 
communiqués in the reverse direction of the original propaganda. Despite this, French 
communiqués in this imported Belgian paper did allow occupied France to hear a 
somewhat more distorted version of military facts than that received by their compatriots 
in free France. They were given the same hope that “in general, the situation on the whole 
front is very satisfactory for our armies,” when they were told the German attacks from 
the direction of Dixmude and northeast of Ypres were pushed back.24   They could place 
hope on an official report discussed in a Paris communiqué that stated during the week of 
November 21-27 enemy attacks were becoming less violent at the same time Allied 
counter-attacks were causing more serious losses for the other side (the Germans allowed 
themselves to be referred as the enemy in Allied communiqués).25 The next month 
another French communiqué reported that the Allies took an enemy trench west of the 
Arras-Lille route that had been a major obstacle.26 Burg and Purcell described the entire 
Western Front as having settled into a near-stasis of “trench warfare,” with only 
inconsequential movements back and forth by this time.27 These communiqués let in just 
enough information about unproductive days as well to make them appear creditable, that 
they were sharing all information, and when nothing occurred, they reported that.  A 
November 11, 1914, Paris communiqué made the qualified observation that between 
Nieuport and Lys the Allies had generally (italics inserted) held their position, and while 
the Germans had taken Dixmude, the Allies were on the outskirts of the town.28 In the 
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newspaper published two days later, a London communiqué admitted that near Ypres 
both sides suffered considerable losses.29 When the First Battle of Ypres settled into 
trench warfare around November 13, 1914, German casualties had reached 130,000 and 
British and French casualties each numbered approximately 58,000.30 Readers in 
occupied France would continue to receive battle news from La Belgique for three 
months after the First Battle of Ypres. 
 Readers also received rare news about battle outcomes close to them, when they 
learned Lille had been the jumping off point for a furious German attack that the French 
communiqué claimed Allied forces not only pushed back but destroyed some of the 
German defenses in the process.31  David F. Burg and L. Edward Purcell do not refer to 
any such German attack, with their only reference to Lille being that the British sent a 
force to attack the city on January 18, 1915, but the Germans successfully repulsed the 
attack. Overall, the tide of battle during the first days of 1915 in northern France and 
Belgium favored the Germans.32 It is plausible conjecture that the German-controlled 
paper included this information to demonstrate the duplicity in some French 
communiqués, as the people of Lille would most likely have known if a military attack 
utilized their city as a base. 
 Printing the German and Austrian communiqués beside them revealed the 
potential embellishments in the Allied communiqués. Just as the French communiqués 
relied heavily on the Havas Press Agency, and the British relied upon Reuters, German 
communiqués relied upon the Wolff press agency for many of its reports.  German 
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communiqués read much like those of the Allies only suggesting Germany would 
eventually win the war. One difference between the two sides communiqués was the 
German preference for quantifying their victories.  For example, harking back to the First 
Battle of Ypres, a Paris notice in the November 13, 1914, issue stated that their side had 
had a good day and made progress toward Langemark and Dixmude. The German 
communiqué stated that east of Ypres they captured seven hundred French soldiers, along 
with four cannons and four machine guns.33  The Germans also lent creditability to their 
communiqués by allowing in such lackluster news as admitting that their attacks in 
Flanders were progressing slowly, or that no change in the front was occurring because 
frozen land and snowstorms were proving to be obstacles.34  
On numerous occasions German and Allied news sources resembled wars of 
words, as each side attempted to portray its efforts in the best light. One dispatch 
countered Allied assertions that in Alsace the French retook Aspach-le-Haut and Aspach-
le-Bas.  Rather, the Germans contended they had voluntarily left the first because it was 
of no importance and the latter was still under their control.35 While Aspach-le-Bas was 
still under German control, the Germans did not voluntarily leave Aspach-le-Haut, but 
lost it to Allied forces. Later on that month, a Berlin dispatch claimed French and Russian 
dispatches lauding the capture of twenty thousand German soldiers on the Eastern Front 
was pure invention.36 On December 3, 1914, the Serbian First Army launched an 
unexpected counterattack at the Battle of the Ridges surprising the Austrian – not 
German – Sixth Army.  After three days of battle, the Austrians retreated towards the 
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Kolubara River, during which the Serbians captured forty thousand Austrian prisoners, as 
well as large quantities of guns and ammunition.37 
Usually the differences in interpretations were apparent as communiqués ran 
beside each other telling different versions of the same battle.  Rarely did communiqués 
utterly contradict each other, as Allied and Central Powers’ stories each focused on 
slightly different areas of the battle. Thus, both sides discussed the battle southeast of 
Ypres in one issue of the newspaper, but while the French noted that the Germans failed 
to take the Nieuport Bridge, the Germans focused on the fact that they had captured 
prisoners.38 Again, neither side mentioned the opening of the sluice gates of the coastal 
dikes to flood the area between the Yser and the railway extending from Dixmude to 
Nieuport, the defining action of fighting near Nieuport.39 In almost every edition of the 
paper both sides touted what they gained in a particular skirmish, with the only exception 
being when one or both sides declared it had been a relatively calm day. Berlin notices 
also provided coverage of Allied bombing of occupied areas, emphasizing the systematic 
nature of their attacks and how they appeared to be indifferent that they were killing their 
compatriots.40 There were rarely Allied communiqués that discussed these events. This 
section of the newspaper did provide readers in occupied France with a great deal more 
news about the actual battles underway, but it also surely must have left readers bemused 
at what was actually happening.  To clarify the confusion, the editors of La Belgique 
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provided a daily column, in which they could write as “impartial observers” and share 
their insight with readers.41 
 
Day 93 – Day 207 of the War & Other International News 
 Starting in the second issue of the newspaper and running for the rest of the time 
the Germans imported it into occupied France, the lead article’s title reflected how many 
days since the war began (i.e. Day 93 of the war was November 6, 1914, Day 94 of the 
war was November 7, 1914, etc.). This article, always the first one to appear in the paper, 
provided analysis of war events and something akin to an editorial voice to the paper.42  
Based on the communiqués, the editors of the paper scrutinized the situation and reported 
upon it, much like reporters in non-occupied areas. After commenting that the 
communiqués had followed their usual formula of stating that nothing was new, on day 
97 of the war La Belgique’s editors noted that both sides testified to their small victories 
in the same area northeast of Ypres.  After examining these different viewpoints of the 
same war front, the editors supposed that this war was greatly different from those of the 
past – no one grand battle would decide a victor.43 They even went so far as to make 
predictions, speculating in late November that the status quo in Flanders would not 
change over the winter months.44 The stated aim of this feature was to offer insight into 
the communiqués, which the paper blatantly called biased and confusing, pointing out the 
failings in these reports created by censorship and propaganda. They recognized the 
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nervousness of newspaper readers, stating that worried people existed not only in 
occupied territories but also even in neutral countries such as Holland.45  In the day 161 
article, editors observed that while the Allies reported they had voluntarily abandoned 
sections of the trenches near Arras, the Berlin report claimed the Germans took the 
trenches in a surprise attack that awoke the defenders from their beds.  The authors 
commented to their readers that such conflicting reports of the same event made 
communiqués difficult to interpret and, implicitly suggested, to trust.46 A month earlier 
the editors’ message had been much more explicit. It began by stating that the 
communiqués from the Allied armies continued to be flawed, making it extremely 
difficult to comment impartially on the day-to-day events of the war.47 It is most likely 
lost to history whether they also believed German communiqués were also flawed; if they 
did, that fact was not reported or was censored out. Nevertheless, the message remains 
that La Belgique endeavored to appear to remain a dispassionate journal of news. Editors 
stated that they understood it to be prudent during the difficult times of war that military 
authorities censor truth and falsehoods, but because of that, official communiqués were 
unreliable until confirmed from other sources.48 This section used communiqués and 
some outside newspapers from all sides, attempting to piece the stories together.  Thus, 
readers in occupied France briefly received some attempts at accurate journalistic 
coverage of the war.  Even censored, this section provided greater detail about events 
than historians long believed permeated the Lille region. 
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 This section of the newspaper provided extensive coverage of the Eastern Front, 
which it described as unfolding in a particularly disconcerting manner.49  The 
newspaper’s almost daily coverage included information about the Eastern Front, in 
particular activities in Polish Russia, which was a very active battlefield in November 
1914. The article often lamented that more news was coming out of Berlin and Vienna, 
than Petrograd, not allowing the newspaper to confirm stories. During the First World 
War, the Russian press had to submit to both military and political censorship.  
Censorship in Russia was more severe than in any other warring nation, as its limited 
tradition of freedom of the press only dated back to the 1905 revolution, after which the 
press was relatively free to articulate its own position on foreign policy.50  Not 
surprisingly, however, the two dispatches received from Petrograd in time for the “Day 
110,” contradicted Berlin’s version of events.51 La Belgique’s editors even commented on 
the tone of communiqués.  They juxtaposed the laconic German communiqués from the 
Western Front with the optimistic dispatches from Vienna after the Austrians took 15,000 
Russian prisoners.52  Coverage from the Eastern Front was often hard to confirm, causing 
stories to unfold over days rather than in one article.  In “Day 117,” La Belgique reported, 
with the caveat that the story had to be confirmed, that the Russians had won an 
important victory on November 26, 1914 near Lodz.53 The reality was the Russians had 
encircled a large number of German troops, but when the Russian leader Rennenkampf 
failed to seal off the northern escape route, the Germans broke through and smashed a 
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Siberian division to capture thousands of prisoners.54 By the December 2, 1914, edition 
of La Belgique a story closer to the actual events began to emerge, and in the next day’s 
paper, editors noted the German army’s success in an article that took up a large portion 
of the first page.55 Towards the end of La Belgique’s importation into occupied northern 
France, the newspaper began to include maps to help its readers locate some of the 
obscure Eastern European towns that were now be featured in this section.  In eight 
issues, maps allowed people to better visualize the war news they were receiving from 
the Eastern Front.56 
 War coverage did not end with the lead article of La Belgique.  Approximately 
half the issues received in occupied northern France included another article, providing 
detailed analysis of a certain aspect of the war. Again, several articles dealt with the war 
in Eastern Europe, and most read as if written by a neutral observer.  While one article on 
the war in Eastern Europe provided an obvious German slant, reminding readers that 
hostilities between Russia and Austria and Germany began with a violent attack on 
eastern Germany by the Russians, other articles provided rather detailed, unbiased, fact-
based looks at the composition of the Russian army, noting many of its strengths.57 Quite 
frequently, articles provided a great deal of information, including the names of particular 
side’s warships and their tonnage.58 Several articles examined the British military 
situation, including topics such as retired British warships, the British naval budget, and 
an examination of the British military, including their use of non-European soldiers 
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(referred to as soldiers of color from India).59 While one could search for propaganda in 
these articles and claim they contained bias against the Allied powers, much is open to 
interpretation, with the articles containing no overtly prejudiced comments for the time.60 
Thus, while an article on the Turkish and Russian fleets stated that the Russian ships were 
inferior to other nations’ warships and that none could go faster than sixteen miles an 
hour, many historians would claim that was simply a statement of fact rather than 
propaganda against an Allied country. Under the pen name Ray Nyst, one or several 
writers for La Belgique did write articles propounding the German cause. His articles 
frequently encouraged pacifism. Pacifism was a German talking point that the authorities 
hoped would convince occupied people to want to seek a negotiated peace.  In contrast to 
the Ray Nyst pieces, many articles read like neutral analyses, including a retrospective 
published in January 1915, which chronicled the events of the first five months of the 
war.61 Other articles considered the nature of war conducted in mountainous regions, the 
role weather played in the war, and a lengthy discussion of trench warfare, including six 
diagrams to illustrate key concepts.62 It would take an active imagination to discern any 
propaganda or bias in these articles.  One article in particular, whose author described the 
destructive power of French bombs, even seemed to be pro-Allied powers.63 
 International news beyond the war received coverage in La Belgique. Most days 
the paper had a section devoted to “Diverse Dispatches,” which supplied a few sentences 
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on world topics.  These sections came mostly from other newspapers and cited their 
sources, providing readers with a small connection to news sources that the Germans 
otherwise banned.  Sometimes the newspapers included longer articles about world news.  
Political turmoil in Italy was a frequent subject matter, as was the Mexican civil war and 
the fall of Tsingtau in China.64 Not surprisingly, American events received a 
disproportionate amount of coverage.  Much of it related directly to the war, as snippets 
and articles weighed facts in deciding to which side in the war the U.S. was leaning.65 
Some articles on the United States simply reported facts without any slant, such as those 
discussing American elections.66 It is highly probable that some news was simply 
reporting on hard-to-learn-about current events that a responsible newspaper would want 
to publish and that would lead news-deprived people in occupied zones to buy the paper. 
Reports about the Bank of the Russian Empire placing five and half million rubles at the 
disposal of cotton manufacturers to purchase cotton from Egypt and the United States 
could hint that the Russian economy was having a difficult time adjusting to war time 
needs, or could just be providing information.67 Another report stated that, according to 
the Hague Convention, warring nations could not utilize the Panama Canal to replenish 
their supplies.68   
 
News about France and Insight into the Suffering of Others 
 “Happenings of the Day” and “Diverse Dispatches” were two sections of La 
Belgique that frequently carried information about unoccupied France.  However, the 
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news provided was usually brief and at times haphazard in the level of coverage – minor 
incidents could be reported in detail while major events occurring that day could be 
ignored.  An example of brevity occurred in the January 30, l915, newspaper, when, in 
two sentences, it was noted that the French Chamber of Deputies would meet on 
February 4, in the Bourbon Palace in Paris. The Chamber planned to ratify decrees on 
finance, customs, and financial dealings with Austria-Hungry and Germany.69 However, 
the newspaper did not report upon other routine meetings such as this one.  French 
political coverage was nothing more than random blurbs of information. The movements 
of French President Poincaré received modest coverage, in particular his visits to the 
front, such as when he went to Clermont-en-Argonne and Reims in December 1914.70  As 
random as French news coverage may have been, items in La Belgique demonstrate that 
at least until early 1915, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received some news 
about the rest of their country.  Lille and its surrounding areas were not completely 
isolated from the rest of France in terms of news.  While the amount of this news was 
often paltry, to state it was non-existent would be an exaggeration.  
 A few articles may have even proved useful (beyond the importance people 
placed on being informed) to the people of occupied France.  They would have learned 
about the treatment of people escaping northern France for Paris who did not have 
financial resources or family members in the capital. Authorities quickly created a 
floating village in Paris made of barges in the Seine to provide shelter for refugees from 
Belgium and northern France.71 Created by a wood merchant named Liève, two barges 
housed families, a third housed single men, and a fourth sheltered single women, while a 
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fifth acted as a dining hall for all. La Belgique also provided the odd speck of news 
happening around occupied France. Annette Becker notes that although news was not 
abundant in occupied France, rumors were.  People heard and read the news in the 
version approved by the Germans, including military communiqués, and interpreted 
them, while trying to distinguish any real news of Allied forces from the German 
propaganda.72 In such an environment reading a Paris communiqué stating that just north 
of Lille the Allies had pushed back two enemy-attacks must have been a received as a 
gift.73 Other useful news relayed by the Belgian paper included lists of French prisoners 
of war being held in Germany, and rules for communicating with prisoners of war via the 
Red Cross.74 
While it may have been hard for people in the occupied zone to reflect on others’ 
suffering, several articles in La Belgique revealed that different areas shared some degree 
of adversity. The most obvious partners in suffering were the Belgians. Reading a 
newspaper aimed at the Belgians, people in occupied France could see that the Germans 
also expected others to pay war taxes, and live under strict rules of occupation.75 Despite 
many of the shared rules and regulations, French readers might have also gained a false 
sense that the Belgians were being ordered around in a kinder tone. German decrees in La 
Belgique did not scream from the lead position in an intimidating bold print.  Rather, they 
usually appeared on the second page of the newspaper, often in the center of the middle 
column. While Governor-General Moritz von Bissing often issued the orders in the name 
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of the public good, authorities in occupied France did not apply this fig leaf to similarly 
harsh rules.76 In occupied France, the Germans allowed different areas to have only 
limited contact with each other, as the German occupiers isolated them into municipal 
enclaves. So to see that this newspaper kept people in Brussels current on events 
happening in other areas of the country (never mind all the news from the rest of Europe) 
must have been a bitter pill for the readers of occupied France.  On its second page, La 
Belgique usually carried a section entitled “Life in Our Provinces.” People in northern 
France who had to live without such news must have envied the Belgium neighbors. The 
tone and lay-out of the German-controlled newspapers in Belgium may have been more 
moderate than those produced in occupied France, but that did not mean the hardships of 
life in occupied Belgium were any less. Brand Whitlock, the American Ambassador to 
Belgium described Belgium under German occupation as a place where, “the very air is 
poisoned with militarism, one has a constant sense of personal discomfort…one cannot 
voice one’s own thoughts.”77 Describing among other evils the torture of those who 
refused to work for the Germans and the jailing of thousands on contrived charges, Larry 
Zuckerman states, “Occupied Belgium was a forerunner of Nazi Europe.”78 If the Belgian 
imported newspaper suggested any less to readers in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, it 
was a misrepresentation of fact.  
 La Belgique informed its readers about how the citizenries of London and Paris 
suffered during the war.  Readers of La Belgique on November 24, 1914, would have 
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learned that in London stores had to close by 8pm and no light could be visible outside by 
police order.  High society no longer held parties, as most of the great families were 
involved with the Red Cross.  Business remained calm during the day and at teatime 
musicians still played in many restaurants.79 In Paris as well, the police prefect ordered 
that restaurants must close by 10pm. and cafes by 8pm.80 La Belgique reported that the 
Parisian population faced strict restriction on light usage to make zeppelin attacks more 
problematical.81 People in unoccupied France were also facing shortages of white bread 
and instead were eating brown bread; sugar prices were high (because most beet sugar 
production occurred in occupied France) and coal was becoming scarce.82 Juxtaposed 
against these hardships were stories that revealed some gaiety remained to life in the 
French capital.  La Belgique reprinted a fashion story from the French newspaper Le 
Matin, noting that wool was the fabric of the season.  The newspaper, in one of its few 
attempts at transparent propaganda, suggested it superficial to concern oneself with such 
trivial matters at such a dark hour.83 
The other group that faced hardships equal to those in occupied France were the 
men fighting in the trenches.  As one article noted, the war was long for everyone, but it 
was longer for the men in the trenches and the women and parents missing them.84 Hew 
Strachan places the horrors of the trenches in context, noting that trenches created health 
problems – particularly the ones dug out of the cultivated soil of Belgium and northern 
France, which encouraged the rapid infection of wounds with gangrene – but saved 
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lives.85 The quality of life varied between trenches, as some had wood floors and were 
well built, while others were nothing more than basic mud-holes. Not only was life 
dismal in most the trenches, with lice and rats spreading disease and soldiers standing in 
cold, wet mud dealing with trench foot and frostbite, but the trench system allowed 
fighting to be continuous.86  News of soldiers was the most coveted and often the least 
available, unless the enemy captured them and their names appeared on prisoner of war 
lists.  
 
Conclusion 
 In Maxence van der Meersch’s fictional account of life in occupied France during 
the Great War, Invasion, the importance, and deficit of news is a recurring theme.  He 
writes that since October 1914, “news from France had entirely ceased.  A steel curtain 
had been lowered between the occupied districts and the rest of the world.  What was 
happening to the French troops?  Why was the German army being allowed to hold 
ground here?  How long would it stay?”87  La Belgique answered a few of these 
questions.  The German occupiers chose to import this newspaper into occupied France 
for approximately four months, but a small percentage of the time under occupation.  
During this paper’s brief sojourn in occupied France, it did provide snippets of news – 
sometimes surprisingly candid news considering it was supposed to be a tool inhibiting 
the hope in its readers. Readers received a broad spectrum of news, but coverage of most 
topics was concise. One exception to this rule was submarine coverage.  Like other 
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German-controlled newspapers, La Belgique provided readers with extensive coverage of 
German submarine news.  However, this most likely was not a noteworthy element of 
this newspaper’s content for French readers, as La Gazette des Ardennes already 
provided all the submarine news an occupied Frenchmen could possibly want.  
Despite its German censors, La Belgique provided glimpses of unbiased news. 
Perhaps the German censors allowed this news through to lend creditability to the idea of 
La Belgique still being a Belgian newspaper, separate from the German authorities. As 
Sophie De Schaepdrijver notes, the propaganda in this newspaper was subtle, the 
newspaper “…did not sing the praises of the Kaiser,” but aimed to quietly garner favor 
for the occupiers’ position.88  This would be even more so the case in the less well- 
controlled imported Belgian paper, Le Bien Public. 
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Chapter Eight 
German Imported Belgian Papers 2: 
 Le Bien Public 
 
 
 
 Le Bien Public of Ghent began publishing under German control on October 14, 
1914, when only two days prior it had been a Belgian paper decrying German aggression. 
During the years preceding the war, Le Bien Public was a patriotic  newspaper, with 
German rather than French sympathies when reporting upon international affairs.1  
Before the war, this newspaper opposed allowing the use of Flemish at the University of 
Ghent, and the 1898 Loi d’Egalité, which legally placed French and Flemish on equally 
footing throughout Belgium.2 The editors began this first issue under occupation with an 
article entitled “To Our Readers,” in which they acknowledged the inevitably precarious 
position of a patriotic Belgian newspaper that was continuing to print under German 
rule.3 This daily newspaper’s editors expanded upon their position further in the next 
edition, stating that they wanted to keep publishing as a Belgian, Catholic newspaper 
whose new aim would be to give their readers a feeling of calm and confidence and 
deliver useful, albeit limited, information.4 The editors discussed the obstacles they faced 
gathering news, noting that they had to base coverage of war operations strictly on 
official communications from various governments.  While the German authorities 
agreed not to impose any information on the paper, they did review it prior to publication 
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and information could be censored.5 The editors stated their position bluntly: we can 
follow the rules of occupation and German censorship and still be patriotic Belgians.6 
 The Germans forced Le Bien Public and L’Ami de L’Order from Namur (which 
was not imported into occupied France), to reappear shortly after all Belgian papers were 
suppressed.  For a short time after it reappeared, the newspaper maintained its previous 
practice of producing three editions a day.  It was usually three pages in length, with war 
and international news on the first page, sometimes spilling over to the second, and then 
provincial and local information and advertisements on the second and third pages. 
Despite being closely monitored by the German censors, and being used by the Germans 
in occupied France, the Bien Public’s publication was often provisional and always 
uncertain.7 In December 1914, the editors of the paper forewarned readers that they were 
not confident the paper would continue publishing in 1915.8 This uncertainty appeared to 
be a reflection of the editors’ mixed sentiments about publishing under German control.   
Le Bien Public reported that Belgian journalists who fled to London and were publishing 
newspapers in exile saw their colleagues who stayed and worked under the Germans as 
quasi-collaborators.9 A historian of the Belgian press during World War I, Jean Massart, 
described such papers as Le Bien Public as “professed” (as opposed to authentic) Belgian 
newspapers.10 A lack of by-lines or statement of editors’ names suggests its staff did not 
want their identities known, as some saw them as colleagues of the German authorities. 
Such charges must have tried the staff of the newspaper, but they chose to continue 
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working. They described the readers’ negative response to the newspaper’s initial 
suspension as a sort of referendum that had deemed Le Bien Public indispensable.11 
Hence, the newspaper did continue, and for the period that it was available in occupied 
France, it did so without any further significant suspensions of publication.12  
 Resembling its imported counterpart from Brussels, La Belgique, Le Bien Public 
temporarily provided occupied France with more information about the war and 
international affairs than historians usually believed to have been available.  The paper 
provided official war communiqués, articles on international affairs not directly related to 
the war, and war and cultural analysis. Even more so than La Belgique, the Ghent 
newspaper provided news from unoccupied France. Indeed, Le Bien Public tested the 
German censors more than other German-approved Belgian papers. It thus had a few 
articles that probably slipped by German censors alongside blank spaces in the newspaper 
clearly indicating the work of censors in excising material found objectionable in by 
occupation authorities.   
 
Official Communiqués & War Analysis 
 Coverage of military operations in Le Bien Public was quite irregular as compared 
with La Belgique.  In the beginning of the Ghent newspaper’s occupation publication, the 
majority of war news presented itself as official communiqués printed under the heading 
of either “War in France and Belgium” or “On the Eastern Front.”  The German censors 
did edit Allied communiqués, despite their promise to the readers only to suppress 
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articles in their entirety, in order not to provide mutilated news.13 Despite this practice, 
some positive reports from a French perspective did seep in to the newspapers early in 
the occupation. On November 1, 1914, a Reuters account told of German attacks losing 
energy in Nieuport and Arras, while also confirming that the Germans had suffered heavy 
losses, including many wounded and dead.  Incongruously, a Wolff dispatch appeared in 
the same section that day, claiming German attacks south of Nieuport were continuing 
with success and that had they captured eight machine guns and two hundred British 
prisoners.14 Similar to the reporting in La Belgique, no mention was made of the Belgian 
army flooding the area to slow the Germans. Sometimes dispatches from the two sides 
disagreed with each other, but usually Allied and German communiqués focused on 
different areas.   
Starting in mid-December 1914, newspapers appeared without any war news.  
These gaps in battle coverage continued into early January 1915. The newspaper staff 
never included any explanation as to why battle coverage briefly ceased, but difficulties 
either in attaining communiqués or with German censors were most likely to blame.  
When the newspaper returned to publishing war news almost daily, it did so in a different 
format.  It switched journalistic styles, providing war news not in the form of 
communiqués, but as articles under “Political Bulletins” that provided a synthesis of the 
day’s communiqués. Much like the “This Day in War” articles found in La Belgique, 
these articles, sub-titled “Military Operations” often cited their sources, and frequently 
offered a comparison of French and German dispatches.15 These articles even critiqued 
their sources, noting that after all these weeks reports start sounding alike – what really 
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do these advances and retreats mean in terms of one side winning the war?16 Presenting 
the information in this format gave different weight to different data.  When Le Bien 
Public simply printed dispatches, the reader determined what was relevant and what was 
not.  Now, journalists commented on reports, often prefacing them with statements such 
as, “nothing very salient to report today, only the failure of one small French 
offensive.”17 Furthermore, it was less perceptible when Le Bien Public omitted news of 
military operations, because there was always other international news coverage under 
the “Political Bulletins” headline. This style was short-lived however, and by February 
11, 1915, Le Bien Public reverted to providing war communiqués, this time under the 
title, “The War.” This would be the last detailed information on military operations 
occupied France would receive from this paper, and the last few weeks in February 
provided little in the way of war news; by the end of February the Germans stopped 
importing the newspaper.  War analysis complemented this haphazard coverage of 
military operations. 
Le Bien Public included at least eight articles of substance providing war analysis 
during the time the Germans imported it into occupied France. While that was not 
substantial number for a daily newspaper over four and a half months, these articles are 
worth mentioning because they appeared in an arena believed to be receiving only a 
modest amount of news. Very early in the newspaper’s importation into occupied France, 
a report from the Times (presumably the London Times) correspondent in Bordeaux 
compared French General Joffre’s style of leadership to that of Napoleon. Napoleon 
found a weak spot in his enemy’s army, and attacked using all his force in that one 
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position, whereas modern warfare no longer made that strategy viable.  Instead, General 
Joffre focused upon being intimately connected to several positions of combat at the 
same time, driving rapidly in a car from point to point.18 The article was quite the feat of 
German propaganda. It noted that the people of France loved Joffre and perceived him as 
dynamic, but also stated he had actually done little as of yet to garner such devotion.19 
The article was correct in noting that the people of France loved Joffre, as the people of 
France saw him as the man who saved France at the Battle of the Marne.  However, to 
state he had done little to garner such devotion was German propaganda; after incorrectly 
assuming that the main thrust of the attack would come through Alsace and Lorraine, 
Joffre quickly readjusted his thinking and did indeed work a miracle, halting the Germans 
at the Battle of the Marne and “effectively killing the modified Sclieffen strategy.”20 
Towards the end of that month, the newspaper provided readers with a Marshal von 
Hindenburg interview, taken from the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, in which he 
discussed military strategy.21 
Numerous articles provided a larger perspective of military affairs.  An early 
article speculated how long the war would last based on modern warfare (the journalist 
assumed the war would be much longer than those of the nineteenth century but did not 
guess four years).22 By January 1915, Le Bien Public had not published any updates from 
the front for a while, but it did print an article about the economic ramifications of war.  It 
noted that unlike France and Britain, Germany had foreseen the war - and in particular 
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the prolonged fighting – and that this had a profound impact on the countries’ agriculture, 
commerce, and finance.23 For those unfamiliar with war events, the editors published a 
long article in January 1915, providing a month-by-month recap of the episodes leading 
to war and the actual battles fought, from June 28, 1914, until December 31, 1914.24 If 
this particular issue reached occupied France, the people there must have considered it a 
treasure trove of information, as news of the last three months of the year had been 
sporadic. Five days later, the newspaper published a straightforward account of the Triple 
Alliance’s history, including the text of the 1879 Austrian-German treaty.25 The article 
acknowledged Italy’s neutrality, noting that its non-participation in the war was 
explainable, as the Triple Alliance was purely defensive in character. However, the 
article noted that the Germans remained quietly expectant that Italy would eventually 
enter the war on the German side; instead, Italy declared war on Austria on May 20, 
1915.26 
The newspaper included several articles about the strength of the belligerent fleets 
(Germans allowed themselves to be referred to as both the belligerents and enemy in 
certain pieces).  In mid-January 1915, Le Bien Public’s editors managed to publish an 
article detailing the potency of the Allied fleets, providing details about the number of 
ships both the British and French had available for fighting.27 To laymen, the strength of 
the Allied fleets must have seemed encouraging. Overall, Le Bien Public did not provide 
much coverage of battles and the movement of troops, despite for a time carrying a 
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recurring article entitled “The French and Belgian Front.”  What this newspaper did grant 
readers in occupied France was a substantial amount of international news outside the 
immediate confines of the war.  It also provided ample discussions of the cultural and 
political ramifications of the war. 
 
International News & Analysis 
 International news came most frequently in the form of quick blurbs under the 
headline, “Political Bulletin.”  Much like La Belgique, this newspaper provided a wide 
variety of news about numerous places. For the brief time the Germans imported it into 
France, Le Bien Public did provide a consistent source of international news.  While most 
articles were brief – usually a paragraph – there was regular coverage of world affairs.  
The importance of places and events the paper discussed appears apparent. The two most 
important neutral countries from a German perspective, Holland and the United States, 
received abundant reporting. This focus on Holland, which shared a border with Belgium 
and was an important source of pre-war goods, and the United States, whose potential 
entrance into the war was a vital concern, accompanied coverage of politics and opinion 
in other neutral countries, especially Italy. The newspaper staff frequently reported upon 
the Allied powers and areas under their influence, such as South Africa, that hinted at the 
well being of the British Empire. The newspaper provided ample coverage of the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Pope’s role in the war, not surprising for a professed Catholic 
newspaper.  
 Starting early in the newspaper’s censored publication, Holland was a key focus, 
to the extent that a semi-regular article, “In Holland,” was a frequently-seen sub-title 
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under “Political Bulletins”.  Beginning in late October 1914, readers read about relations 
with their neighbor to the north that was untouched by invasion. This issue even included 
a second article “Holland and the War,” which reprinted an official German declaration 
from M.P.J. Troelstra stating that Germany would not violate Dutch independence. 28 A 
topic naturally discussed was the situation of Belgian refugees in Holland, who numbered 
in the hundreds of thousands.29 During the German siege of Antwerp in October 1914, 
approximately one million Belgians fled across the Dutch frontier, increasing the 
Netherlands population by one-sixth.30 The newspaper did not mention the German 
soldiers who also sought refuge from the war in Holland. In early November, the paper 
ran an article that methodically analyzed the economic consequences of the war for 
Holland and the military measures the war forced it to take.31  Dutch neutrality was also 
thrashed out frequently in the paper.  A longer article in November covered this subject, 
as well as German laws regulating the Dutch-Belgian border, and the implications of 
Dutch neutrality on Belgian refugees living there.32 This article appeared a few months 
prior to the Germans, expenditure of huge effort and much money to build a lethal 
electric fence along three hundred kilometers of the Dutch-Belgian border to disprupt 
Allied intelligence operations based in Holland (and prevent the escape of Belgians).33 
Two articles discussed the effect of the British blockades on the Dutch and world 
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economies, including “The Dutch Crisis,” which spoke to the economic hardships faced 
there due, in part, to the blockade hindering trade.34As Maartje M. Abbenhuis describes 
it, during the war Holland felt caught between the devil (Germany) and the great blue sea 
(ruled by Britain).35 Le Bien Public provided news of the hardship caused by the great 
blue sea, but not the devil. The Dutch government protested against the British blockade 
measures such as interfering with the rights of neutral citizens to unhindered trade.  When 
such protests achieved little, the Dutch adjusted their trade practices and formed a 
Commission for Trade, which was on very good terms with Britain.36 The effect of the 
war on Dutch agriculture was the subject of yet another article that portrayed Holland as 
suffering along with Belgium.37 The image of Holland struggling in similar fashion to the 
occupied zones continued into the next year, with the first paragraph under “Political 
Bulletins” describing censorship in the Dutch press, noting that it did not really affect 
Dutch newspapers.38 In reality, the Dutch government censored its press, but not 
universally and never consistently. When the war started, the Dutch government asked 
newspaper editors to refrain from endangering neutrality by praising or condemning any 
of the belligerents.39 In February, just a few weeks before occupied France stopped 
receiving Le Bien Public, the paper reported that Holland was mobilizing to armed 
neutrality.40 The report did not state that throughout the war the Dutch feared invasion, 
especially from the Germans. 
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 The United States, as a rising world power, garnered international attention before 
the war started.  With its declaration of neutrality during the first part of the war, 
however, both sides were vying for its support, and coverage of events occurring across 
the sea increased.  Even within the short time span occupied Frenchmen had access to Le 
Bien Public, one could see a proliferation of stories focusing on the United States. An 
early snippet of news told of a bomb exploding in a Bronx courthouse, aimed at a Judge 
Gibbs who had been doling out harsh sentences.41 This story seems to have been included 
merely because of its shocking elements.  Most articles about the United States either 
provided insight into its political climate or focused on the relationship between it and 
England and potential rifts building between the two.  
 President Wilson’s attitudes towards the war were of such importance that in 
January 1915, Le Bien Public published a two-issue serial on the topic.42 Earlier, it had 
reported upon his official protest in regards to the bombing of open cities.43 The January 
21,1915 issue also included pieces about a proposed amendment to American 
immigration laws excluding illiterate immigrants from entry to the country, and Senator 
Lodge’s demand for a commission to examine if the United States was sufficiently 
prepared if it had to enter the war.44 The paper provided a few sentences on the Senatorial 
elections.45 Immigration law also received continuing coverage, including when President 
Wilson utilized his veto power to cut down a bill.46  Le Bien Public also supplied an 
examination of America’s relations with both Mexico and Argentina.47 Most political 
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articles about the United States, however, focused on whether it would enter the war, 
including items on American neutrality, the build-up of the American arsenal, including 
its aerial fleet, weaponry, naval projects (in particular its submarine program) and the 
Ship Purchase Bill.48 The Ship Purchase Bill was Secretary of the Treasury William G. 
McAddo’s attempt to deal with the disruption of shipping that jeopardized American 
exports.  The legislation called for the creation of a government-owned corporation to 
purchase and operate ships on overseas trade routes.  President Wilson supported the 
legislation but Congress balked at the idea, claiming it was expensive and socialistic. The 
bill was prepared shortly after the outbreak of war, but had to be introduced to Senate 
several times, and with numerous modification before passage in May 1916. The final 
bill limited the existence of the Shipping Board to times of “national emergency.”49 The 
Ship Purchase Bill issue revealed the differing political opinions in the United States 
during the war. Any person in occupied France who was fortunate enough to have read 
all these issues of Le Bien Public would have had a solid understanding of the American 
political outlook toward the war. 
The United States and England enjoyed close ties. Readers discovered in early 
January that Dr. Hexamer, president of the American Association of University 
Professors founded that year, had organized meetings protesting the overtly anglophile 
attitude of the American government.50 Various articles concentrated upon the potential 
of increasing estrangement between the two countries. When the United States protested 
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British enforcement of their blockade, including the British seizure of leather and olive 
oil from neutral countries on the grounds that the destination of the products was enemy 
territory, it received coverage.51 However, the newspaper also reported upon British 
assurances sent via their Washington ambassador to the United States that the British 
navy would not slow down American ships in the search for contraband.52  Le Bien 
Public included even petty incidents of strife between the two countries.  For example, 
when a Canadian duck hunter accidentally killed an American duck hunter near Lake 
Erie in the British dominion of Canada, the very overblown headline in Le Bien Public 
read “Incident on Anglo-American Frontier.”53 It would be an understatement to assert 
that the newspaper provided detailed coverage of the two countries’ relationship. 
Coverage of neutral countries’ internal politics was a stable fixture in this Ghent 
newspaper. Stories pertaining to Italy were especially prevalent. The Italian earthquake 
received substantial coverage in both Le Bien Public and La Belgique because of its 
enormity. Occurring on January 13,1915, this major earthquake in the Abruzzi province 
affected fifty-four communes, leaving 25,000 dead and another 100,000 people 
homeless.54 One of the first articles on Italy to appear in the German-censored Le Bien 
Public was a Wolff report examining Italian neutrality and the internal struggle gripping 
its politics.55 Readers in occupied France were relatively well informed on Italian politics, 
being able to follow its ministerial crisis and then learn about its new cabinet.56 Once this 
new government emerged, further pieces detailed the nature of the country’s neutrality 
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and its military preparedness.57 When Italy did enter the war on the side of the Allies on 
April 26, 1915, (after the French occupied zone stopped receiving Le Bien Public) war 
deeply divided the country.58 In early 1915, when occupied France was still receiving this 
newspaper, the question of intervention was dividing the Italian left, with many socialists 
being identified by the population as defeatists for their position of neutrality, while many 
others on the left, including revolutionary socialists like Benito Mussolini supported the 
war effort.59  
Articles were also included in the paper focusing on Romanian neutrality, and the 
Portuguese political crisis and neutrality.60  One article quoted Nika Petreseu, a 
Romanian Professor of law at the University of Louvain. He stated that Romania did not 
want to become involved in the war, in part because of Russia’s bullying tactics in 1878, 
after the two countries fought together against the Ottoman Empire, taking Plevna by 
siege.61  Petreseu continued on to state that not only did Russia’s ingratitude push 
Romanian into the Austrian sphere of influence and made him realize the potential 
dangers Romania faced from Russia if the Austria and Hungary lost the war, but it also 
made the country not want to enter into war unless its vital interests were endangered.62 
This article not only implied the untrustworthiness of Russia, from a neutral, but 
suggested Romania was leaning towards Germany’s side. Romania had recently renewed 
a treaty of alliance with the Central Powers, and its ruler, Ferdinand of Hohenzollern, was 
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a member of the same royal family as Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II. Despite these ties, 
Romania entered the war against Germany in June 1916, after Russia promised to back 
Romanian claims to predominantly Romanian-inhabited Transylvania, the Banat, and 
Southern Bukovina.63 Coverage of the Portuguese struggle with neutrality did note that 
Portugal already had a treaty with Britain, and focused upon Portugal’s hesitation to enter 
the war, rather than suggesting it might do so on the German side.64 Germany declared 
war on Portugal after Le Bien Public was no longer available in the French occupied 
cities, in March 1916, after Lisbon agreed to the British request to seize German vessels 
detained in Portuguese ports.65    
In one issue alone, the paper carried brief blurbs under the heading “Political 
Bulletin,” giving updates on Swiss, Italian, Romanian, and Bulgarian neutrality.66 In 
December 1914 and January 1915, articles entitled “The Role of Neutrals” and “Neutrals 
and the War” provided an overview of their role in the war.67 One of their roles was to act 
as intermediaries, as did two Swiss delegates when they visited and reported upon 
prisoner of war camps in both France and Germany.68 Readers in occupied France who 
had the chance to read this paper were knowledgeable and up to date on the position of 
many neutral powers up until February 1915.  
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Coverage of the English home front, as well as those of her dominions, was 
extensive in Le Bien Public.69 Considering the role of the German censors, it was not 
surprising that most of these stories painted the Allied countries in a bad light. The South 
African riots received extensive coverage, demonstrating the volatility of one of 
England’s most important spheres of influence.70 The Union of South Africa supported 
the British war effort, but Prime Minister Botha underestimated Afrikaner resistance to 
fighting for the British, as they remembered the destruction and harsh concentration 
camps the British utilized during the Boer War, as well as Germany’s support for the 
Afrikaners during that war.71 The riots were apart of a larger Afrikaner uprising partly 
directed against military service for the empire.72 The insurrection in Egypt also received 
coverage, as did a bomb explosion in a police station in Calcutta, India.73 A short blurb 
told about the uprising in the British protectorate of Nyasaland (now Malawi) when a few 
tribesmen revolted against British colonialists stationed there.74 Reports on England 
proper focused on its domestic woes caused by the war, such as its faltering economic 
health. Two articles but ten days apart told readers in late autumn of 1914 that despite 
taxes having been raised on several items, including beer and income, the British still 
needed a loan from the treasury to pay for the war.75 Troubles with coal production in 
Yorkshire received treatment, as did the looming menace of strikes, and the sharp 
increase in overall prices across England. 76 A British economic story particularly 
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germane for Belgian readers appeared in the last issue of 1914, entitled “The Problem of 
Refugees in England.” It reported that Belgian refugees in England were having a 
difficult time procuring jobs, as employers judged that hiring them would undermine the 
indigenous workforce.77 A German proclamation, uncharacteristically in the lead 
position, claimed the British were taking severe measures against German and Austrian 
residents in their country.78 Perhaps the German authorities encouraged the newspaper’s 
editors to lead with this story because it was true.  On August 5, 1914, Parliament passed 
into law the Alien Restrictions Bill as an emergency measure, giving the Home Secretary 
total control over all aliens, requiring aliens to reside and remain within certain parts of 
the country, and enabling their deportation without trial.79 The Alien Restrictions Bill 
made German and Austrian nationals extremely vulnerable in Britain, as the British 
government utilized this legislation to expel and intern the majority of Germans in Britain 
by the end of the war.80 Of the approximately 75,000 people classified as enemy aliens 
during the war, the British government interned roughly 32,000 and repatriated 20,000.81 
As a professed Roman Catholic newspaper, Le Bien Public provided Catholic 
occupied France with some coverage of Vatican affairs. Twenty-one days after its 
occurrence, the newspaper covered the death of Cardinal Ferrata, the former papal nuncio 
to Belgium and France.82 By mid-November, the newspaper was running stories under 
the title, “The Pope and the War.”83 The second article under this title paraphrased Pope 
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Benedict XV’s telegram stating Vatican neutrality.84 The Vatican stance was actually one 
of absolute impartiality, which, as opposed to neutrality, forbade public moral 
determinations.85 It was certainly good propaganda for the German authorities to tell 
Catholic Belgians that their religious leader was not taking sides. Three weeks later, the 
newspaper published two articles about his encyclical letter relating to the war.86 Ad 
beatissimi apostolorum appealed in a loving tone to both sides, stating that the ruling 
states had ceased to observe Christian wisdom leading to the war and beseeching both 
sides to find some others means of resolving their differences.87 Readers also read of the 
Pope’s pleas for a Christmas truce, before both sides ultimately rejected the idea.88 Two 
days before Christmas Le Bien Public published both a letter from Pope Benedict to 
Cardinal Mercier (Archbishop of Malines who opposed the deportation of unemployed 
Belgian men to Germany), and an article about the religious spirit in internment camps.89 
The January 2, 1915, edition of the paper discussed the Vatican’s relationship with 
France.90 Discussing the gradual weakening of Church influence in France was discrete 
propaganda aimed at the still religious Belgians.91 In a later issue, a paragraph of the 
paper examined the Vatican’s relationship with the Quirinal (the Italian civilian 
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government).92 Another article recounted the Pope’s visit to those injured in the Italian 
earthquake and the comfort he provided them.93 
 The newspaper provided religious coverage in broader terms beyond the Vatican 
as a political entity. Mid-way through the period of the paper’s importation into occupied 
France a regular feature entitled “Press Review” provided an editorial section to the 
newspaper. One article placed the blame for the war on the Catholic Church for not 
forbidding Catholic Austria from starting the war (somewhat ignoring the realities of 
Church power in the twentieth century).94 A later “Press Review” lauded the revival of 
religious sentiment throughout Catholic Europe, noting the comfort it was bringing 
people during trying times.95 One piece, “The Mysterious Law,” questioned why God 
was not intervening to end the suffering caused by the war, with the author’s answer that 
the natural state of man is to work and suffer96  
Some international news pieces appear to be included purely for their inherent 
interest.  No less than fourteen issues of the paper mentioned the erupting Mexican civil 
war.  Two articles talked of Noble Peace Prize winners, one piece confirmed that Mount 
Vesuvius was becoming active, while additional pieces discussed South American unrest 
that only marginally could have an impact on the European war. Le Bien Public provided 
a wide array of international news coverage.  If a small amount of that information 
managed to filter into occupied France, then from October 1914 till February 1915, the 
area received more world news than is usually recognized.  
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 Le Bien Public extensively covered the international pacifist movement, with at 
least six articles devoted to the topic, not counting those pertaining to the Pope’s attempts 
to broker a peace. At first readers learned that it was not a very large movement, but the 
reporting continued.97 Most of these articles provided little to revitalize hopes for peace, 
and one article explained that, while there was a widespread desire for peace, the flood of 
violence spread across Europe for profound reasons and could not end until something 
was achieved.98 Le Bien Public reached back to peace conferences held at The Hague in 
1899 and 1907, noting that the general public knew little about the results, which were 
supposed to help avoid such a war.99 The newspaper even discussed the concept of 
pacifism at an academic level, as one article provided the opinion of Charles W. Eliot, 
President of Harvard University from 1869-1909, that a federation of European states 
was the only way to ensure peace.100 It is interesting that the peace movement received 
this much coverage, as one editorial in Le Bien Public called it an “inopportune 
controversy,” and opined that this was not the time to undermine the German war effort 
by talking about peace.101 Other broad, war-related, topics discussed in the newspaper 
included the role of women in the war, the effects of so many deaths on the family 
structure, and the relationship between war and art. Articles that analyzed international 
trends offered substantial discussions of the effects and nature of war that would later be 
lacking in news received in occupied France, even examining loftier topics such as 
human progress and the war. 
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News about France 
 
As we noted, history remembers occupied France as starved for news from the 
rest of the country. As Deborah Buffton states in her dissertation, people living in 
occupied France compared their nutritional depravation to their knowledge 
depravation.102 Hence, the news about France they did receive from Le Bien Public must 
have been welcome, even though it frequently focused on France’s woes. At least 
fourteen articles reported on news from unoccupied French unrelated to the battlefront. 
Readers learned that three German airplanes flew over Paris, and that a German zeppelin 
dropped six bombs on Paris in late October, killing eight people and injuring many 
more.103 However, Le Bien Public relayed the French government’s return to Paris from 
Bordeaux with no trace of propaganda inserted into the stories. A story on President 
Poincaré’s return to Paris was followed three issues later with a blurb stating the next 
session would start sometime between December 15th and 20th, and that the Parliament 
was going to limit voting to money bills and laws indispensable to the war and national 
life.104 Coverage of parliamentary activity continued into the next year, when in February 
readers were informed of the nine topics Parliament intended to focus upon in the new 
session, including road construction in various areas of France, limits on the number of 
treasury bonds issued, passing a law forbidding trade with Germans, and limiting the sale 
of absinthe.105 
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 Most of the stories spotlighted France’s social and economic afflictions. A 
lengthy article ran in the end of November, simply titled “In French Industry.”  Citing the 
Petit Parisien as its source, it stated that stagnation had gripped the country, as the army 
had taken all able-bodied men, forcing businesses to close and placing both the young 
and old on welfare. It was true that mobilization and the war brought industrial activity 
effectively to a halt, as most firms retained on average only one-third of their pre-1914 
workforce.106 However, as the military front stabilized, the French state authorized 
industrialists to recall mobilized essential workers.107   Especially important to readers in 
the occupied zone, Le Bien Public continued on to reveal concerns about the large 
number of Belgian and French refugees flooding Paris and the surrounding areas, 
accentuating economic problems.  The French government was asking female refugees to 
work a few hours a week making clothes for the wounded and children.108 Political angst 
was also fair grist for Le Bien Public.  Without providing much detail or context, it 
reported that some members of parliament and journalists had joined forces under 
Clemenceau to name a commission to present to the prime minister a protest against the 
illegal manner in which he was censoring of the news.109 The newspaper covered social 
issues, such as the falling French birthrate.110 The birthrate story warned it would take 
generations to make up for war losses if families continued to limit the number of 
children they had. If the French government did not make changes soon, the undesirable 
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action of bringing foreigners in to help France recover its position would be necessary.111  
The paper reported that the French government attempted to deal with the crisis by 
enacting laws to punish single people and to favor large families. This statement 
represented an interpretation of two laws passed in France.  In January 1914, the new 
family allowance act recognized large families as a special category of poor, which 
deserved more money because of childcare costs.  The law granted aid in the form of an 
allowance to fathers or lone mothers who had three children or more between the ages of 
three and thirteen.112 In July 1914, France graduated income tax contributions according 
to family size.113 Related to this, another blurb noted that some in the French government 
feared the French national esprit was waning, and the naturalization law of 1889 had to 
be modified to ensure the country’s identity.114 In the last issue potentially received in 
occupied France, it reported that Senator Bérenger wanted a law banning all foreigners 
from French military service and wanted those already in the service recalled.115 
Immigrant manual laborers were an important part of France’s population, even before 
the war; in 1914, Paris ranked as the first European capital in its proportion of foreign 
residents.116 Before the war, these immigrants mainly came from Germany, and to a 
lesser extent, other central and Eastern European countries.  As the war caused the 
reconstitution of this labor force, Belgians, Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, and colonial 
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workers replaced these workers from now-enemy countries.117 These stories suggested 
that the rest of France was changing for the worse during the Nord’s separation from it. 
Occupied France felt isolated from the rest of the world, the rest of France, and 
even internally as villages and towns felt detached from one another. These sentiments 
were based in reality. Occupation authorities restricted or forbade travel between areas. 
Such policies isolated citizens of occupied locales from all but their immediate areas, 
while censorship deprived them of most news from the outside world, making 
information scarce, and rumor indistinguishable from fact.118 In this atmosphere, Le Bien 
Public might even have provided information about occupied France to people within its 
boundaries. With the battlefield literally being entrenched within the Nord, daily reports 
of skirmishes were local news. Furthermore, an article in Le Bien Public allowed 
residents of occupied France a chance to gauge the problems their conquest posed for the 
nation. An assessment of the occupied territories, taken from the Petit Parisien, let people 
know that 3.25 million were in the occupied zone, and placed a monetary value on the 
lost area at 9,500,000,000 francs.119 Indeed, the industrial production of the Département 
du Nord was valued at four billion francs annually before the war.120  Two other articles 
provided information perhaps not known outside the Lille area. A short article in the last 
column of the front page of the November 19 issue, quoting the Nord Maritime, reported 
the Germans had not allowed anybody to enter or leave Lille since October 13.121 A much 
longer article in early December extolled the Bulletin de Lille as providing details of the 
city’s occupation, with an accurate assessment of the use of hostages and the amount of 
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food available.122 Such praise for that mainstay of German authority, Bulletin de Lille, 
must have been a bitter pill to readers in occupied France. 
 
Censorship in Le Bien Public 
 All of the German-authorized newspapers, whether originating in Belgium or 
France, were supposed to provide a view of life as the Germans wished people under 
their control to interpret it.123 Le Bien Public’s publishing staff did not always put 
forward the world image the Germans wanted, and hence occupation authorities 
frequently censored the paper.  The censors went as far as suspending le Bien Public for 
all of May 1915 (after it was no longer available in occupied France) over its practice of 
publishing Allied communiqués relatively unaltered.124 At the outset of German control, 
the censors allowed the newspaper to leave a blank space in the place of the deleted 
portion.125 The result in Le Bien Public was a lot of blank space. The first incident of 
blank space occurred on the second page of the fifth issue produced under German 
supervision.126 Two issues later, censors deleted a paragraph from an article “On the 
Eastern Front.”127 By the next issue a great deal of the first page was blank: the lead 
article had been censored, as well as a British communiqué; missing too was a large 
portion of a report on the Japanese attack of Tsingtau, and another section whose topic is 
not identifiable.128 The attack on Tsingtau was most likely a difficult topic for German 
censors. Japan, aligned with the British, demonstrated its expansionist plans in China, a 
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tendency German propaganda writers could utilize to their advantage.  However, with the 
capture of the Port of Tsingtau the Japanese established themselves in the Shantung 
Province, pushing out the Germans, who used to control the region.129 By early 
December, these blank spots disappeared. Perhaps this change reflected the editors’ 
recognition of what the Germans would censor. The editors wrote in one article, “We 
have no illusions – we know what subjects will not escape the censors’ pens.”130 More 
likely, the Germans reversed their decision to allow evidence of their censorship, 
demanding the paper’s staff rework page layouts to hide the deletion of items.  Either 
way, people in occupied France no longer were able to tell which stories the Germans 
censored. 
 Despite the heavy hand of censorship, a few articles were included that seemed to 
escape the censors’ attention.  In the second issue, an article entitled “Prudence,” reported 
that German soldiers in Belgium were frequently ending up drunk, because Belgian 
alcohol was much stronger than the German variety, and they were not accustomed to 
it.131 The article made the German soldiers sound clownish at the same time the French 
were being told they had to salute the occupiers. Shocking was an article about the 
wireless telegraph station at the Eiffel Tower.  It explained in detail how during the night 
its news broadcast could reach a distance of 5,000-6,000km and during the day 3,000-
4,000km.132 Considering the ban on outside news sources, and the fact that those very 
broadcasts would be the central source of news for the main clandestine press, La 
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Patience, not censoring this story was odd, even if few individuals had receivers. Other 
reports, telling of economic hardships in Germany and reverses in German-held colonies 
seem like the type of news a censor would consider deleting. One piece informed readers 
that a British warship torpedoed a German submarine, and painted the picture of the 
Germans waving a white flag as they sank.133 As Deborah Buffton noted about the 
Gazette des Ardennes134, two voices coexisted in Le Bien Public despite German control. 
That second, a Belgian voice, must have been welcomed in the Nord.  
 
Conclusion 
 The ability of Le Bien Public editors to test, and occasionally exceed, the limits of 
German news control must have been evident to readers in occupied France. Compared to 
newspapers produced in German-controlled France, it provided extensive coverage of 
both the battlefronts and the world at large. The Bulletin de Lille and Bulletin de Roubaix 
provided almost no coverage outside local affairs.  La Gazette des Ardennes did include 
war coverage but more heavily censored it.  The German voice was the dominant one in 
these papers – in Le Bien Public it was often the quieter of the two voices. Of course, the 
end-result was that the Germans stopped importing the paper into occupied France. It is 
interesting that the Germans chose to briefly import these two newspapers to occupied 
France, as within Belgium, the Germans did not allow either newspaper to be distributed 
beyond its province.135  
 Readers of La Belgique and Le Bien Public in France were also certain to notice 
the different tone the Germans took with the Belgians.  The less-authoritarian tone in 
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these French-language newspapers should not be associated with Governor Baron von 
Bissing’s statement, “I am of the opinion that a squeezed lemon has no value and that a 
dead cow will give no milk.”136 The German authorities saw some Belgians as potential 
future members of the German empire in a way they rarely saw the French, but they were 
not the French-speaking Belgians. The German policy of Flamenpolitik encouraged the 
German occupiers to court Flemish leaders and exploit their pre-existing quarrels with the 
French-speaking Walloons to split Belgian loyalties, with the ultimate aim eventually 
being Belgium as a Flemish state under German rule.137 Le Bien Public did not begin 
with German notices and threats.  Rather, they were located in the middle of the first 
page, or sometimes on the second, without a blaring headline, and sometimes even sound 
like a request rather than a threat. This did not mean the Belgians suffered any less than 
the French under German occupation, although readers of these newspapers may have 
drawn that conclusion.  
History did not record which issues of the paper made it in to occupied France 
between October 14, 1914, and February 28, 1915, so one cannot say for certain what 
exact information people received.  What can be asserted is that during this time the 
residents of occupied France did receive a greater amount of war and international news 
than they would at any other time during occupation.  They would also have insight into 
Germany’s occupation of Belgium, revealing people suffering under requisitions, scarcity 
of necessities, and living in general terror.  However, this newspaper may have misled 
readers in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing to believe that perhaps the Belgians did not 
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suffer all the indignities they knew in their daily lives. While this news was a brief portal 
providing a connection with the rest of the world, it also may have painfully reminded the 
people of occupied France of their isolation.  
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Chapter Nine: 
German Imported Belgian Papers 3: 
Le Bruxellois 
 
In the July 10, 1915, issue of Le Bruxellois, the editors extended a fraternal 
welcome to readers in northern France, as the Germans began allowing its importation to 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing.1 The German’s advertised Le Bruxellois alongside the 
Gazette des Ardennes in locally-produced French newspapers, such as the Bulletin de 
Roubaix. Before Le Bruxellois’s appearance, readers in the tri-city area of occupied 
France had not received news from a Belgian source since February 1915, when the 
German occupiers deemed two other newspapers under their control, Le Bien Public and 
La Belgique as too uncontrollable to continue as a tool in the occupation of northern 
France.  
Le Bruxellois posed no similar problems to the Germans. Le Bruxellois was a 
collaborationist newspaper. The editors made a great show of impartiality in their 
presentation of war news and in claiming their independence in relation to the German 
occupying government. Despite these claims, the editors of the paper propagated the 
German position on almost every topic.  An example can be seen in an early lead story, 
signed simply TONY, on Italian neutrality. The writer states in the article that Italy 
remained neutral on the pretext that Austria attacked Serbia and that the Triple Alliance 
required Italian involvement only in a defensive war.2 The author, however, implied that 
Austria was not an aggressor in the war. Such assertions reflected the views of the 
German occupiers and were a central feature of this newspaper.  
                                                 
1
 Le Bruxellois, July 10, 1915. 
2
 Ibid., July 26, 1915. 
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Even though the newspaper’s staff distorted information with a German 
viewpoint, they did provide important news to occupied France.  Unlike several of the 
other sources of information available, there were no glaring gaps in news in terms of 
follow-up.  In many newspapers, like the Gazette des Ardennes, an important story could 
be mentioned one day, with no follow-up forthcoming. However, even deprived of news, 
the people of occupied France remained aloof from this publication.3 Hence, it is difficult 
to know how many people in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing read Le Bruxellois. History 
recorded that the paper did reach these cities. However, nobody in occupied France 
believed it was an unbiased paper.  One man who lived in Roubaix until January 1917 
noted that the only war news available was from the “German” newspaper, Le 
Bruxellois.4 People could pay to place information in the newspaper, in a manner similar 
to modern classified advertisements, and people from occupied France placed such 
advertisements, as did people from other areas to reach people in northern France. In one 
issue, a man named Victor Rider wanted to tell his wife, living in the Lille area that he 
was in good health in a prisoner of war camp in Staumohle, Germany.5 Starting in August 
1915, advertisements from Lille-area stores also appeared in Le Bruxellois. 
Advertisements from occupied France slowly stopped appearing in the pages of the 
newspaper, however, perhaps an indicator of the unpopularity of the newspaper, the 
difficulties in placing advertisements in a foreign newspaper, or the dwindling 
availability of the newspaper. 
For the most part, Le Bruxellois provided readers with information concerning the 
same happenings that people in other parts of Europe learned about from their 
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newspapers. The difference was in emphasis: this German-controlled newspaper 
emphasized some news while devaluing (or at times even ignoring) other items.  This 
chapter analysis this German “emphasis” as it affected different categories of the news 
available in Le Bruxellois.6 First, we examine the communiqués and battle news with 
special attention placed on the newspaper editors’ coverage of Verdun, the Somme, and 
Gallipoli.  Next, we will provide an overview of news demonstrating German successes 
and greatness, with two prominent subcategories being their submarine and aerial 
exploits. The next category reviews the great volume of information categorized as 
stories revealing domestic problems of the Entente powers, and the inherent evil of these 
countries.  A final category of information that we analyze looks at stories promoting 
pacifism and demonstrating the evil nature of war. Before the news available to readers in 
occupied France from this paper can be examined, however, it is worthwhile to discuss 
the format of the newspaper and share what little is known about its publishing.7     
 
Publishing the Newspaper 
Le Bruxellois began publishing in September 1915 and continued until the 
liberation of Brussels in November 1918. Despite the fact it was the Belgian newspaper 
most under German control, in its initial issue, Le Bruxellois’ editors described the new 
                                                 
6
 It is important to note that this examination reviews Le Bruxellois with an eye to what news it provided 
the readers of occupied France, as opposed to those in Belgium.  While the audience does not change the 
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tensions. 
7
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paper as edited and administered by Belgians for Belgians, and as an organ “worthy of its 
name.”8 It claimed that German censors wanted to review issues before publication, but 
that such demands by the Germans were logical in time of war.9 In the issue celebrating 
the newspaper’s one-year anniversary, an article described how two Belgian journalists 
founded the paper to restore to national life an open forum for the aspirations of the 
public.10 This statement is very suspect. For this paper to achieve its mandate of 
influencing the people it had to appear to be a Belgian paper, hence its German 
ownership was a secret. At the time, people believed a Herr Rosenfeld of the German 
civil administration most likely owned it.11 Very little information is available about 
Rosenfeld. It is suggestive that his name is similar to that of Herman Hugo Rosenbaum, a 
German expatriate, originally from Hamburg who lived in Brussels for many years before 
the war.12 Andreas Laska described Rosenbaum as the editor of Le Bruxellois, but until 
January 19, 1917, the front page proclaimed Marc de Salm as its editor.  This was the 
pseudonym of François Belvaux, a former journalist of the Patriote newspaper.13 The 
Patriote was the most influential Catholic journal in Belgium before the war and it 
stopped publication with the occupation. While de Salm (as he will be referred to in this 
chapter) may have taken pains to hide his identity, he never tried to hide his 
Germanophile sympathies.14  Unlike most of the newspaper editors still working under 
German occupation, this editor was not doing his job against his better judgment. From 
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January 1917 on, the newspaper stated that René Armand was its editor, however, Marc 
de Salm frequently wrote the lead story in the paper, continuing up until its very last 
issue. Even as Germany was evacuating Brussels, Marc de Salm defended the occupiers’ 
utilization of Belgian goods as legitimate during a time of war, and worried what would 
happen when the Entente soldiers got their “claws” into Belgian territory.15 The editors 
oversaw a staff of professional journalists, unlike many other newspapers in the occupied 
zones whose staff included people whose key qualification was a willingness to work for 
the Germans.  
The newspaper began by printing 69,000 copies daily, quickly increasing to 
75,000 copies daily, until late September 1916, when it increased production to 90,000 
copies of the newspaper a day. In November 1917, the number of copies produced daily 
increased again, this time to 125,000.16 For readers in Brussels, Le Bruxellois cost five 
centimes until a price hike to ten centimes on October 24, 1917.  The newspaper’s staff, 
with a rather self-congratulatory note, stated they were keeping true to their principles, 
with only a five centimes rise in price per issue.17 This sounded a lot better than stating 
they were doubling the price of the newspaper. By July 1918, the price reached fifteen 
centimes. For international readers (namely readers in occupied France) the price for a 
three-month subscription was roughly double the domestic price, at 8.5 francs before the 
1917 price hike. Interestingly, the subscription rate went down in 1917 because of an 
increase in advertising rates.18 Advertisements in other newspapers available in occupied 
France suggest that Le Bruxellois was available for sale at newsstands, but at what price 
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is unclear. The newspaper informed readers at the beginning of March 1917 that to allow 
for enough room for information, serials and small announcements (comparable to 
modern classified advertisements) would not appear on Mondays in the first edition.19 By 
the summer of 1918, readers could most likely tell that the newspaper was facing difficult 
times.  In July, the paper underwent a format change.  Instead of publishing two issues 
daily, the staff produced one paper a day.  Four times a week, it was a four-page 
newspaper; and three times a week was two pages in length.   
 
Format of the Newspaper 
 Le Bruxellois looked somewhat different from the other newspaper available in 
occupied France. The newspaper was sixteen by twenty-two inches, with news presented 
in five columns. The paper usually began with a lead story, followed by communiqués 
and then “latest news,” and “foreign news.”  What made this newspaper look slightly 
different was that from the fall of 1915 on, the newspaper frequently contained banner 
headlines.  The banner usually drew attention to the first story under “latest news,” such 
as in the September 23-25, 1915, issue, which told of general mobilization in Bulgaria.20 
These blazing headlines mostly told of news that was good for the German cause, such as 
Bulgaria entering the war on their side. The presence of such headlines did not 
necessarily mean then newspaper was about to provide a great deal of information on the 
topic; often, only a paragraph of information followed a banner headline. This gave this 
newspaper a different look and feel as compared to the other newspapers in the occupied 
zone.  
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 This newspaper also felt quite different from German-controlled papers produced 
in France because of the positioning of German ordinances and demands. Like the 
Bulletin de Lille and Bulletin de Roubaix, this newspaper did carry notices from the 
German occupiers, but the notices’ frequency and placement in the newspaper differed, 
also contributing to the dissimilar look of the newspapers.  Commands from the Germans 
appeared in the Belgian paper on average once or twice a week and these directives were 
not only worded less harshly than in the French German-controlled newspapers, but did 
not carry the same blaring titles. For example, one German order in Le Bruxellois related 
to registering horses and cattle provided polite reassurances that the census was not going 
to lead to confiscation for military purposes, but was intended to make sure that the area 
conserved its resources.21 Even when somebody stabbed a German soldier to death and 
the Germans believed that they knew the hometown of the suspect, the German notice 
offered a reward for information, rather than threatening the entire populace of the 
suspects’ town.22 After Bulgaria entered the war against Germany, a notice in the 
newspaper “invited” Bulgarian subjects in Brussels to please bring their papers to 
German authorities, all in a very friendly tone.23 One interesting German notice did not 
announce any rules or orders, but instead informed readers that the British enslaved 
Belgian refugees, forcing them to work in factories making munitions or sending them to 
plantations in India.24 Few studies mention the plight of Belgian refugees in Britain.  
However, it appears that the refugees’ class and status determined the British treatment of 
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Belgian refugees, with poorer Belgians facing the greatest animosity, which at times 
degenerated into violence.25 
 
Communiqués and Battle Coverage 
 From the first issue, the editors made a great show of their impartiality when 
presenting war news. The newspaper published official communiqués of all the 
belligerents in a relatively timely manner, with Entente communiqués almost as up to 
date as the German ones, if a day or two later in some cases. For most of the first year of 
the paper’s publication, the editors did not publish French communiqués with the same 
regularity as German communiqués and when they were published, they were often only 
a few lines long.  The newspaper offered an explanation within its pages, claiming that 
the French were putting out hardly any communiqués.26  This of course was a fabrication. 
By the summer of 1915, the newspaper had begun to publish complete versions of the 
French reports, often with little censorship. The editors most likely picked the 
communiqués they shared with care, to only allow smaller Entente victories to reach their 
readers. Hence, communiqués were similar to those in the Gazette des Ardennes.  One 
small difference is that in this newspaper German and Austro-Hungarian communiqués 
identified each battle by providing a sub-title, stating the Entente general who led the 
fight. 
 The German and Austro-Hungarian communiqués frequently told of British, 
French, and Italian failures, often making their enemies look like failed aggressors. The 
July 12, 1915, issue of the newspaper provided an example of this trend, with a 
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communiqué detailing events of the fighting at Ypres. It stated that the British tried to 
take the German position on a canal, but the attack failed with enormous losses for the 
British.27 As with the other newspapers, Le Bruxellois included the Entente nations’ 
communiqués describing small victories. In one from August 1915, Field Marshal Sir 
John French commander of the BEF stated that since August 1, there had been a great 
deal of artillery activity from both the north and east of Ypres. Nine days into the 
fighting, the French attacked trenches taken by the enemy west of Hooge on July 30, 
taking back over a thousand meters of trenches, and capturing three officers and one 
hundred twenty-four men.28 The newspaper made no mention that the Germans had 
initially captured the area around Hooge utilizing six flamethrowers, which spewed liquid 
fire over the British trenches.29 Another communiqué quoted Field Marshal French as 
asserting that the British inflicted on the enemy serious losses east of Loos, taking 53 
officers, 2,800 soldiers, 18 cannons, and 32 machine guns.30 In reality, this was the 
continuation of the unsuccessful Allied offensive, which resulted in slight back-and-forth 
gains and losses for both sides. On September 30,1915, Joffre halted the attacks.31 While 
announcements of only minor victories for the Entente were the norm in the newspaper, 
the editors did allow in examples of the British and French causing great destruction, 
presumably to cast them in a bad light in the readers’ eyes.  For example, a December 30, 
1915, British communiqué made it into the newspaper, proclaiming that the British 
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bombed areas behind enemy lines.32 In the same issue, a German communiqué 
announced that the British caused considerable damage to the Belgian city of Oostende, 
omitting the fact that the Germans utilized the port town as a base for submarine 
attacks.33  
 Le Bruxellois covered the Battle of Verdun as one extended battle. This differed 
from many other newspapers available in occupied France that discussed various 
engagements without always making it obvious they were apart of the same offensive.  
Coverage began in earnest in the February 29, 1916, issue of the paper, when a notice 
described the success of the Brandenburg regiments.34 This issue did not carry a lead 
story but began with the communiqués and two headlines, with the second drawing 
readers to the notice, by announcing “The Situation at Verdun.” The newspaper reported 
news from the Verdun front within a few days of it happening. The French attempted to 
retake Douaumont and failed on March 2, 1916, and the newspaper reported this fact in 
the March 5-6, 1916, edition.35 While coverage of Verdun focused upon larger German 
victories and French failures, readers did gain the correct impression that Verdun quickly 
became a battle of attrition. The newspaper never stated that Falkenhayn wanted to inflict 
damage so great that the French army could not continue to fight, and it also did not 
mention the use of poison gas or the German introduction of flamethrowers. The editors 
did include communiqués that told of French soldiers utilizing grenades to take back a 
few trenches around Champagne.36 The editors of the newspaper also did not shield 
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readers from the damage to Verdun, informing readers that bombing completely 
destroyed the city.37 At the beginning of April, 1916, a lead story, signed “H. Narcy,” 
noted that French officials evacuated the entire civilian population (which had occurred 
months earlier) and provided a brief history of the city of Verdun, including an overview 
of statues and buildings that the writer assumed were most likely destroyed.38 The article 
suggested two older works, Historie de Verdun by Clouet and Le Première Invasion 
Pressienne by Chitquet for reference.39 
William Martin notes in Verdun 1916: They Shall Not Pass, that on March 9, 
1916, the Germans released a communiqué announcing the capture of Fort Vaux, but it 
was still in French hands. Fighting continued around it until the Germans actually took 
Fort Vaux on June 8, 1916.40 The official communiqués pertaining to Verdun in Le 
Bruxellois copied the German error, either accidentally or intentionally, and announced 
the fall of Fort Vaux in the March 10-11, 1916, issue.41 As the war of attrition continued, 
the newspaper still provided communiqués from Verdun, but drew less attention to them.  
One article, looking back upon Verdun, told of French blindness on the subject of 
Verdun, but not that the Germans were also wasting soldiers on an endless battle that 
nearly destroyed both sides, not just the French.42 
 The British and French took the offensive in July 1916 to relieve some of the 
pressure on the French defending Verdun.43 The Somme was a disaster for the British, as 
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they sustained 432,000 casualties before the fighting ended in November 1916.44 Western 
Front coverage in Le Bruxellois switched over to include more Somme coverage than 
Verdun information by the end of July 1916.  After a month of battle, the newspaper 
editors included an article, signed “George Gueri,” and uniquely placed on the second 
page of newspaper rather than the first, stating the German defenses at the Somme gave 
the Anglo-French forces no room to advance. He described their attack as simple blind 
rage.45 The Somme lasted until mid-November 1916, and often included small 
skirmishes.  Interestingly, Le Bruxellois continued to allow some positive news from the 
French side, such as accounts of their recapture of certain trenches or capture of small 
numbers of prisoners.46 However, the emphasis placed upon French and British losses, 
even after the battle was over, informed readers that the French and British were the true 
losers at the Somme.47 The newspaper gave approximately accurate numbers of French 
and British losses, but did not dwell upon the casualties inflicted upon the German army 
during the four and a half month battle. As William Philpott notes, an accurate figure for 
German casualties on the Somme will never be established, but from available evidence, 
he has inferred they very heavy, at around approximately 500,000 irreplaceable losses.48 
 Battle coverage in Le Bruxellois was not limited to the Western Front and the 
editors included coverage of fighting in Gallipoli. Surely, to British dismay, their failures 
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in Gallipoli in the fall of 1915 were public knowledge throughout the world. Utilizing a 
dispatch originating from Geneva, Le Bruxellois reported that Kitchener might order a 
retreat from Gallipoli, and this was causing outrage among the British public.49 However, 
the article also allowed in a little British propaganda, noting that Kitchener planned a trip 
to the Orient, and that hopefully he could find bring victory for the British to the Turkish-
Balkan problem.50 For once, the newspaper perhaps underplayed this seriousness of the 
situation.  On October 11, 1915, Lord Kitchener stated that withdrawal from Gallipoli 
“would be the most disastrous event in the history of the Empire.”51 Nevertheless, Lloyd 
George and Bonar Law forced him to fire General Ian Hamilton in Gallipoli, replacing 
him with General Charles Monro, who did not believe in the Gallipoli adventure.52 
Kitchener’s visit on November 14, 1915, was to make a personal assessment before 
beginning the evacuation. One of the last articles about Gallipoli cited a Swiss source 
about the staggering losses the French and British had suffered.53 Indeed, the British and 
French endured 252,000 causalities in Gallipoli.54 In another example of telling only half 
the story – the half telling of the Entente’s problems – the Turkish side endured 251,000 
casualties, albeit in a winning effort.55  The timing of this story also would have allowed 
the editors to mention that the British managed a miraculous escape, evacuating 35,000 
troops, 3,600 horses and mules, 127 guns, and 328 vehicles without a single casualty, but 
they did not.56 Lord Kitchener died seven months later when a German mine sunk the 
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armored cruiser Hampshire, which he was traveling upon to Russia not far from the 
Orkney Islands.  Le Bruxellois recognized Lord Kitchener as a worthy military man, 
describing his career as brilliant.57 
 
German Success and Greatness 
 René Deruyk, who wrote several books about the German occupation of Lille, 
noted, “Buy le Bruxellois and you will read every day how the German army has never 
lost a soldier.”58  The examples of German bias in the newspaper were too numerous to 
record them all, but the praise – not just the reporting - of Hindenburg’s triumphs on 
Germany’s Eastern Front in an article recapping the war in 1915 provides a good 
example.59 While there is no doubt the Central Powers enjoyed success in 1915 on the 
Eastern Front, the emphasis placed on Germany’s victories revealed the Germanophile 
stance of the paper.  
By the fall of 1917, the tides were turning against Germany on the Western Front.  
Hence, Le Bruxellois again reported in detail about German successes on the Eastern 
Front, notably Hindenburg’s taking of Riga.60  The German victory at Riga in September 
1917 to all intents and purposes took Russia from the war.  This allowed the Germans to 
begin to transfer forces to the Western Front, giving them at eighteen-division superiority 
over the Allies at the start of 1918.61 One report captured Russian shock at the event, 
noting that the Russians expected the Germans to attempt to occupy Riga, but thought 
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such an attack was not imminent because the rivers provided safety.62 As late as August 
31, life was carrying on as normal in Riga, with even the theatres playing as usual.63 The 
editors placed particular emphasis on German prowess by providing a great deal of 
newspaper space to stories telling of German submarine and aerial feats. 
 German success at sea came from its submarine campaign. Germany showed 
caution in utilizing its High Seas Fleet, due to weakness in numbers, geographical 
disadvantages, and an inferiority complex, reinforced by the Heligoland Bight and 
Dogger Bank battles.64 For most of the war, the main achievement of the German High 
Seas Fleet was forcing the British to invest in an infrastructure for supporting their Grand 
Fleet, whose ships could otherwise been useful in commerce protection and anti-
submarine warfare.65 The only major fleet engagement of the First World War took place 
in the North Sea, west of the Jutland peninsula of Denmark and ended with the British 
losing 6,094 dead and Germany losing 2,551.66  However, Le Bruxellois covered this one 
apparent German naval success, the Battle of Jutland, in detail over several days. While 
some historians concluded that the battle ended in little worse than a tie, the Germans 
gained a public relations victory because of the number of British ships sunk.67 Referring 
to it, as is the German practice, as the Battle of Skaggerak, the headline was about the 
naval battle for a full week, with the newspaper editors reprinting German statements that 
it was a grand and brilliant success, as well as American newspaper coverage alleging 
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that Germany had just won the largest naval battle in modern history, with the win being 
meaningful to the outcome of the war.68 
 With this one exception, Le Bruxellois focused upon German submarine 
successes. Dozens of blurbs appeared like the one that stated that between October 1 and 
October 20, 1915, French steamships sunk in the Mediterranean included the Provencia, 
the Sainte-Marie, the Antoine, and the Amoral Hamile.69 The German submarine sinking 
the Lusitania went beyond the initial story to telling of the political fallout that ensued. 
Indeed, the consequences of the German sinking of the Lusitania received extensive 
coverage, including the back and forth diplomatic correspondence between the United 
States and Germany. Coverage of this issue may be an example of people in the occupied 
zone receiving a distorted report of events. Under the paper’s frequent section, “Press 
Review,” an article appeared reporting that American opinion in regard to the latest 
German note was generally favorable.70 Germany sent a second note, responding to the 
American note, on July 8, 1915.  According to Dinana Preston, who wrote Lusitania: An 
Epic Tragedy, this note was as unsatisfactory to the American administration as the 
previous German note, as it evaded the issue of sinking enemy ships without warning.71 
President Wilson did not intend to accept the German offer to provide safe conduct to 
American ships (painted in American colors through the submarine zone provided the 
Germans received advanced notice).  The American press backed the president, and made 
quips about “barber ships” as the American ships painted with red, white, and blue stripes 
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would look like barber poles.72 The timing of this article in Le Bruxellois was interesting, 
as eight days earlier President Wilson had sent another note to Germany, which noted 
that any future infringement of American rights would be deemed deliberately unfriendly.  
 Le Bruxellois shared news of both zeppelin attacks and the success of German 
flying aces. The German pride in their zeppelin attacks carried over to the reporting of 
those attacks in Le Bruxellois.  The need to tie up numerous British and French squadrons 
was the zeppelin’s greatest achievement.  The cost of constructing the one hundred 
fifteen zeppelins employed by the Germans was approximately five times the cost of the 
damage they inflicted.73 However, the editors of Le Bruxellois focused upon the fear 
zeppelin raids caused, including in the newspaper an article entitled, “A War Night in 
Paris,” which stated that life had greatly changed in Paris as it could no longer be the 
“city of lights.”74 The editors were correct in noting the atmosphere of fear the zeppelins 
created.  A bold, large, headline screamed “Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, and 
Sheffield Bombed,” and the following blurb noted that the bombing by the zeppelin did 
not kill anybody and the only damage done was to a communication establishment.75 The 
editors chose this story wisely, as it showed both Germany’s might and sense of 
chivalrous conduct of war. 
 The newspaper also reported upon the aerial aspect of the battles at Verdun and 
the Somme. Verdun saw the largest use of aircraft in war as an adjunct to a battle waged 
on land to that time, a fact that Le Bruxellois shared with readers.76 A communiqué stated 
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German pilots came out the winners in air battles around Verdun, as German planes shot 
down at least three Entente planes and several French pilots sustained injuries.77  As the 
battle of the Somme concluded in November after the Germans sustained nearly a half 
million casualties, the newspaper focused upon a description of aerial battle, noting that 
the superiority of the German flyers displayed itself clearly.78 While most of the coverage 
of the aerial war was to vaunt German successes, Le Bruxellois also carried a few 
examples of Entente failures.   Utilizing a Havas report, the paper reported that the 
French dirigible Alsace that left on October 2, 1915, on a bombing mission, did not return 
and that a German source said that it had been downed and its crew taken prisoner.79 Le 
Bruxellois’s editors demonstrated compassion and civility at least once in covering the 
aerial war.  When French aviator Adolphe Pégoud died, the German press expressed its 
sympathy and Le Bruxellois summarized these sentiments in its pages.80 Their remorse at 
the death of the first flying ace appeared genuine. 
 
Problems in the Entente Countries 
 This newspaper certainly kept readers abreast of the political and socials issues 
plaguing France and England, if at times exaggerating those problems. Le Bruxellois 
informed readers about problems in French politics, with pieces on the French economy, 
the French public spirit, and alcoholism and population decline. France’s political 
happenings were always good fodder for Le Bruxellois, as could be seen in the pages of 
the newspaper toward the end of October 1915. At that time, the French cabinet 
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reshuffled, mainly in response to the lack of French success in the Balkans. In this 
reshuffle, René Viviani and Aristide Briand switched positions, with Briand becoming 
prime minister and Viviani taking his spot as deputy prime minister. While this 
restructuring left Millerand out and added the Catholic right leader Denys Cochin, there 
was a great deal of continuity in the personnel of the French government.81 However, to 
read about the cabinet change in Le Bruxellois was to believe the entire French 
government was undergoing a crisis.  While the newspaper editors admitted they shared 
this news with reservation because their sources were not the best, they reported that even 
President Poincaré’s position was in jeopardy.82 The editors’ reservations about their 
sources did not stop them from running the banner headline “Presidential Crisis in 
France?” at the top of that issue. Follow-up issues correctly named the new members of 
the French cabinet, without making reference to previous statements that Poincaré’s 
position was in jeopardy, and article authors focused upon the failure of the old cabinet 
that led to its fall.83 A two-part story on Georges Clémenceau portrayed him as the only 
respectable politician in France, as he was the only one not trying to fool the people of 
France.84 Despite the editors holding Clémenceau up as the one just public figure left in 
France, they did not praise him once he became the French prime minister in November 
1917.  In 1916 Clémenceau was “the tiger,” a man pointing out the flaws in the French 
military system, and of course also providing fodder for German propaganda.  When he 
became prime minister, Le Bruxellois emphasized his repression of dissent, and arrest of 
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a few senior politicians with pro-German views. He stopped being a Le Bruxellois 
favorite. 
 The failing French economy received attention in the pages of Le Bruxellois 
several times in the course of the newspaper’s life.  An example that typifies the coverage 
was a lead story that ran in the summer of 1916, stating that the economic situation in 
France worsened with the war, and comparing the French poorly with that of Germany in 
terms of sustaining its war effort.85 The timing of the article demonstrated the presence of 
German propaganda, telling only the problems of one country and not the other. This was 
the first summer that the pressure of the British blockade caused the critical failure of 
German agriculture. The lack of fertilizer led to a poor potato crop in the summer and 
shortages of fodder for livestock reduced meat production. Hardship was Germany’s in 
the coming winter.86 
 Early in 1916, one article told of a deeply discouraged French public, waiting 
impatiently for the end of the war, a sentiment Le Bruxellois portrayed as similar public 
opinion in other Entente countries.87 At this time, civilian morale was beginning to crack 
in most of the warring nations, including Germany. For example, 50,000 German workers 
had a three-day work stoppage in Berlin to object to the arrest of radical socialist 
leaders.88  Le Bruxellois did not cover this. Another article appeared in the newspaper that 
summer, stating that nervousness permeated the French capital, as popular sentiment felt 
Germany might still have war plans unknown to French leaders.89 A common thread  
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(discussed later in this chapter) suggested that England was to blame for the war. The 
editors of the newspaper at times suggested that not only was England to blame for 
starting the war, but the French government was separate from the French people. The 
editors hinted that the French people were tiring of their government.  In a lead story, 
entitled “The Essential Causes of the World War,” the newspaper reported that while 
French newspapers might blame German militarism and economic organization for the 
war, the French people did not agree.  Rather, brave, isolated voices from within France 
note that French political leaders did nothing to avoid war, making their nation as 
responsible as any other.90 The article, taken from an unnamed Geneva newspaper, cited 
Jean Grave as one of those voices blaming France for the war. Grave was an anarchist (a 
word not utilized to describe him in the Le Bruxellois article) who edited two 
newspapers, La Révolté and Les Temps Nouveaux.  That Grave blamed France for the war 
is a partial truth.  He blamed the war upon commercial aims, such as finding new 
markets, “which themselves were part of a larger mosaic that not only included the civil 
and military bureaucracies in imperialism’s service but also a largely predatory bourgeois 
Weltanschauung tied to nationalism that expropriated the lands of conquered peoples … 
[done] by appealing to a jingoistic patriotism.”91 Such a viewpoint hardly exonerated 
Germany from partial blame for the starting the war. An unsigned lead story blamed 
Poincaré and Briand for leading France into war, declaring them jointly a third Napoleon.  
This article writer claimed the real destiny of France was under socialist leadership, not 
the militarism of the governing elite.92 
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 A common thread in the newspaper was evident in lead stories warning about the 
scourge of alcohol throughout Europe. This was not a topic unique to Le Bruxellois, as 
alcohol use became an area of concern in all the warring nations, as people saw it as both 
an impediment to mobilization and a waste of resources.93 In an article published early in 
the period of the paper’s distribution in France, Marc de Salm pointed to the issues facing 
Russia and France due to drink.94 However, both countries had done exactly what de 
Salm was asking; taken definite action to stem the tide of alcohol abuse. In Russia, the 
tsar halted the operation of the state vodka monopoly in 1914, curtailed the sale of spirits, 
wine, and beer, and voided all prewar licenses, despite this action causing a dramatic 
drop in revenue for the government.95 France relied more upon propaganda linking 
alcohol abuse to military impotence to quell over drinking, but did limit café hours and 
banned absinthe in the year after de Salm’s article appeared.96 While Marc de Salm did 
manage to insert a few jabs at Germany’s enemies into this article, it appears that his 
concern over alcoholism was not a German imposed issue; in Germany, the government 
placed limits on drinking, but concerns were based on the grain supply, rather than on 
intemperance.97 De Salm also wrote an additional lead story, telling the shocking story of 
alcohol and opium abuse in France98 A few days later another article stated that Parisians 
amused themselves during the war by drinking a great deal at night.99 
Interestingly, de Salm tied alcoholism to another topic he frequently returned to, 
namely women’s suffrage.  He noted that in places where women had the vote, such as 
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Denmark and New Zealand, women worked to combat alcoholism and “cabaretisme.”100 
De Salm returned to the evils of alcoholism many times in the newspaper, and not just to 
cast aspersions on France and Russia; he also wrote on the effects on children of their 
mothers’ drinking.101 Le Bruxellois quoted a French specialist on the subject of 
alcoholism when it wrote an article on Dr. P. Garnier’s La Folie à Paris.102 Originally 
published in 1890, Garnier’s work studied the medico-legal aspects of moral offenses, 
frequently finding alcohol to be a contributing factor. Not surprisingly for a work done in 
France, the information discusses alcoholism in Paris, which, within the pages of Le 
Bruxellois, cast the city in a bad light. 
 Alcohol abuse and France’s population decline were two interconnected issues in 
the pages of Le Bruxellois. Marc de Salm wrote another lead story, this time entitled 
“Antialcoholism in France,” stating that alcohol was the prime cause of the degeneration 
of the human race. He noted that France was facing becoming a second tier power, thanks 
to its low birthrate, which he tied to alcoholism.103 Another lead story cautioned about the 
abnormalities caused in children born to alcoholic parents, warning parents within the 
occupied zone not to undermine their children with this behavior.104 Indeed, in most 
countries, protecting children from alcohol abuse was a key issue, as people viewed 
children as both an investment and a threat due to their value as future healthy, 
economically productive citizens.105 Some articles gave the impression of being an 
unbiased overview of depopulation and birth rate trends throughout Europe.  Then at 
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some point in the article, the writer pointed to France to prove his point about the dangers 
of population decline. One article admitted that Germany was also starting down the road 
of diminished birthrates in its large cities.106 
 The newspaper editors returned to the topic of the low French birth rate 
frequently, and not all articles simply associated the with the alcohol abuse.107 One article 
placed the blame for France’s future population woes on the women of the country, 
stating that “chosen infertility” was the cause of France’s falling birthrate.108  Attacking 
France for its low birthrate was commenting on a portion of the country’s long-term war 
preparedness.  France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war stunned the nation.  Many 
fixed upon the relative size of France’s population compared to Germany’s and France’s 
low birthrate.109 Hence, pronatalism became a nationalist concern to many, with 
maternity becoming a measure of national defense.110 
 
Evil and Untrustworthy Nature of the Entente Countries 
 The international coverage of Le Bruxellois, while extensive, was suffused with 
pro-German propaganda in which we can discern certain broad themes. Le Bruxellois’ 
editors seem to have enjoyed demonstrating that France, Germany, and Belgium shared a 
common enemy even if they did not know it: England.  Their paradigm was that England 
caused the war but was not suffering alongside the others. The United States enjoyed 
positive coverage at first, but as it grew closer to declaring war, America became corrupt 
capitalists with an agenda. Coverage of the Russian revolution in this newspaper is 
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intriguing, as the editors walked a fine line of declaring the Tsarist government 
malevolent, but not wanting to endorse wholeheartedly the provisional government.  
Finally under this heading is included the newspaper’s coverage of Greece during the 
war, as the editors continuously highlighted events in Greece to demonstrate the 
underhanded manner in which France and England conducted the war. 
 The mantra of the newspaper’s staff was that England was the true enemy of the 
French and Belgians. One lead story provided an analysis of the causes of war, 
concluding that British capitalism was the cause, as England feared the increased 
industrial competition from Germany and the United States.111 This was a common 
refrain of the editors, who frequently laid blame for starting the war on Britain’s 
doorstep, as opposed to Germany.  One lead story, entitled “The Punishment of 
Germany,” stated that England saw Germany as a troublesome economic competitor, so it 
began the war to make Germany docile and less of a commercial threat.112 The 
newspaper enjoyed sharing the differences in the cost of living in England and France to 
show France suffering much more from the war.  It one issue, a blurb under the heading 
“Foreign News” stated that it cost thirty percent more to live in France than England, 
with a pound of meat costing 1.75 francs in England compared to 2.5 francs in France.113 
This brief news item reflected reality, as Britain experienced the least disruption to 
civilian society of any warring nation.114 In 1915, the British state introduced fixed prices 
for essential food, and the centralized distribution of food supplies and rationing meant 
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that nutrition, especially among the poor, actually improved during the war.115 At the 
same time, France faced falling agricultural output due to the mobilization of farmers and 
rising food prices.  Interestingly, towards the end of 1917, when the rise in food prices in 
France became dramatic, British assistance helped restore the French food supply.116  
However, at least one story contradicted the notion that England was not suffering due to 
the war.  Rather, news reached readers that Britain had to introduce bread cards due to the 
success of the German submarine campaign in reducing supplies of imported food 
stuffs.117 Britain faced a food crisis by the end of 1917 (several months after this notice 
appeared), manifested in long shopping lines for butter, tea, and meat. In January 1918, 
the British Ministry of Food issued ration cards for scare food (the Ministry had begun a 
registration program before this), which was a solid success.118  Consumption of bread 
went up during the war, as it compensated for the decline in per capita consumption of 
butter, fresh meat, sugar, and milk.119 Germany fared much more poorly on the home 
front, as the government had to ration almost all foods and most were in very short 
supply. 
 Not surprisingly, the British blockade of Germany received a great deal of 
negative attention in newspaper.  While the newspaper blamed the blockade for a lack of 
food, the editors chose stories that focused more upon international abhorrence of the 
blockade, and in particular, the reaction of America before its entry into the war. The 
editors of the newspaper appeared to want to push an agenda of British-American 
animosity. Towards the end of January 1916, a headline and attendant article highlighted 
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the discord between the two countries by reliving their enmity during the American Civil 
War.120 One article, entitled “England and the American Note” stated that England 
believed Wilson’s note denouncing the British blockade did not change anything.121 The 
article hinted at British callousness in the face of world judgment.  The United States had, 
months earlier, sent lengthy official notes protesting the infringements on the legal rights 
of neutrals to trade in non-contraband goods. The notes warned of the bad effect on 
American opinion of British practices, but Wilson stated it in friendly terms.122 
Realistically, England had nothing to fear from these notes.  By late 1915, not only had 
American opinion swayed to the Entente side, but any American economic loss from the 
British blockade was more than compensated for by increased Allied purchases of 
American goods.123 The newspaper’s editors had no qualms stating their view of the 
blockade; they entitled “A Tyrannical System” one lead story on the blockade signed 
“PAX.”124 
Another 1916 article, under “Press Review,” and taken from the Economiste 
français, provided several statistics demonstrating that France was spending huge sums 
upon the war, while England was enriching itself.125 The timing of the article was 
fortuitous; the balance of trade between Britain and France was moving steadily against 
France, forcing the latter to raise taxes and increase its borrowing.126 That did not 
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translate into Britain shrinking from making its economic contribution to the war, as it 
often financially carrying her allies. 
 A lead story, signed Zoltan de Szasz, expounded upon the idea that France was 
the principal victim of the war.127 He stated that Poincaré’s “victory at any cost” was 
hurting the nation, as the war was destroying France’s – not Germany or England’s – 
cities and artwork. Another article, this one by Marc de Salm, told much the same story, 
this time under the headline, “The French Nation Has Been Led to War in Spite of 
Herself.”128 A further lead story argued that Britain – not Germany – was France’s 
hereditary enemy.  Signed A. Gel., the writer, admitted that since the war of 1870, the 
French hated the Germans, but if people had longer memories, they would recall whom 
they truly disliked, especially if one asked a Picard, Norman, or Breton.129  A lead article 
signed “Sera,” asserted that the war revealed British character, with the good being three 
million men signing up, and the negative being the lack of talent and courage in 
leadership.130 If readers still had any doubt about England’s integrity, Le Bruxellois 
provided coverage of the Irish troubles, casting the English as exploiting the Irish.131  
 While Britain consistently received poor treatment in the pages of Le Bruxellois, 
the treatment of the United States varied over time.  During the first months of 
publication, the editors and journalists wrote courteously about the United States. Before 
the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, Le Bruxellois devoted several articles 
explaining why the United States would never enter the war on the side of the British and 
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French. For example, in May 1916, a lead story signed “Jonathan,” asserted that the 
United States would not enter the war because it would be bad for its economy.132 The 
same edition carried a quotation from the American ambassador to Germany, James 
Watson Gerald, that he wished peace to continue between the two countries. The article 
suggested that Gerald had warm feelings for Germany, when in fact he was so unabashed 
in his anti-Germanism that President Wilson grew to believe it compromised his 
effectiveness.133  
 Slowly the editors began commenting more about America as a country driven by 
economic ambition. The editors of the newspaper mentioned numerous times how 
wealthy the United States was becoming thanks to the war.  One lead story, simply 
entitled “The Unites States becomes Rich from the War,” reiterated the wealth that was 
streaming across the ocean.134  This was indeed true.  The war quickly reversed the credit 
standing of the United States.  The Entente powers began importing massive quantities of 
American goods, unmatched by the same quantities of exports.  At first, the European 
countries paid these debts in gold, almost doubling the American gold supply by 1917.135 
As the gold supply of European countries rapidly diminished, the United States extended 
loans and accepted securities in payment.  By the time American neutrality ended in 
April 1917, it held over a billion dollars in foreign securities and several billion dollars in 
newly acquired European debt obligations.136 Readers of Le Bruxellois knew that the 
financial capital of the world was shifting from London to New York. 
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As German submarine policies soured German-American relations, references to 
the United States became more insulting and dismissive as the editors described the 
country as immoral and money-obsessed. In a lead story appearing in the late summer of 
1916, the editors of the newspaper referred to “dollaricans” and described America’s 
military as small and dated.137 In the pages of Le Bruxellois, the editors began treating the 
United States as an enemy while President Wilson was still engaged in a re-election 
campaign, running on a peace platform. The newspaper’s editors’ opinion of the 
American military was “on the mark”; even though the United States National Defense 
Act of 1916 authorized a wartime regular army strength of 300,000 men and a National 
Guard of 400,000, it in no way provided for an army comparable to those of the European 
combatants.138 Indeed, in 1916, Portugal, with a smaller population than Ohio, 
maintained a great-sized army than America.139 By 1918, the newspaper carried a lead 
story entitled “Wilson and Yankee Hypocrisy,” stating that while the American president 
might claim to be an academic and an idealist he acted like another Entente minister.140 
The article concluded almost threateningly towards the United States, stating the country 
was about to pay a heavy price.141 
 Le Bruxellois covered the Russian revolution daily and in detail, ensuring readers 
in the occupied zone knew as much as readers anywhere else. Starting in March 1917, the 
newspaper informed readers that twenty thousand men joined the revolutionaries and all 
the tsarist ministers were in prison.142 The reference to twenty thousand men having 
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joined the revolutionaries most likely referred to the Bolshevik Party membership, which 
numbered around 20,000 men in February, 1917.143 At this point, the Bolsheviks were a 
rather insignificant political force, but in the spring and summer of 1917, it grew quickly, 
as tens of thousands of new members joined, drawn by the Bolshevik Party’s promise of 
a better future. The Bolshevik Party became a national force as soldiers, tired of the war, 
became increasingly radicalized and joined the party.144  
Frequently news from Russia garnered the newspaper’s headline, such as when 
the Tsar abdicated.145 But early coverage of events in Russia presented Le Bruxellois’ 
editors with difficulties; they had been very critical of Russian government under the 
monarchy but did not want to praise the revolution.  Hence, most of the information 
focused upon the wrongs of the tsarist government that had provoked this uprising and 
the ensuing chaos.  For example, the newspaper reported that train travel to Petrograd 
stopped and the rioting continued in the suburbs on March 16-17, 1917.146 The lead story 
on that day told readers not to have any illusions about any change because, the ignorance 
of the Russian people ensured that the country would not make any great strides.147 The 
newspaper summarized the free French press’ coverage of Russian affairs, noting that the 
general sentiment in France was one of pessimism, as the country feared that Russia 
might not observe the promises it had made to the Allies.148 Le Bruxellois covered the 
bevy of problems facing Russia, from naval officers protesting brutal reprimands to the 
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disheartened spirits of the people of St. Petersburg.149 Readers learned in a timely manner 
about the German peace offer to Russia and the different workers and soldiers’ councils 
about to vote upon it.150 Of course it was with the Bolshevik Revolution in November 
that Russia left the war, freeing up German troops for Germany’s last great offensive in 
1918. 
 Le Bruxellois kept readers informed of developments in detail in the countries late 
to declare war, including Romania and Bulgaria. However, events in Greece received a 
greater amount of attention, as the editors utilized this coverage to vilify the French and 
British. Readers of Le Bruxellois were well informed on happenings in Greece, beginning 
in mid-August 1915, and continuing for over a year. The war tore Greece apart, as King 
Constantine, brother-in-law of the Kaiser, believed the Germans would win the war and 
wanted to remain neutral while Prime Minister Venizelos judged that the Entente would 
be victorious and wanted to intervene on the side of the French and British.151 The British 
and French admittedly took advantage of a divided Greece.  The Entente nations, having 
no success in the eastern Mediterranean, debated the strategic merits of Salonika.  Once 
Bulgaria mobilized in September 1915, Britain and France decided to land troops at 
Salonika to march north in aid of the Serbs.  Prime Minister Venizelos approved the plan, 
even though Greece was still neutral, leading the king to demand his resignation.152 On 
October 5, 1915, Entente troops arrived in Salonika, leading Constantine to threaten that 
if British and French troops did not leave, he would order the Greek army to allow 
Bulgarian forces into Greece. He delivered on this threat in the spring of 1916, as the 
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Bulgarian army took over Greek border fortifications and took most of the Greek Fourth 
Army prisoner.153  This act clearly threatened Greece’s territorial integrity and national 
honor, turning popular opinion against the king. It also outraged the Entente powers, and 
they declared martial law in Salonika on June 3, 1916, as French troops took over the 
main government buildings. On August 30, 1916, a pro-Entente revolution declared 
Macedonia independent of Athens, and Venizelos established a provisional government 
sympathetic to the Entente, creating two Greek governments. This drama unfolded in the 
pages of Le Bruxellois, as Greece frequently made the headlines of the newspaper.154 
Coverage of this topic portrayed the British as bullies, confronting Greece with unfair 
ultimatums.155 In many articles, it appeared that France was practically invading Greece, 
although at least one article asserted that Greece accorded the Entente powers right of 
passage.156 One headline read, “Occupation of Salonika by the Entente,” making the 
situation sound similar to that of the Germans in Belgium and northern France. Another 
read “Salonika Evacuated by Greek Troops.”157 Another notice appeared under the title 
“Reign of Terror in Greece,” in which the Allied high commissioner Célestin Jonnart is 
only referred to as a dictator.158 
 The newspaper reveled in Delcassé’s resignation as French foreign minister, 
announcing it in a headline in the October 13-14, 1915, issue.  Suddenly, Delcassé 
became a respectable politician in the Le Bruxellois, choosing to resign rather than stand 
by the violation of Greek neutrality.159 In one lead story, Pierre Hantcheff described 
                                                 
153
 Ibid., 289. 
154
 Le Bruxellois, October 5-6, 1915 and October 9-10,1915. 
155
 Ibid., October 29-30, 1915. 
156
 Ibid., October 18-19, 1915. 
157
 Ibid., December 29-30, 1915. 
158
 Ibid., June 21, 1917.  
159
 Ibid., October, 13-14, 1915. 
  
282
 
Delcassé as a victim of France’s deceitful Balkan political dealings.160 Indeed, Delcassé 
resigned because he did not believe in the creation of a Balkan front; however the 
newspaper made no mention of any Greek compliance with the Entente powers landing 
troops in Salonika, providing the appearance that Delcassé was resigning due to French 
violation of international law, eliminating all shades of gray from the complex issue. 
People in occupied France may not have appreciated the slant added to coverage 
of the Entente powers in Salonika, but at least Le Bruxellois kept them abreast of events 
almost daily. The lack of follow-up available in other newspapers in occupied France 
helped give the impression that people in occupied France knew little of what was going 
on in the news.  This newspaper provided consistent news on events in Greece.  
However, the coverage did contain factual errors. The newspaper editors may have gotten 
ahead of themselves when the newspaper announced the French government had recalled 
General Sarrail from Salonika in April 1915.161 Sarrail was experiencing failures at the 
time, as two British divisions failed to break into the German-Bulgarian positions.  
However, it took several months of complaints until the French government replaced him 
in December 1917 with General Marie-Louis Guillaumat.162 The newspaper’s editors 
made another slight error, when the newspaper informed readers the Greek King 
Constantine had abdicated in June 1917.163 In reality, conflict with General Sarrail and 
the Allied forces had forced the king into exile but without formal abdication. 
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Push for Pacifism  
 Items chosen from international news and lead stories written by the newspaper’s 
editors frequently advocated pacifism.  The aim of this pacifism, according to Oscar 
Millard, was to undermine the morale of the civilian population and quash their patriotic 
sentiments.164 The newspaper’s editors gave the impression that the people of Belgium 
wanted peace.  Occasionally the newspaper included a “Free Forum,” article, similar to a 
letter to the editor.165 These articles frequently supported the concept that people wanted 
peace. One such article, published in the lead story position, stated that the working class 
had had enough of war, and that the socialist movement wanted peace.166 The editors 
added to this, with one article pointing out the economic costs of the war to individuals, 
noting that military service delayed the age at which a young man could begin his 
working career.167 
 The editors of the newspaper reported on “Lloyd George and the Neutral Press,” 
noting that the Swedish press denounced the prime minister’s ignoring the last peace 
proposal by Lord Lansdowne as another example of British imperialism.168 Lord 
Lansdowne led the Conservative opposition in the House of Lords from 1905-1915, 
continuously defeating measures passed by the Liberal majority in the House of 
Commons.169 In May 1915, he entered the coalition cabinet as a minister (without a 
portfolio).  By 1916, he believed that a negotiated with Germany was the only solution.  
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Without consulting the rest of the Cabinet, he shared his views by addressing himself to 
the press. His “peace letter” appeared in the Daily Telegraph on November 29, 1917.  He 
stated he did not want to annihilate Germany as a great power or deny her place among 
great commercial communities of the world.170 It is not surprising Lloyd George did not 
embrace Lord Landsdowne’s suggestions. 
In December 1916, Germany suggested peace negotiations. However, the 
chancellor’s offer, published on December 12, was meaningless, as it failed to specify 
terms with the exception that the peace offered rested on a German victory.171 From this 
moment on, the editors of Le Bruxellois placed the blame for the continuation of the war 
upon France and England. A lead story, signed simply “R.A.” stated that by refusing to 
enter into negotiations with the Central Powers, the Entente Powers were completely 
responsible for the continuation of the war.172 Another article recounted Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg’s speech to the Reichstag to the effect that the British and French had 
spurned Germany’s proposed peace talks it was they who forced the war’s continuation. 
Germany therefore had the right to utilize submarines to win the war.173  
 
Conclusion 
 The German occupiers gave the newspaper a title meant to invoke friendly 
sentiments and its by-lines always carried Belgian-named contributors. This did not 
change the German control over the newspaper, implemented not only through stringent 
censorship but also by staffing it with Germanophiles. Sophie de Schaepdrijver describes 
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both La Belgique and Le Bruxellois as propagating the German cause with some 
subtleness.  This was much less true for Le Bruxellois than La Belgique. The pro-German 
stance of the newspaper editors permeated every issue.  When Romania attacked Austria-
Hungary and declared war on the Central Powers, Marc de Salm wrote in a lead story that 
it was a historic date that might prove fatal for Romania.174 As this chapter attempted to 
demonstrate, the editors and staff arranged news in a manner meant to dishearten the 
Belgian and French readers, but news was present in abundance. The result was that 
readers of Le Bruxellois knew a great deal about the happenings of the war, except 
perhaps the news they most wanted.  As the war began going badly for Germany during 
1917, the newspaper reported mostly upon the rarer and rarer bright spots for the 
Germans, such as the taking of Ösel island in the Gulf of Finland in October 1917.175 By 
the time the newspaper carried news suggestive of Germany and Austria-Hungary’s fate 
in September of 1918 it is uncertain whether the newspaper was still available in 
occupied France.  The newspaper still carried an announcement at the time of each issue 
explaining its “international” availability, but with the problems facing the Germans, it 
would be surprising if the newspaper still reached Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. 
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Chapter Ten: 
The Clandestine Press 
Maxence van der Meersch’s fictionalized account of life in occupied Roubaix 
accurately captures how people reacted to life under occupation.  His portrayal of 
people’s need for information and reactions to the clandestine press are particularly 
poignant. He writes, “But in this state of universal uncertainty, imaginations grew heated.  
Elaborate stories gained currency; tales of sensational defeats and victories were passed 
from mouth to mouth… It was quite obvious that the continued ignorance was sapping 
the morale and generally unsettling the civilian population; and it was undoubtedly the 
intention of the enemy to do so.”1 He claims people welcomed news through the 
clandestine press, whether it was good or bad, noting the creators of the underground 
newspapers (based on the real men) “saw how relieved people were to know, to get 
genuine information, whether it was good or bad.”2 A letter written by someone in Lille 
and smuggled into Britain tells of the many hardships people in the occupied zone faced 
but noted, “the greatest depravation is to not receive news.”3 Perhaps more than other 
hardships, German control of news dissemination caused resentment among the people of 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Sporadic mail service and German media control meant 
that the French people of the occupied zone suffered from a double lack of news: lack of 
news about loved ones fighting on the front or living in other parts of the country and 
information from a trustworthy medium. While it was extremely difficult for residents of 
the occupied Nord to gain information about individual loved ones, the clandestine press 
was able to bring news that was more general to the people, a task not without dangers. 
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The German occupiers placed the utmost importance on controlling information.  Hence, 
they considered the production and distribution of clandestine newspapers as one of the 
most serious infractions a French civilian could commit, in gravity ranking perhaps just 
under hiding enemy soldiers.  Conversely, the people of the occupied zone considered the 
men and women who produced the underground newspapers as some the greatest heroes 
of the time. Indeed, their story is one of bravery in the service of others.  
Firmin Dubar, Abbé Pinte, and Joseph Willot aimed to break the German 
stranglehold on news distribution by providing the people of Roubaix and Tourcoing, and 
then Lille, an underground newspaper that could be trusted.  Firmin Dubar was a well-
known textile manufacturer and Abbé Pinte was a young priest. Joseph Willot was a 
chemistry teacher at the Roubaix technical institute and doctor of pharmacology at Lille 
University with his own laboratory in Roubaix. How these three men, with the help of 
many others, for a short time produced and distributed a clandestine newspaper in the 
occupied cities is a fantastic part of the story of news availability in the occupied zone. 
Not surprisingly, considering that each issue of the newspaper carried the request that 
readers incinerate it after reading, copies of every issue no longer exist.  What is perhaps 
more surprising is how many copies survive. For the purpose of this study, I was able to 
locate and consult twenty-eight issues of the clandestine press.  The clandestine press in 
the occupied zone produced numerous papers under different names with their editors 
and writers never identified on the papers. However, the Dubar-Pinte-Willot groups, 
aided by a consistent staff, produced all these papers and while the newspaper name 
changed frequently for security reasons, in reality all were the same newspaper. The 
newspaper appeared under the following names: Le Journal des occupés…inoccupés, 
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Patience, Nouvelles françaises, Echo de France, Voix de la Patrie, L’Hirondelle de 
France, Courrier de France, L’Oiseau de France, L’Oiseau, and La Prudence. Some 
issues carried no name, but were similar enough in format and style to identify their 
origin with the Dubar-Pinte-Willot group. For this dissertation, I consulted the only major 
collection still in existence of the clandestine press, saved at the Archives 
Départementales du Nord. This collection includes nine issues of L’Oiseau de France, 
seven issues of La Patience, four issues of La Voix de la Patrie, four untitled issues, one 
issue of L’Echo de France, one issue of Nouvelle française, and one issue of L’Oiseau.  
There also exist printed reproductions of newspaper articles from banned newspapers that 
appear to have been printed utilizing a machine sometimes used for the abovementioned 
newspapers. As shall be discussed later in the chapter, there were other, minor, examples 
of clandestine printed media produced in the occupied zone during the war, but there is 
no concrete evidence suggesting who created these items and so they must be dealt with 
separately.  
 
Producing the Newspapers 
 The story of the clandestine press began when Abbé Pinte assembled a makeshift 
radio receiver in his living quarters, utilizing a telephone wire on the roof as the aerial. 
He hid the radio when not in use behind the paneling around his bed.4 Firmin Dubar 
encouraged the priest to attempt building the device, knowing that before the war Pinte 
had gained experience with the wireless transmitter owned by the Roubaix technical 
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institute seized by the Germans at the time of occupation.5 On October 24,1914, Pinte 
received the first news reports on his radio from unoccupied France, transmissions from 
the Eiffel Tower and the English station at Poldhu. The War Ministry had established a 
military station at the Eiffel Tower, utilizing it to send out both military communications 
and news reports imbued with the same style of propaganda that their written 
communiqués contained. Likewise, the British government took control of the station in 
Poldhu, Cornwall, utilizing it both for naval communications and to issue daily war 
bulletins. Pinte dutifully listened to the 3pm and 11pm war bulletins. He quickly shared 
the news he received with a chosen few, including the departmental prefect, Félix 
Trépont, the bishop, Mgr. Charost, Senator Dron, Professor Clamette, and of course 
Firmin Dubar and Joseph Willot.6  Just listening to the radio was dangerous, and from the 
start, Pinte risked discovery by the Germans. As a chemistry professor at the Institute, 
Pinte chose to live at the school, his apartment in the technical institute linked to the 
military prisoners’ room, and German sentries almost continuously patrolled outside his 
door.7 As Pinte felt the pressure mounting and believed continuing from his room would 
lead to capture, he decided to move his radio equipment to a space behind the altar in a 
chapel, located along the same corridor.  He made the transfer, carrying the radio in a 
suitcase past several sentries. He continued receiving transmissions for two more years, 
despite the fact that the Germans suspected the Institute and searched it eleven times.8 
 At first, the men disseminated news via word of mouth to important, trustworthy 
people. However, word of mouth news dissemination could only reach a limited number 
                                                 
5
 Bernard Girelle and Jean-Paul Visse, “La presse clandestine pendant la Première Guerre modiale,” 
L’abeille: Journal de la société des Amis de Panckoucke, 1 (June 2005): 2. 
6
 Ibid., 2.  
7
 McPhail, 131. 
8
 Ibid. 
  
290
 
of people, and as information circulated orally to larger groups, it could become 
inaccurate.9  It was Firmin Dubar who began planning a newspaper, eventually 
commencing production on the mimeograph machine of his friend Joseph Delespant.  On 
January 1, 1915, eighty copies of Le Journal des occupés…inoccupés appeared under the 
doors or were discreetly handed to the most important citizens of Roubaix.10 The second 
issue of the paper appeared January 13, with the third issue on January 24, and the fourth 
and fifth issues appearing on February 6 and February 23 respectively.11 Joseph Willot 
played a key role. As a university professor and the senior pharmacist for the health 
service, the German authorities expected him to travel daily between Lille and Roubaix, 
which allowed him to pass information between the cities. Both Pinte and Willot worked 
for the health service in Roubaix, allowing them daily contact.  Hence, Willot took on the 
role of distributing and gathering news in Lille while Pinte did the same in Roubaix.  The 
group did not forget Tourcoing.  No less a person than the chief of police and head of the 
French information services, M. Lenfant, collected and distributed news in the third city 
of the conurbation.12   
 Quickly the newspaper became an indispensable counterweight to the German 
produced news, however, with only fifty to eighty copies of each issue appearing, the 
number of copies were painfully insufficient. Furthermore, very few of those copies 
circulated beyond Roubaix. Willot believed it to be imperative to start a newspaper in 
Lille. Working with Pinte and Dubar, Willot published La Patience in Lille on February 
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23, 1915.  This first issue was nineteen pages long and carried the same news as the 
Roubaix version of the paper.13 Willot chose to name the Lille newspaper La Patience to 
encourage the population to have continued patience and confidence that France and 
Britain would win the war. They continued to produce two newspapers until March 1915, 
when the three men decided to combine the Lille and Roubaix newspapers to limit the 
risks of detection, which doubled by producing separate newspapers. They met daily to 
prepare the issues, which at this point ran about twenty pages each. At this stage in the 
venture, they produced two-hundred and fifty copies per an issue, which meant an outlay 
of five to seven thousand sheets of paper per run.14 
 The newspaper team was not satisfied with only including news Pinte received via 
his radio.  Along with a wide net of co-conspirators, (many of whose names are lost to 
history and others who are both remembered and were later incarcerated for their efforts), 
they actively collected news, both local and international. In an environment where 
newspapers from unoccupied France were very hard to come by, they managed regularly 
to include articles from Le Figaro, Le Temps, and Le Petit Journal. They secured French 
newspapers by stealing them from German officers, obtaining smuggled-in copies, or 
retrieving them from airplane drops. The clandestine newspapers also included local 
news, which, thanks to the strict German controls on travel and communicating with 
others, was also hard to gather. By April 1, 1915, over a dozen people worked to prepare 
each issue. Two priests from the Catholic University of Lille, Auguste Leman, and 
Délépine provided religious and economic coverage for the newspaper (Délépine also 
provided the artwork), while Dr. Calmette, director of the Pasteur Institute, provided 
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scientific coverage and acted as a sounding board for Willot.  Joseph Willot’s wife often 
contributed a women’s page that aimed to provide morale support to mothers and wives 
with loved ones at the front.15  
 Printing these newspapers in secret posed considerable difficulties.  One serious 
difficulty was attaining enough paper.  The German authorities requisitioned paper on a 
regular basis.16 Fortunately, another industrialist (whose name is unknown today) had a 
large quantity of paper that he donated to the cause. Of the samples that still exist, the 
newspapers were usually printed on standard eight inch by eleven-inch paper of rather 
poor quality. Another problem for editors of the secret press was the actual printing press. 
Their original mimeograph machine proved inadequate for producing the larger number 
of copies they now wanted to produce. In February 1915, Paul Delmasure, a Roubaix 
industrialist who frequently helped distribute newspapers, provided a new mimeograph 
machine. That machine quickly proved inadequate to the task as well. By the spring of 
1915, the group was facing new problems.  The mimeograph machine created poor 
quality newspapers, with the master copy falling apart after eighty copies. The clarity of 
the print varied greatly, both from issue to issue and even within the same issue. A few 
issues were difficult to read because the print was faint, suggesting the mimeograph 
machine was running low on ink.  The team printed one issue with type that was in poor 
condition, as “e”s looked like “o”s.  
The quality of newspaper improved, however, when Madame Reboux, manager 
of the Journal de Roubaix offered a proper, pedal driven printing press, which Willot 
kept in a small room behind his laboratory on rue du Vieil Abreuvoir. With Edouard 
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Dutriux, a competent typesetter, on the team, production increased, and the newspaper 
expanded.17 This solution, however, was short-lived. German demands forced Reboux to 
take her printing press back in a vain attempt to escape detection.  The Germans 
demanded a list of all workers in the printing business and took samples of the typeface 
of each press in an attempt to figure out who was publishing the underground newspapers 
that they managed to obtain. The Germans thus recognized the typeface of the clandestine 
newspaper as the same as that of Reboux’s newspaper.  Fortunately, within three days 
Willot found in Tourcoing a new printing press that the Germans did not know existed, 
and its owner, Georges Rohart de Valkenaere, allowed Willot to install it in his 
laboratory.18 This change in press meant the team could produce a newspaper in the same 
format and similar quality, but with a different typeface, one that the Germans could not 
trace. Indeed, the look of the publication even improved at this point.  In the spring of 
1915 the papers averaged twenty-pages, on 22 x 27cm paper, with two columns per page.  
Articles came one after another, separated by large titles. When space was available, the 
newspaper carried a table of contents, which the editors included in four of the issues 
consulted.  A few issues even had supplements, suggesting that when the editorial team 
had the time and supplies to offer even more information, they did. When space was at a 
premium the editors utilized tricks to fit in as much news as possible, including 
abbreviating many common words to offer a lot of information in shortened newspapers.  
A women’s page often appeared, and Henri Soubricas provided humorous illustrations 
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and caricatures of German soldiers. Father Delépine, professor of geography at the 
Catholic University of Lille frequently drew maps of the front for the newspaper.19 
 Cost of production was also an issue: the newspaper producers chose not to 
collect money from the readership, as this would have been difficult while maintaining 
their anonymity. The newspaper’s front page frequently reminded readers that the 
newspaper was to be a free publication, hoping to avoid dishonest people from trying to 
make a profit by selling copies.  One estimate suggests that producing the newspapers 
cost approximately 32,000 francs (in 1915 currency), paid by Willot and Dubar.20 This 
amount refers only to materials and products they donated or bought; it does not include 
the people working on the paper who volunteered their time, or donated items. Perhaps 
the true largest cost of producing the clandestine press was the toll the constant stress 
took upon the people involved. Joseph Willot experienced extreme mental and physical 
stress, attempting to produce the underground newspaper while maintaining his façade as 
university professor co-operating with the German occupation authorities. He pursued 
academic contacts with German professors to sustain his alibi.  To keep the Germans 
from requisitioning all of his paper he had to have an ongoing project to justify his 
supplies and his time.  Indeed, in February 1916, he published Le Guide médical des 
laboratories.21 Employment in production of this book also provided alibis for René Coq 
and Margueire Nollet, both of whom worked for Willot at the Instiute and helped publish 
the underground newspapers.  
  The problem of disseminating news while not getting caught was evident in each 
newspaper issue, which advised readers to share the information in its pages with 
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discretion and to burn all issues once they had been read.  A note in one of the Journal 
des occupés best summed up news dissemination in the occupied zone, noting that, 
“under the régime of terror which we are undergoing, we must understand how to dare, 
but we must dare with caution, with moderation, and without rashness.”22 The German 
occupiers made it a top priority to discover the source of these newspapers. In March 
1915, an official proclamation forbade the reading of any newspaper in Lille except for 
the Gazette des Ardennes and the Bulletin de Lille. Specialized German investigators with 
trained dogs ripped apart houses and businesses, looking for evidence of the underground 
newspapers.23 During one of the earlier raids Dubar managed to hide the printing 
equipment at the Institute in a chimney flue of an old steam-driven machine, which, 
located behind the large flush water closet, appeared to be a drain. Another raid occurred 
on April 1, 1915.  Four German officers arrived, interrupting the team in the midst of 
completing an issue meant for distribution later that day. Dubar sounded the special alarm 
bell to warn printers and folders to hide everything, while he took his time answering the 
door.24 Amazingly, the Germans discovered no incriminating evidence, but clearly they 
suspected Dubar, for the next day, they requisitioned more than a thousand lengths of 
fabric from his stores.25 The distributors of the clandestine press were also at risk of 
exposure. One distributor, Henri Soubricas, outsmarted the Germans, and avoided tram 
searches and the need for German-authorized passes by regularly walking from Roubaix 
to Lille with newspapers. 
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 German pressure affected the newspaper.  April 1915 saw the last twenty-page 
edition; the paper from that point on usually contained only one or two pages (up until 
August some issues still contained ten to twelve pages) but with more frequent issues.  
The name of the newspaper changed frequently and at times the paper appeared without a 
name. In May 1915, the team changed the newspaper’s name to Les Nouvelles françaises.  
In June, it became L’Echo de France and in July 1915, it changed again to La Voix de la 
Patrie.  In August and September 1915, the newspaper carried the names Le Courrier de 
France, La Voix de Patrie (again), La Confiance, and L’Hirondelle.  In October, it 
became La Prudence.  
 During the early fall of 1915 a few issues of the newspaper fell into German 
hands.  To counter the danger of detection, the next issue proclaimed that French refugees 
in a neutral country produced the paper and sent it into the occupied zone. The team then 
made sure a copy of the issue with that statement reached German hands. In October, a 
French woman brought the German Kommandantur a copy of La Prudence.  The 
Germans carefully searched Lille, but not Roubaix, the location of the printing press.  
This led Willot in October 1915 to suspend the newspaper.  From this point forward, only 
a few bulletins, shared with a small circle of trusted people came out. Each copy carried a 
stamp declaring “French airmail” to protect readers who could claim to have just picked 
it up.26 The newspaper shrank to one page with three columns, and it continued in this 
form until its end in 1916. Almost every issue carried a warning not to share the 
newspaper with others and to burn it once read.  Most issues began by stating the paper’s 
headquarters was “X,” a locale outside the occupied zone. The newspaper asked that 
people not research the location, but simply know that it was outside the occupied zone 
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and the newspaper producers were French refugees originally from the occupied zone 
who bravely worked to bring the truth to people in the occupied zone.27 The team 
attempted to make it truly appear that the newspaper came from outside the occupied 
zone.   
The dating of newspapers also presented security risks to their editors. Only one 
of the newspapers consulted in the present research – the first issue published in Lille - 
carried an exact date of publication.  One can assume the editors stopped using exact 
dates, instead leaving an underlined blank space where the day should have been, to 
cloud the issue of transportation time and the paper’s publishing locale.  Hence, several 
issues could carry the same date, it simply being a month and year.  The dates on the 
official communiqués reproduced by the newspapers allow historians to place the 
newspapers in order, but not to determine an exact publication date for each issue.28  
Later, the editors identified the date by referring to how long it had been since the war 
began, providing dates such as Day 752.  
Security concerns also underlay the editors’ complaints in the newspaper of 
transportation problems. In a November 1915, issue, the editors blamed transportation 
difficulties in getting the papers past the German authorities and into the occupied zone 
for the reduced format and irregularity of the paper’s appearance.29 In a later issue, the 
editors promised that anytime something happened to change the military situation, they 
would drop this paper into the invaded area via airplane.30 Moreover, throughout the 
existence of this clandestine newspaper, the editors included articles on the importance of 
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treating the paper like secret documents. In May 1915, the newspaper writers noted that 
rumors circulating that the Germans arrested the newspaper’s editor were ridiculous, 
stating it would be just as easy for the Germans to stop the editors of the Le Temps, Le 
Figaro, or Le Matin.31 Still, the editors warned people to be careful.  In a September 
issue, they lamented the carelessness of readers in a large city in the occupied zone that 
forced the newspaper producers to modify how they transported the paper.  Trust nobody 
was the message. Apparently the editorial staff’s requests were not completely heeded, 
for a later article in the newspaper noted that people committed serious transgressions, 
including reading the paper in public places, and talking about it in the streets and 
tramways, creating a dangerous atmosphere.32  
 In October 1916, the Germans detained Dubar, suspecting his connection to the 
clandestine press.  On October 21, 1916, a double agent named Lefebvre provided 
Germans with evidence that led to Pinte’s arrest.33 Unlike Pinte, the Germans released 
Dubar, who warned Willot, who then destroyed compromising papers. People 
encouraged Willot to leave occupied France. Willot had the means to repatriate to 
unoccupied France, but his wife was too ill to travel and he refused to leave without her. 
Immediately after Pinte’s arrest, the Germans searched the Institute again, although 
workers, particularly Marguerite Nollet and her friend Antoinette Valentin, again 
successfully hid material.  However, this time the Germans found incriminating evidence 
kept by the Institute’s janitor, including a complete run of L’Oiseau, notes about the 
newspaper’s publication in various people’s handwriting, and a photograph of the entire 
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newspaper team taken on Bastille Day 1916.34 The Germans found the actual printing 
press and related material later that month. The Germans again detained Dubar. This time 
they interrogated him and placed him in solitary confinement. Although he did not reveal 
information about the newspaper staff, the Germans also arrested Willot’s assistant, 
Marquerite Nollet.  Surprisingly, Willot was still not a suspect and decided to print 
another issue using simple equipment.  The Germans discovered a copy of a newspaper at 
the university, and descended on the campus but Willot was not there, although he was 
now a suspect.  The police arrived at Willot’s house while he again attempted another 
issue. Again, one of the press team hid the incriminating evidence from German eyes. 
 Willot did the only thing he could think of to clear his friends of suspicion: he 
printed one final issue.  Five hundred copies, printed by Valkenaere in Tourcoing and 
distributed by Soubricas, proclaimed that the wrong people were under arrest.35 The plan 
enjoyed some success; the Germans temporarily released Dubar and Nollet, but Pinte 
remained in prison. Returning to the newspaper name, La Voix de la Patrie, Willot 
attempted to print another issue, with the help of a Roubaix student, Jean-Baptiste Pennel, 
listening to Pinte’s radio.  However, on December 19, 1915 a surprise German raid on his 
laboratory caught Willot in the act of preparing the newspaper.  The German authorities 
arrested Willot along with thirteen others.36 The publishing team faced trial in April 
1917. A few received acquittals, while the Germans sentenced the rest to prison terms 
either in German prisons, or in the case of Pinte, a Brussels prison. The main forces 
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behind the newspaper received the harshest sentences; Firmin Dubar received a sentence 
of ten years and one month in isolation; Joseph Willot a sentence of ten years; Jules Pinte 
a sentence of ten years and six months; and Marquerite Nollet a sentence of two years 
and six months. While all endured and survived their prison terms until the Armistice, 
Willot died shortly after due to the hardship and strain of prison life. 
 Even with the main contributors to the underground newspaper in prison, Willot’s 
wife continued their work.  An electrician, Vandendriesche, installed a radio inside her 
home. The Germans always suspected her, and not only searched her house frequently 
but also forbade her to receive visitors. This did not stop her. When publishing news 
became too difficult, she relayed news via word of mouth until the end of the war. Upon 
their release from prison, Coq and Soubricas (who both received a few months’ sentence) 
as well as Pennel and Valentin helped her. A series of articles published in Le Progrès du 
Nord after the war revealed that Madame Willot published about twenty-five issues of the 
paper after the Germans imprisoned her husband.37  
 
News in the Papers 
 The first issue of Le Journal des occupés…inoccupés stated the newspaper’s 
producers were “As resolutely hostile to the foolish optimism which is blinded to truth 
and transforms the most obvious failures into victories, as to the destructive pessimism 
which, for fear of being surprised, can only believe in depressing news.”38 To this end, 
the team worked to produce as professional a newspaper as possible. However, with their 
main sources being French and British, often they were simply offering propaganda from 
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a different point of view, albeit a more palatable one from the point of view of the 
occupied. The editorial team frequently identified the sources of articles, noting the 
newspaper in which the articles originally appeared and sometimes their authors. Articles 
from important journalists in unoccupied France, such as Alfred Capus and Maurice 
Barrès appeared relatively frequently.  Willot and the editing team always signed articles 
they wrote with an “X.”  Willot and his team also provided balanced coverage of the war 
by providing excerpts from different newspapers on the same topic. For example, in April 
1915, the editors put together a piece on British and American coverage of the Germans 
sinking steamboats. The piece included brief excerpts from the Westminster Gazette, The 
Times, The Pall Mall Gazette, The Globe, New York Herald, and New York World.39 
While none of the articles represented the German point of view and hence was not an 
unbiased account, the sampling counter-balanced the voluminous submarine coverage in 
La Gazette des Ardennes and Le Bruxellois. Most news provided by the clandestine press 
can be divided into five categories: battle news and information about the war, in 
particular good news for the French; news that was negative for the Germans; articles that 
demonstrated world opinion was against Germany; news from unoccupied France; and 
news from the occupied zone.  
 
Battle News 
 People in the occupied zone longed for battle news from a French point of view, 
and the clandestine press provided it. This came in the form of official French 
communiqués taken from newspapers in unoccupied France, and in sections entitled 
“Review of the Main War Events of the Week” which were taken from French and 
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foreign newspapers, and in “The Situation in the Last Hour.”40  The editors tried to cram 
as much news into these sections as possible.  The newspaper always began with battle 
coverage and news from the fronts of northern France.  The first issues began updating 
people on battles immediately. For example, in January 1915, the newspaper provided 
details of fighting around the River Yser and gave detailed, relatively accurate, accounts 
of fighting around the Soissons.41 Reports such as these continued and included detailed 
information about trenches taken, areas bombed, and German soldiers taken prisoner. 
One article, entitled “Conquering the Labyrinth,” depicted the danger and hardship 
attached to taking enemy trenches, as it told of the May 30th through June 19th battle to 
take German trenches between Neuville-Saint-Vaast and Ecurie.42 The article concluded 
on a positive but relatively unbiased note, stating that the Germans not only lost their 
trenches, but the entire 161st regiment, with the French taking approximately a thousand 
prisoners and killing the rest. However, it also reports that the French army sustained two 
thousand casualties in the fight.43  
Each issue contained three to five days’ worth of communiqués. If readers 
compared these newspapers’ communiqués from the front with those the German-
controlled press provided in its newspapers, they found not only contradictions of detail, 
but even more frequently that the editors of the French and German organs simply 
concentrated on different parts of the extensive front where the war was going well for 
their side. The newspaper’s editors tried to reassure a readership sensitive to the insertion 
of propaganda into reports, providing an article from the Dutch newspaper the Telegraaf, 
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stating that communiqués reporting the success of French armies north and south of Arras 
as well as between Oise and Aisne were accurate and honest.44 Coverage extended to 
every front, including the aerial and naval wars. The newspaper also extensively covered 
the Eastern Front, which experienced more movement during this time.  
Not only did the newspaper carry news from the Russian front, but also insight 
into Russian strategies.  For example, in a reprint of a New York World article, Russian 
War Minister Poliwanow explained that the Russian army chose to retreat to Warsaw to 
deny the Germans the quick battle they wanted, and instead tire the German soldiers by 
forcing them to march prior to the fight.45 By the fall of 1915, the Russians retreated 
beyond Warsaw, establishing a stabilized frontline running from Riga to the Romanian 
border.  The shortening of the front meant that Russian manpower was sufficient to hold 
the line, and the chase across Eastern Europe and the stretching of their supply lines to 
their limits did exhaust the Germans.46 What the article featured in the clandestine press 
did not mention was the artillery and ammunition left behind during the Russian retreat, 
as well as the huge territory and hundreds of thousands of prisoners lost to the Germans.47  
The newspaper acknowledged that the Balkan situation was complex, and provided 
readers with a detailed article analyzing the Balkan state of affairs.48 Taken from Le 
Temps, the article portrayed the Balkans, already plagued with multiple groups with 
conflicting national aspirations, as falling victim to Austrian-German ambition.49 The 
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article, talking about the aims of different countries for the Balkan area, juxtaposes 
Austria and Germany’s treatment against the French desire for independence for the area.  
News about the South African and Canadian volunteers entering the war and 
British munitions production provided small but important details proving the strength of 
the French and British endeavor.50 Italian war efforts also received substantial notice. 
Almost every story offered hope of the British and French side winning the war in an 
attempt to counteract German propaganda in the form of false or exaggerated battle 
reports.  For example, in late February 1915 the Germans announced their remarkable 
victory over the Russians in the winter battle of Masuria.  Pinte, relying on news received 
from the Eiffel Tower, was unable to find confirmation of this victory, and passed along 
news denying the great German victory, heartening the French population.51  Neither 
version received in the occupied cities was entirely accurate. The German commanders 
on the Eastern Front, Paul von Hindenburg and his chief of staff Erich Ludendorff, 
planned a “knockout blow” against Russia.  On February 7, 1915, the German Eighth 
Army struck east against the Russian Tenth Army standing north of the Masurian 
Lakes.52  During a heavy snowstorm, the Germans took the Russians by surprise; as the 
Russians began falling back, the German Tenth Army assaulted them from the north. All 
four Russian corps seemed on the brink of annihilation. The brave resistance of the 
Russian XX corps in the Forest of Augustrow enabled the other three corps to escape.  
The XX corps did eventually surrender to the Germans on February 21, 1915.  German 
combat losses were light, but numerous German soldiers suffered harshly from 
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exposure.53  While the winter battle of Masuria was not the great victory the Germans 
claimed it to be with the occupied population, it was still a minor German victory.   
During the summer of 1916, the newspaper provided detailed coverage of 
Verdun, noting the French recapture of le Morte-Homme and the Fort de Vaux, events 
the German-controlled newspapers did not report.54 The Germans captured le Morte-
Homme earlier in 1916, rendering the French vulnerable at the salient around Fort 
Moulainville.55 The Germans fought for months to gain this high ground, with “…the 
grim weeks of seesaw battle over control of le Morte Homme have exact[ing] a dreadful 
toll [in terms of casualties].”56 The editors of the clandestine press shared relevant battle 
news the Germans were withholding when they reported that General Philippe Pétain 
launched a successful offensive, recapturing le Morte Homme.57 The fighting for Fort 
Vaux, the smallest fortress of the Verdun fortifications was equally brutal, with French 
soldiers enduring siege conditions prior to the Germans taking the fort. The clandestine 
press may have been premature in reporting the French retaking the fort however, as it 
was only on November 2, 1916, after five days of bombardment by French artillery, that 
the German garrison finally abandoned the fort during the night.58  Thanks to the 
clandestine press, many in the occupied zone knew that the Germans never completely 
captured the city of Verdun, despite German-controlled newspapers proclaiming it.59 
Through the Eiffel Tower transmissions, Abbé Pinte was also able to confirm the 
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stalemate along the Allied front line.60 Readers were able to catch up on any war 
information they missed before the inception of the clandestine press, as the newspaper 
included the “Official History of the War,” series originally published in The Times in 
July 1915.61 Of course, since a large portion of its news came from French newspapers, 
the clandestine press administered to its readers its own dose of propaganda, this time 
from the French point of view.  
 
Negative Information About the German War Cause 
Not surprisingly, the German-controlled press in the occupied zone provided very 
little information that presented their war effort in a negative light.  The clandestine press 
offered a great deal of news to counteract German propaganda that the war was going the 
German way and that people in Germany were resilient. Many articles told of heavy 
German and Austrian losses on the battlefield, while others explained why victory was 
impossible for the two countries.”62 The newspaper staff reported the naval battle of 
Dogger Bank and the sinking of the German warship Blücher, deeming this a major 
setback for the German navy.63 It was not the complete British victory the British and 
French media proclaimed, as three of the four Germans ships escaped, however it did 
have serious repercussions for the Germans.  Wilhelm II and the Naval general staff 
made major personnel changes in the leadership of the High Sea Fleet and became more 
cautious in deploying Fleet as a result.64 The newspaper’s editors reported problems on 
the enemies’ home fronts as well.  One quick blurb informed readers that numerous 
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people in Austria-Hungary were dying from cholera.65 This statement appears to be true, 
if exaggerated.  A cholera epidemic occurred in Hungary in 1913 and outbreaks again 
occurred during the war in both Hungary and Austria in areas around prisoner of war 
camps housing Russian prisoners.66 However, these outbreaks do not compare to the 
cholera epidemic Austria-Hungary endured during the Austro-Prussian War.  In 1866 
approximately 165,000 deaths due to cholera occurred in the two countries.67  
A longer article, taken from the Daily Telegraph, examined German morale at 
home.  Reporting from Rotterdam, the journalist remarked that everyone in Germany, 
from the public to government officials were worried and demonstrated great anxiety.68 
Francis March, in his work, World War One: History of the World War, includes a line 
graph depicting the state of German civilian morale.  He arbitrarily regards morale as 
standing at one hundred percent in August 1914, and at zero at the end of the war, a point 
at which an effective majority of the German people refused to support the war.  In the 
fall of 1916, when this article appeared in the clandestine press, German civilian morale 
hovered at approximately sixty percent on the line graph, having been in decline since 
October of the previous year.69  
Another article the editors published reported that German threats of regular 
zeppelin attacks on England were German distress cries in a war they were losing.70  That 
the clandestine press associated a potential increase in German zeppelin attacks on 
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England with Germany losing the war, demonstrates that some of its news contained 
blatant Allied propaganda, in the this case British. This article appeared before Britain 
developed defenses, such as incendiary bullets that later in the war would render zeppelin 
raids ineffective.  In the fall of 1915, “the specter of these great leviathans of the air 
sowing the seeds of death and destruction in the streets of London…” was still a real fear, 
with bad weather being Britain’s greatest weapon in stopping the zeppelins from 
bombing its cities.71  While zeppelin attacks resulted in only moderate damage in 
England, their psychological effect on the British home front in 1915 was profound.  This 
article represented brave talk in the face of fear, something readers most likely would 
have recognized. Borrowing a tactic from the German-controlled press in the occupied 
zone, the clandestine press included articles about sections of the German government 
wanting peace, including one that claimed the Chancellor had sanctioned a socialist 
public appeal to end the war.72 Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg would publicly indicate 
his support for a negotiated peace a year later, but the Allies rejected his request, 
potentially because they realized German military leadership did not support Hollweg’s 
stance.73 
 The clandestine press also covered the desperation of the German military to 
garner supplies, running an article stating that the Germans mobilized their churches to 
requisition metals.  Clergy were supposed to both encourage their congregations to hand 
in metal, as well as to hand over all metal items that belonged to the churches.74 While 
not explicitly stated in the article, this news surely supported the French belief that the 
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Germans were sacrilegious barbarians, for who else would ransack their own churches 
for the war effort? Biased editorializing, perhaps, but the basis of the news article was 
accurate. Germany needed metal reserves. Calling for self-sacrifice to overcome metal 
shortages, particularly copper, Wilhelm II promised to melt down some of his own 
monuments.  In May 1915, the Prussian Ministry of War began to deal systematically 
with metal shortages.  It requisitioned metal objects such as kitchen utensils and church 
bells.  More than 40,000 churches and religious institutions relinquished items, and by 
January 1918, German authorities took half of all church bells in Germany.75 Another 
article focused upon the cost of living in Germany, and in particular in Silesia, where 
potatoes had skyrocketed to the equivalent of thirty-seven francs a pound and ham to 15 
francs a pound (in 1915 currency).76 The cost of living rose to twelve times pre-war 
levels in Germany during the war, as compared to it rising by a factor of three in the 
United States, four in Britain, and seven in France.77 Silesia, as one of Germany’s main 
industrial centers, felt the rise in the cost of living, as wage increases did not match the 
increase in the cost of living.   
No piece of bad news for the Germans was too small too report. For example, a 
brief article ran in the paper telling of the Spanish government interring Moulai Hafid, 
the former sultan of Morocco, who expressed pro-German sympathies.78 The article did 
not mention the fact that Moulai Hafid was most likely still receiving a French pension 
paid since he abdicated as sultan of the French protectorate of Morocco. Like other 
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French media, the tone of the clandestine press did approach gloating when reporting 
Germany’s woes.  This is not surprising, considering how the French viewed the 
Germans during the war. These clandestine newspapers frequently referred to France’s 
“hereditary enemy,” stating that Germany was looking to complete a conquest that began 
in 1870.79 Deborah Buffton notes that the memory of 1870 was particularly strong among 
the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, as they believed that if Germany won the 
war, the Germans would annex their towns, just as they had Alsace and Lorraine.80 
 
World Opinion against the Germans. 
 The clandestine press provided moral support to its readers, letting them know 
that much of the world was on France’s side.  Several articles in the underground 
newspaper detailed the world’s disgust with Germany’s behavior, including certain 
groups in neutral countries, such as professors, judges, lawyers, and the public in 
Holland.81  Rising tensions between the Germans and Americans also received ample 
attention. One article outlined a back and forth between the Kaiser and President Wilson 
over the German use of submarines, providing analysis noting that the German leader 
demonstrated a lack of judgment by utilizing aggressive language with the Americans.82  
Another issue of the paper included two reports, one noting that President Wilson asked 
the Austrian government to recall its ambassador to the United States because he was 
attempting to ferment strikes in American munitions factories, and another taken from the 
Dutch newspaper the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant claiming that German-American 
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relations were more tenuous than ever before.83 By the fall of 1915, events strained 
German-American relations.  The German sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania on 
May 7, 1915, while it was carrying American passengers and the German reaction to the 
incident soured relations. On June 8, 1915, American Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan resigned because he believed President Woodrow Wilson’s strong protests against 
the German response to the incident and their general war policy could lead to the United 
States entering the war.84 By the beginning of 1916, the War Press Office in Germany 
had to clear any mention of German-American relations.85 Of course, German-American 
relations were to deteriorate even further; the March 1917 Zimmerman Telegram incident 
led directly to war. 
Other articles told of Americans’ sympathy for the French cause and their 
abhorrence of the first of two German campaigns of unrestricted submarine warfare.86 
The clandestine press made its readers aware of the submarine attacks by the Germans, 
including coverage of the sinking of the Falaba, although in the issues consulted no 
connection was made between the sinking of this British ship headed to West Africa and 
American anger over one of its citizens being killed.87 
 The clandestine press also reported that the German secretly admired the French 
military. A reprinted article from the Daily Telegraph reported that a German army major 
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taken prisoner stated that the French military never ceased to show great determination 
and courage.88 Another article, taken from the Frankfurter Zeitung, stated that the 
German press was impressed with how the French in the occupied zone kept their morale 
up, and compared it to the deplorable spirit of the Germans on the home front.89 This 
statement bore out the truth, as the German home front moved towards collapse and all 
the French in the occupied zone could control was their morale and dignity.90 However, 
unlike the journalists, the occupied French people’s aloofness and pride angered rather 
than impressed some of the more perceptive German soldiers. 
 
News from Unoccupied France 
 The clandestine press attempted to provide readers with information from 
unoccupied France.  A lot of this information concerned the French government, 
financing the war, and French industry.  The newspaper included coverage of political 
speeches, such as that by Prime Minister Briand declaring politics in France had only one 
aim – victory.91 The newspaper staff included political news from France whenever 
possible, such as when Minister of War Millerand received a check for four million 
francs to buy war supplies.92 The newspaper informed readers of the Bank of France’s 
gold reserve status in one article and attempts to minimize the imports of raw materials in 
another.93 The newspaper covered politicians’ public events, including Poincaré’s trip to 
the front and various politicians’ trips to munitions factories. The clandestine press also 
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included political and domestic news from France’s allies. A report on British Minister of 
Munitios Lloyd George’s speech to Welsh miners fighting on the Italian front was even 
accompanied by an illustration of the prime minister in a special supplement.94  The state 
of Russia and England’s economy and war effort also received coverage in the 
newspaper, with Russian munitions production receiving particular attention.95 
 Some of the news provided by the underground press from unoccupied France 
dealt with life in the occupied zone.  One such article was “To Women of the Nord.”96 
Composed as a letter, signed from “a French woman,” it tells the women of the occupied 
zone that women in unoccupied France write to their husbands and fathers fighting on the 
front, and they do so like mothers writing to their sons. This knowledge, that the men 
from the occupied zone fighting at the front receive caring letters despite their families’ 
inability to send them from German occupied France, was supposed to comfort the 
women of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. The same letter reported that recent evacuees 
had a good trip and were now on French land, as their compatriots received them with 
tenderness.97 Another article provided even greater detail about people evacuated from 
the occupied zone to Paris. The article provided insight into the life of refugees after they 
left the land of barbarians, including information about the Parisian neighborhoods in 
which they congregated.98  Evacuees from the tri-city area arrived in France via 
Switzerland, enduring what was often an exhausting journey, taking several days with 
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people crammed into trains.  News in this article that people arrived safely and in good 
health would have been very welcome to the readers of the clandestine press. 
 
News From Within Occupied Zones. 
 While the Bulletin de Lille and the Journal de Roubaix provided some coverage 
of news occurring in occupied zone, the clandestine press supplemented that coverage. 
The German occupiers attempted to isolate towns from each other, letting little news 
from Lille reach Roubaix and Tourcoing, and vice versa.99  The underground press 
covered other areas of the occupied zone. At least one story expressed anger towards 
another occupied area, namely Brussels.  An article written by a member of the 
clandestine press team (as opposed to one taken from another newspaper) stated that life 
in Brussels was close to normal; tramways ran late into the night, the cost of living 
remained average, and cafés, movie theaters, and music halls were full of Belgians and 
Germans alike.  Indeed, the article noted that in Brussels it was not strange for German 
officers and Belgians to socialize in cafés, a concept that would be scandalous in Lille or 
Roubaix.100 These statements were far from accurate; yet they appeared to be a rumor 
that had wide circulation in occupied France during the war. The reality was that the 
Germans plundered Belgium with great thoroughness, and the more authoritarian the 
Germans acted, the more stubbornly the Belgians resisted.101 The occupation of Belgium 
was so brutal that Brand Whitlock, the American Ambassador to Belgium during the war, 
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described it as a “slow poisoning for the purpose of enslavement.”102  It is interesting to 
speculate how the editors – educated, intelligent men – could believe that life in Brussels 
could be so much better.  Perhaps the glimpse they received into Belgian life via the 
German-controlled imported newspapers from Brussels convinced them life there was 
less harsh. 
Articles about the occupied zone sometimes provided support, and sometimes 
reminded people of their difficult patriotic duty.  Support came in the form of an article 
noting that Carnival in 1915 would not be a party, without even the flour necessary to 
make the traditional crêpes, but that the people of the Nord were strong and would get 
through the occupation if they had patience.103 Many people in Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing kept pigeons before the war as pets, something the German occupiers quickly 
forbade for fear the French would use the birds to communicate with the outside world. 
Hence an article in the first issue of the Lille version of the paper, telling of pigeons 
living happily in the trees of Lille, must have brought comfort to many.104  The editors of 
the clandestine press were also quick to remind people of their patriotic duty.  A long 
article urged people not to exchange their gold for city vouchers, noting that this was 
simply giving resources to the Germans that could be transformed into enemy cannons 
and munitions that would kill fathers and brothers in the French trenches.105  The tone of 
the message was harsh and uncompromising, especially considering the hardship people 
in the cities endured if they did not have money to buy items at their newly elevated, 
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wartime prices. The newspaper frequently encouraged readers not to work for the 
Germans, despite the suffering such resistance brought to people who followed this 
advice. 
The editors of the clandestine press frequently wrote articles about the occupied 
zone that revealed aspects of life that the Germans would not allow discussed publicly.  
For example, one article explained how German requisition demands were illegal 
according not only to international law but also to also German law.106 Another article let 
readers know that government officials in unoccupied France were aware that the 
German military systematically took machinery and raw materials from the occupied 
zone and transported it to Germany.107 The newspaper producers were not afraid to mock 
the German occupiers. A March 1915 issue La Patience included a poem entitled “The 
Ten Commandments of Von Heinrich.”108 The poem humorously pointed out the German 
Governor of Lille’s attempts to control even the most mundane aspects of life, including 
the lines, “The worst of falsehoods shalt thou swallow / Without the least reproach/ Thou 
shalt accept the situation / or else look out for retribution!”109       
 
Other Underground Newspapers? 
 Not included in the above discussion of the clandestine press are several copies of 
newssheets, newspaper articles, and reproductions of speeches.  For example, French 
archives preserved a half dozen hand-written and typed copies of the Gazette de Cologne, 
found in what was the occupied zone after the war.  Did the same people or others 
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attempting to disseminate news produce these sheets? Were they intended for private 
consumption or passed around? Were the undated ones the work of Madame Willot? One 
news bulletin was thirty-six pages long and appeared somewhat similar to Willot’s 
clandestine publications, but not similar enough to say with certainty that she produced it.  
 Other people claimed to have produced underground newspapers in the tri-city 
area during the war.  Jules Eucher, a Roubaisien professor of stenography claimed that 
during October 1917 he produced and distributed a clandestine newspaper entitled Les 
Feuilles jaunes.110 While no copies exist to prove his story, he claimed that he provided 
extracts from French and British newspapers as well as information from radio reports.  
He did spend one month in prison under the Germans. Others have made similar claims 
that cannot be proved or disproved. What is known is that the clandestine press provided 
the inspiration for like-minded people to start another underground newspaper during the 
German occupation of the Second World War, Les Petites Ailes de France.  
 
Conclusion 
 As the risks mounted for Willot, Rector Margerin of the Catholic University of 
Lille told Willot that God did not require him to take these risks, and asked Willot if he 
had the right to chance making his wife a widow and his children orphans. Willot 
responded a few days later, saying he had talked to his wife, and she urged him to 
continue.111 And continue he did for as long as possible. The timing of the fall of the 
clandestine press was unfortunate; Annette Becker cites a weakening of morale at the end 
of 1916 that grew worse until the summer of 1917, which brought a return of hope and a 
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spirit of resolution.112 The timing of the highs and lows of morale were quite divorced 
from war events. This could suggest that while the people in the occupied cities were 
receiving news, that information did not relay to them the large significance of certain 
events, leading to a misunderstanding of how the war was going for the Allied side. 
Perhaps more likely, internal events caused the ebbs and flows of morale. At the end of 
1916, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing had experience over two years of 
horrible occupation. By the summer of 1917, the occupiers were beginning to feel and 
show the strain, a factor that may have bolstered the occupied. 
While many historians lament that the ordeals of occupation suffered by northern 
France are often left out of the narrative of France’s experience during the war, their 
nation did recognize the work of the resisters.  After the war, France bestowed the Ordre 
de la Nation upon Marquerite Nollet and Madame Willot. Willot (posthumously), Pinte, 
and Dubar received the Croix de la Légion d’Honneur.  In 1920, the Académie Française 
honored all involved by awarding the Prix Buisson, founded in 1889 to recognize works 
resulting from righteousness and virtue, to L’Oisseau de France.113  
While historians extol the bravery of the men and women who worked to provide 
the citizens of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing with news they could trust, one does have to 
admit that the audience was a privileged group of readers.  Owing to the difficulty of 
keeping the press a secret from the Germans, people were not encouraged to share the 
news they received. The clandestine papers had a wide but favored circle of readers 
consisting largely of persons known to the middle and upper class professionals who 
produced the newssheets. It is difficult to say how much news trickled down to poorer 
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residents and those without connections to the cities’ leaders. However, there are 
indications that news from the underground press did reach a wider audience at times. On 
at least one occasion, the newspaper was read from a church pulpit.114 Auguste Leman 
also cited people’s indiscriminate reading of the newspaper in cafés, tramways, and even 
in the streets as one of the reasons why publication was temporarily suspended in 
November 1915.115 Copies were even found as far away as Douai, Tournai, and Brussels. 
Every editor makes decisions about what information to include.  The clandestine 
press demonstrated a definite bias towards news that was would uplift morale.  These 
articles focused upon the successes of France and its allies, growing global distrust of the 
Germans, and unrest within Germany. It is a matter of historical debate whether this was 
propaganda as well, or if it simply made sense to publish the news that the German-
controlled papers would not, to provide balance. When the clandestine press was 
available, people did not have to read the German-controlled newspapers for war news. 
However, the secret press did not stop people from reading the other papers, as they were 
still a source of information on prisoners, the latest German regulations, and local news. 
Like the German-controlled press, the underground newspapers frequently included brief 
pieces of news from various places.  However, the producers would have balked at any 
comparison, having declared the German-controlled press part of the German industry of 
lies.116 
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Chapter Eleven: 
Other Sources: 
 Less Influential Publications Available in the Occupied Cities 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to discover what news was available in occupied 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing during the First World War by examining all the news 
sources available.  To be a truly thorough examination, this must include sources that the 
French people of those cities did not regularly read, but that were at times available. 
Some sources were available only sporadically, such as smuggled newspapers from 
unoccupied France. The difficulty and danger involved with attaining these newspapers 
made them a relative rarity.  Later in the war, airplanes and then air balloons dropped 
newspapers produced in France and England for the occupied territory. The Germans 
within the occupied territory made it a priority to intercept these newspapers and severely 
punish anyone caught with one. Combined with the need for good weather and favorable 
wind to drop the newspapers, these too were a rare treat for the occupied French.  
German language newspapers were relatively easy to obtain, but were not widely read. 
Few Frenchmen at this time in these industrial cities could read German and these 
newspapers just provided more news from a German perspective, hence they did not 
become a regular source of news for the French. 
 Even though the focus of this work is news available through newspapers, it is 
worthwhile to briefly consider the books and pamphlets the Germans tried to sell to the 
occupied French.  It is safe to assume that these books did not sell for two reasons. 
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Firstly, all the books had as their basic premise the strength and righteousness of 
Germany and its war effort. Secondly, the occupied people had little disposable income 
with which to purchase items.  However, if we are to attempt to understand what 
information was available in the occupied cities, all sources of news much be considered. 
  
Little Treasures: Newspapers from Unoccupied France  
 Despite the German authorities’ best efforts, some newspapers from outside the 
occupied territory did make their way into Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Auguste 
Leman described receiving newspapers from the motherland as comforting but irregular, 
and the newspapers were always several days old.1 He stresses the irregularity of the 
newspapers noting, they were “too infrequent to help the suffering of the heartbroken 
population of the occupied zone.”2 Newspapers from unoccupied France that did reach 
the tri-city region were extremely expensive and the people passed them from hand to 
hand until the newspapers fell apart. The newspapers most frequently cited as being 
smuggled into the occupied cities were Le Matin, L’Echo de Paris, and Petit Journal.     
 Contraband newspapers reached the tri-city via a few different routes. Some 
people succeeded in smuggling in newspapers from Holland, often as wrapping for other 
items. There existed professional smugglers, before the war, who took advantage in the 
lower prices of alcohol and gasoline in Belgium, selling it as contraband in northern 
France for a profit. Once the war started, old and new smugglers undertook smuggling 
under the Germans, and information passed secretly between France and Belgium despite 
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the presence of sentries, and electrified and barbed wire barriers.3 The New York Times 
reported in 1917 that if people in Roubaix or Tourcoing wished to read a French 
newspaper they could sometimes buy one from German officers, who would sell the 
newspaper for the outrageous price of the equivalent of ten American dollars (in 1917 
currency).4 In occupied Brussels, the trade in prohibited newspapers provided many 
people with a black market livelihood.5 It would not be surprising if German troops 
partook in similar transactions. In “Invasion,” Maxence van der Meersch wrote, “there 
were also occasions when an aeroplane would drop a bundle of French papers.  A single 
copy would be picked up, at the danger of the finder’s life, sometimes on a rooftop, and 
for a fortnight there was sunshine in their hearts.”6 This precursor to concerted efforts of 
dropping newspapers specifically written for the occupied zone occurred very 
haphazardly, usually done as part of a larger aerial mission. 
 There are conflicting reports on how many issues of newspapers the people of 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received from unoccupied France.  The Journal des 
réfugiés du Nord is one of the best sources for such information.  In the July 22, 1916, 
issue, a person repatriated from the occupied zone noted that since the bombing, the 
Lillois have had no news from France.  The rare newspapers from Paris that British 
planes dropped (namely Le Matin and L’Echo de Paris) remained in the hands of a small 
number of people, as it was extremely difficult and dangerous to pass them along to 
others.7 However, just five months later and seventeen miles outside of Lille, in Douai, it 
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was reported that people get to read French newspapers often enough to generate 
confidence in the final victory of the Allies.8 Another article suggested that it was not 
only newspapers from unoccupied France being read on the sly in occupied France; a 
person in the occupied zone stated that he read in La Suisse of American aid to Belgium.9 
By April of the following year, the Journal des réfugiés du Nord reported that news from 
unoccupied France is rare in the occupied zone.10 Overall, the evidence suggests that very 
little information trickled across the barrier separating occupied France from the rest of 
the world.  Eugène Martin-Mamy wrote that he felt he had a responsibility to begin 
publishing a newspaper in Lille immediately after the war ended despite all the obstacles 
he faced, because he knew the misery of the people who went four years without a 
French newspaper.11 
 Sources from the time (such as the Journal des réfugiés du Nord and Auguste 
Leman’s writing) suggest that the three newspapers from unoccupied France most 
frequently smuggled in were the dailies Le Matin, Petit Journal, and L’Echo de Paris.  
Providing an analysis of the news contained in these newspapers would afford light 
insight into the news available in the tri-city area, for we do not know which issues 
reached the people of occupied France.  However, it is worthwhile to include a brief 
overview of each paper, to understand the slant and style of these newspapers that 
occasionally reached some people in the occupied cities. 
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 Two Englishmen and an American started Le Matin in 1884, as an American-
styled tabloid, including short, action-orientated news stories under large headlines.12 The 
newspaper struggled until 1898, when Maurice Bunau-Varilla took over and reorganized 
it.13 The newspaper’s circulation reached 600,000 by 1909. Bunau-Varilla oversaw Le 
Matin until 1944, when French authorities closed it down for collaboration with the 
Nazis.14 During the First World War, Le Matin, a right-of-center newspaper, tended to 
adhere to the official line received from the French military, but its journalists also had a 
propensity for hyperbole. For example, on September 20, 1914, the newspaper included 
an article on two captured German soldiers found to have the severed hands of a woman 
and a child in their pockets.15 The newspaper famously proclaimed that the Russians were 
five days away from Berlin early in the war when it was going poorly for the Allies.16 
With few exceptions, history has not recorded which issues of Le Matin reached Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing.  Did the November 1, 1914, issue, which reassured readers that 
the Allies pushed back violent German attacks (a fairly accurate description although the 
statements that the Germans suffered great losses hinted of exaggeration), reach anybody 
in the occupied zone?17 The most we can say with certainty is that infrequently a few 
issues reached the people of the occupied zone, and when they did, those fortunate 
enough to lay their eyes on the issue would have most likely read the official French 
military line, with perhaps a dose of exaggeration in favor of the French cause. 
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 Moise Millaud launched the smaller format Le Petit Journal.18  The content of the 
newspaper was mainly coverage of crime and violent events, but also included theater 
schedules, stock quotations, and serialized novels.  By the 1880s, illustrations and huge 
headlines announced the sensational articles.19 Perhaps most unique for the time, Le Petit 
Journal was nonpolitical, which exempted it from the government stamp tax on political 
newspapers. Thus, this newspaper sold for approximately half the price of other low-price 
dailies.20  When Millaud died in 1871, a syndicate including Hippolyte Marinonl and 
Emile de Girordina, took over the newspaper.21 By 1882, it boasted the largest circulation 
in Paris. Under the Third Republic the distinction between political and nonpolitical 
newspapers disappeared for taxing purposes, allowing the editor-in-chief, Ernest Prevet, 
to utilize the newspaper to espouse his aggressively nationalist views, that included being 
anti-Dreyfusard in the 1890s.22 This viewpoint lost the paper a portion of its readership in 
Paris, as its circulation dropped behind that of Le Petit Parisien and Le Matin.  However, 
it remained the most popular Parisian daily outside of Paris on the eve of the First World 
War.  Much like Le Matin, Le Petit Journal championed the official French military line, 
which coincided with its political right-wing leaning and reflexive nationalism.23 Did the 
August 1, 1916, issue that relied upon military terms to describe the economic strength of 
France, stating that the country has utilized its economic arsenal prudently and had strong 
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reserves, reach the occupied zone? 24  Again, we are unsure, but it can be stated that the 
few issues of this newspaper that reached the occupied zone would have provided readers 
with very encouraging news from the French perspective. 
 Le Matin and the Le Petit Journal were right of center in the views that their 
editors and journalists espoused, but L’Echo de Paris’ staff published opinions that were 
to the extreme right, leading Jean-Jacques Becker to deem it an organ of the militarist and 
Catholic right.25 The newspaper contained an “inexhaustible flow” of articles on every 
imaginable topic related to the war, written by nationalist writers such as Albert de Mun 
and Maurice Barrès.26 The French novelist Paul Bourget described de Mun during the 
early days of the war as the “pulse of the nation’s heart,” as de Mun preached daily to the 
people, through L’Echo de Paris, a profoundly Christian message, reviving the message 
of Joan of Arc, of courage and hope.27 As the war started, Maurice Barrès was one of 
France’s most well-known and conservative novelists. Utilizing L’Echo de Paris as his 
medium, he glorified the purity of war and the spirit of patriotism.28  Did the November 
19, 1914 issue of L’Echo de Paris reach the occupied zone, with an article by Barrès, 
extolling the unique contribution French women were making to the war, as mothers and 
wives?29 With so many ardently patriotic, and even nationalistic and jingoistic articles, 
many of which condemned the Germans as vile and corrupt, the laws of probability 
suggest that whatever issues of the newspaper reached the readers of Lille, Roubaix, and 
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Tourcoing, they surely raised the patriotic ire of the readers, and fuelled their intense 
dislike for the German authorities.  
 
Dropped Newspapers 
 As mentioned before, sometimes newspapers from unoccupied France reached the 
occupied zone because a plane succeeded in dropping them.30 It is impossible to gauge 
what literature reached people.  Beyond the possibility of people not finding the 
literature, British airmen did not like dropping material and “were reportedly prone to 
burn[ing] leaflets in the hangars.”31 It is unclear whether the airmen distained the job 
because it was not deemed “fighting,” or if they were concerned because Germany 
threatened to hang any aviators captured with propaganda literature. After dropping 
newspapers and pamphlets into unoccupied France for the first year of the war, France 
and England decided to develop newspapers especially for those behind enemy lines. 
 The French government made some rather anemic attempts at influencing people 
through newspapers in the occupied zone. The French army was in charge of propaganda 
directed at French territories occupied by the Germans.  The Section de la propagande 
aérienne dropped imitation German-language newspapers, meant to trick German soldiers 
into believing their own government was taking a defeatist attitude, to demoralize the 
occupiers, and a French newspaper meant to raise the morale of the French population.32 
They titled the newspaper meant for the occupied zone La Voix du Pays. Between 
September 28, 1915, and October 29, 1918, Allied airplanes and balloons dropped 
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approximately eighty issues of la Voix du Pays on occupied France.  The French also 
dropped this newspaper on Alsace and Lorraine.33 The information bulletin usually 
contained four pages filled with war information and news from refugees originally from 
the occupied territories, now living in unoccupied France.34 The March 29, 1916, issue of 
Le Journal des refugiés du Nord described La Voix du Pays, noting it was a small 
newspaper of four pages that brought news of France, which was printed on light paper.  
The news in it was brief but true, and for that reason comforting. It offered news about 
the lives of refugees in Paris and elsewhere, as well as topics such as le Comité des 
réfugies du Nord and the great sorrow felt at the loss of Eugène Jacquet.35 The newspaper 
attempted to provide the people of occupied France not only news of the war in general, 
but news that would be of specific interest to them, that would not receive detailed 
coverage in Le Matin or L’Echo de Paris. 
 Starting in April 1917, the British Ministry of War created a newspaper, Courrier 
de l’Air, for distribution in occupied Belgium and France, and intermittently in Germany. 
Published until January 25, 1918, it was an eleven-inch by nine-inch single-sheet with 
print on both sides produced weekly. The average number of copies distributed was five 
thousand.36 The newspaper’s stated objective was to support the morale of Britain’s 
friends behind German lines. At first airplanes dropped the newspaper until the Germans 
made it a priority to shoot down these planes.  Then the British used air balloons to drop 
the newspapers.  The British dispatched these balloons to France twice a week, but only a 
portion of would reach occupied France.  If the wind suggested the balloons would land 
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in the battle zone, the British attached propaganda leaflets whose intended audience was 
Germans soldiers instead.  
 In at least one issue, the newspaper carried a notice to readers quite different than 
that in the clandestine press.  Unlike the clandestine press, which beseeched readers to be 
very circumspect in sharing news from the paper, the dropped-in paper asked readers to 
not throw out or destroy the newspaper, but to pass it to their neighbors, as they too were 
anxious to know what is happening in the world.37 This suggests that perhaps the British 
military leaders were not as cognizant of the danger facing people in the occupied zone if 
the Germans caught them with the newspaper. However, the people of Lille, Roubaix, 
and Tourcoing knew to treat the airplane dropped newspapers just like those of the 
clandestine press.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, I read sixteen issues of the newssheet. 
However, the source was not from a collection from the occupied zone, so it is uncertain 
if anybody in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received these articles. Hence, there can be 
no benefit in discussing specific articles, but it is worthwhile to note the type of news it 
carried. Much like all the other newspapers, it provided battle coverage, this time infused 
with British propaganda. One news story that was more likely than most to reach the 
people of the occupied zone via this newspaper was the British naval attack on the 
German-held Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostende.  At least five articles described 
the destruction of these important ports and the subsequent attempts to rebuild them by 
the Germans.38 In truth, the daring British operation was a failure, not achieving its 
objective of blocking the port by sinking three old cruisers loaded with cement, and 
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resulting in five hundred casualties.39  Even though the Germans quickly dug a new 
channel at Zeebrugge and subsequent raids on Ostende failed, the attempt boosted British 
morale.40 Overall, all the news published in this newspaper was extremely positive for the 
Allies and hinted the war was going extremely badly for Germany.  As most of the issues 
examined for this dissertation were from the last months of the war, it was of course 
easier for the British to find positive, frequently accurate information as the Allies were 
on the cusp of winning the war.  
Planes intermittently dropped another newspaper, Le Cri des Flandres, over the 
occupied cities of France.41 The man publishing the newspaper was Abbé Lemire, the 
mayor of Hazebrouck, a town northwest of Lille that was the key British rail center north 
of the Somme.  A former professor of theology in a seminary, Rome excommunicated 
Abbé Lemire, supposedly for not asking their permission to sit as a Deputy in the 
Chamber of Deputies, but in reality because of the liberality of his opinions.42 Henry 
Russell Wakefield described Lemire as a leader in a town right at the front.  Lemire took 
it upon himself to produce a newspaper to help sustain morale for those closest to the 
fighting. The German authorities created similar newspapers for German troops, two of 
which, Liller Kriegszeitung and La Gazette de Colgone, were readily available in the 
occupied cities of France. 
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More German Newspapers – 1. Liller Kriegszeitung 
 The Liller Kriegszeitung was a newspaper of the Sixth German Army, meant for 
the occupation forces, and published in Lille, its name translating to “Lille War News.” 
Hauptmann D.L. Hoecker and Rittmeister Freiherr Von Ompteda of the Lille high 
command published the four-page Liller Kriegszeitung from December 8,1914, until 
September 27, 1918, three times a week. Captain Paul Oskar Höcker, a well-known 
writer from Brandenburg, edited the newspaper, overseeing writers from the army. He 
was a best-selling author prior to the war, and he quickly wrote An der Spitze meiner 
Kompagnie (At the Head of my Company) in 1914 from the front.43 Soon after its 
publication in English, The New York Times described his book as one of the most 
graphic and convincing pieces of writing to come out of the war.44 The Germans 
produced the newspaper using the office space and equipment of the closed-down L’Echo 
du Nord (a large regional daily before the war). 
 The Liller Kriegzeitung was a well-produced, high quality newspaper, in terms of 
both presentation and content.  It contained articles not only providing military and 
political news and analysis, but also articles on history and geography, science and 
medicine, literature and musical criticism, poems, and illustrations.45 From 1915 through 
1917 the newspaper included a two-page illustrated supplement, the Kriegslugbläther, 
produced by Karl Arnold. The artistic quality of the photographs and drawings were of a 
high caliber, but always carried a pro-German propaganda message. Within Germany, the 
newspaper enjoyed a widespread reputation for excellence and good taste; in Germany 
and among the German armed forces in France it was a highly regarded newspaper.  
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 By the end of 1916, the Germans produced 110,000 copies per issue, with copies 
given free to members of the Sixth Army. To cover the cost of these free-publications, 
the Germans created a quasi-publishing company that produced postcards, propaganda 
brochures, and a few books.  For example, La Guerre 1914-1918 was a seventy-eight 
page book explaining how the Germans were not responsible for the war, and France’s 
true enemies were Britain and Russia.46   
The Germans considered Lille a prized capture, so many of the articles and 
illustrations in the Liller Kriegszeitung pertained to situations and events taking place in 
the city. The Journal des réfugiés du Nord published an article noting that several 
German newspapers, including the Liller Kriegszeitung, were producing a lot of 
information and articles on Lille, as the city had become a meeting point for German 
reporters.  From a French point of view, the coverage was not impressive, as it did not 
contain detailed information about the state of the city, but rather tirades heavy on 
psychological analysis.47  While glorifying the beauty of grandeur of Lille along with 
German pride at taking the French city, the tone of the newspaper was certainly anti-
French.  However, the writers and publishers of the paper directed most of their hostility 
towards the upper, ruling classes of Lille, while they reported quite fairly on the 
population in general. The newspaper editors even went so far as to publish an article 
showing German admiration for the invaded population.48 Nor did the paper advocate 
nonfraternization with the local population.  As Richard Cobb notes, the content of the 
newspaper, including suggestions of guided tours of Lille’s museums and art galleries, 
seemed to encourage German soldiers to take part in city life and permitted contact with 
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the civilian population.49 However, the Liller Kriegszeitung, like all other German 
military newspapers, lost much of its individuality in 1917 as the Army High Command 
believed they were a useful, influential tool, that needed to be better utilized and directed. 
The German Army High Command homogenized and centralized the information 
included in all its newspapers and restructured the newspaper. Wolfgang Natter describes 
the change, noting “…whatever particularity has been possible for expressing Frontgeist 
within this medium prior to Patriotic Instruction became more circumscribed, even as its 
consolidation of a purported authentic voice from the trenches served as further material 
to sustain élan at home.”50 
 Realistically, very few men and women of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing read 
this newspaper.  The Germans did not intend the newspaper for the occupied population 
and hence did not make it available to them.  In an environment where the occupied 
people learned to covertly gain news, whether through smuggled newspapers or passing 
around issues of the clandestine press, it would not have been difficult for them to 
stealthily picked up copies of the Liller Kriegszeitung from cafés and around town.  
Furthermore, the Germans did not actively use threats to discourage the people from 
reading the paper. However, two factors kept the people of the occupied cities from 
reading this newspaper.  Firstly, the newspaper was in German, and very few people in 
the tri-city area could read German, especially when written in “Bavarian slang,” like this 
newspaper. Richard Cobb commented that he needed assistance in translating this 
newspaper while researching his book.51 Secondly, it most likely did not seem 
                                                 
49
 Cobb, French and Germans, 22-3. 
50
 Natter, 56. Frontgeist roughly translates to “spirit of the trenches,” however Natter utilizes the words to 
cover all soldiers’ active duty experiences, including those occupying occupied territories. 
51
 Cobb, French and Germans, xxii. 
  
334
 
worthwhile to the people of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing to secretly work to attain this 
newspaper, when news from the German perspective was so readily available in La 
Gazette des Ardennes. 
 
More German Newspapers – 2. La Gazette de Cologne 
 Known as the Kölnische Zeitung in German, this German-language newspaper 
was a little-read source of information for the French in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing 
for many of the same reasons as the Liller Kriegszeitung; it was written in German and 
was another source of German propaganda. Nevertheless, Annette Becker notes that 
when it was available in the cities, people did look to it for battle information.52 It was a 
semi-official newspaper, which even before the war frequently inserted articles by the 
Foreign Office.53 Needless to say, the newspaper’s editors were strong proponents of the 
German war aims.  Prior to the German army mobilizing, the newspaper’s St. Petersburg 
correspondent, who also happened to be a member of the German embassy staff, wrote 
that a preventative war was necessary against Russia.54 The paper’s editors placed 
responsibility for the war not on the country that declared war, Germany, but on the 
countries that made war necessary, England and Russia.  The editors noted that Germany 
just was not so obtuse as to wait for the enemy to finish preparing for war.55  
 However, one cannot dismiss this newspaper completely as a source of news for 
the French in the occupied cities.  Typed copies of translated articles from La Gazette de 
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Cologne, published from 1915 through the summer of 1916, seem to have been printed 
utilizing machines similar to those of the clandestine press and on similar inexpensive 
paper. It appears some of the occupied French shared these articles in a manner 
comparable to that of the clandestine press.56 One article, entitled “The Utilization of the 
Occupied Regions of France,” boasted about the amount of raw materials and 
manufactured goods the German military was expropriating from the Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing.57 It is plausible that the aim of the unknown translator and distributor of this 
article was to increase the ire that the French in the occupied zone felt towards the 
German occupiers and validate what many Frenchmen saw occurring before their own 
eyes. 
 
Books Authorized by the Germans 
 Periodically La Gazette des Ardennes included an advertisement for books and 
pamphlets available for order from the Libraire de la Gazette des Ardennes.  The people 
of the occupied cities treasured books, especially as cold winters forced many of them to 
sacrifice their collections to keep themselves warm, burning the pages in fires or ripping 
them out to insulate their clothes.  However, even for those who still had the money to 
buy books, those advertised in La Gazette des Ardennes most likely would not have 
interested them.  Not surprisingly, the literature advocated everything German while 
lambasting the Allies and in particular the British. A quick examination of four of the 
books and pamphlets sold in the occupied zone provide a glimpse into the type of 
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information French people in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing could purchase, if they had 
the means and desire. 
 One pamphlet announced for sale in the Gazette des Ardennes was Bruce 
Glasirr’s (sic) La Militarisme Anglais. This was a translation of Glasier’s thirty-page war 
pamphlet. In it, he denounced the “materialists” who held positions of power and 
influence in Victorian England and how they led to the current British state. Bruce 
Glasier was an ardent socialist and chairman of the Independent Labor Party in Scotland. 
He supported the British anti-war organization, the No-Conscription Fellowship, which 
encouraged men to refuse war service.58 Utilizing British and French writings against the 
Allied war effort was a key German propaganda technique, employed more frequently by 
the placement of adulterated articles by French and English authors in German 
newspapers.  Hence, the misspelling of Glasier’s last name was most likely a 
typographical error rather than an attempt to misrepresent his identity. 
The Gazette des Ardennes also advertised the book, Les Peuplades de Couleur, by 
D’Hansvorst. It is difficult to determine much information about the author of this book.  
It is possible that Hans Vorst, the Moscow correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt during 
the First World War, wrote this book, although his specialty was Russia rather than the 
use of men from Africa in fighting in Europe.  The point of the book is not difficult to 
garner however.  France was the only country to recruit men from its African colonies to 
fight in Europe, doing so to compensate for its demographic weakness against the 
Germans.59 During the course of the four years, France had approximately 171,000 West 
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African troops serving in Europe, and their casualties numbered over 80,000 men.60 
Many in Europe feared that this practice threatened European racial superiority, a fear the 
Germans played up in occupied France both in the newspapers they published and in this 
book.  After the war, Germany’s defeat by a country that allowed Africans to fight and 
kill white men helped fuel the racism of the inter-war years.61 
 Karl Helfferich’s Le Prospérité nationale de l’Allemagne de 1888 à 1918 was 
also available for sale in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing. Dr. Karl Helfferich was the 
German Secretary of the Treasury and later Imperial Vice Chancellor.  Prior to the war he 
was Director of the Deutsche Bank.  This was an updated and translated version of his 
original work, Deutschlands Volkswahlstand 1888-1913.62 The book provides a detailed 
analysis of Germany’s economy, examining issues such as population growth, food 
supply, and the use of science in business, the training of labor, the country’s 
consumption, aggregate income, and national wealth.  It depicts Germany’s economy as 
solid and growing, thanks to a well-trained work force and the utilization of the latest 
science and business techniques. 
 La Gazette des Ardennes also advertised Sevn Hedin’s Vers l’Est avec l’Armée 
allemande sur le Front Oriental for sale.63  This 150-page book was a translated and 
abridged version of Hedin’s 1917 work, Kriget mot Ryssland. Hedin was a Swedish 
                                                 
60
 Ibid., 96. 
61
 Stefan Goodwin, Africa in Europe: Interdependencies, Relocations, and Globalization (Plymouth, U.K.: 
Lexington Books, 2009), 205.  Goodwin notes that this racism was inflamed by the use of African soldiers 
during the supervisory occupation of the Rhineland, 205. Approximately 500,000 French colonial subjects, 
refered to as troupes indigènes, fought for France, including men from North Africa, West Africa, 
Indochina, and Madagascar. Richard Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French 
Army (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 2.  See also Jean-Yves Le Naour, La honte noire: 
l’Allemagne et les trouopes coloniales françaises, 1914-1945 (Paris: Hachette, 2003).  
62
 The English version of the work is titled Germany’s Economic Progress and National Wealth 1888-1913 
(New York: Germanistic Society of America, 1914). 
63
 La Gazette des Ardennes, June 15, 1918. 
  
338
 
explorer and scientist and one of the few foreign correspondents who was with the 
German army since almost the beginning of the war. The Germans’ choice of Hedin was 
not surprising.  He had already established a name for himself as a brave explorer and 
was a passionate Germanophile.  In 1909, he proposed a Scandinavian Union that would 
have close ties to Germany to counter-balance the Anglo-Russian reconciliation.64 In 
1915, Hedin published With the German Armies in the West, a translated version coming 
out the same year as the Swedish original.  For the purpose of this dissertation, I came 
across no evidence that the Germans made this book available in occupied France.  It 
would not be surprising if the Germans withheld this book, for it provided an inaccurate 
assessment of life in Lille.  Hedin suggests that Lille sustained little damage at the hands 
of the Germans, and the areas bombed, namely the Porte Douai area, had to be because of 
French resistance.  Furthermore, this ardent Germanophile claimed life had returned to 
normal in Lille, noting, “In the central parts of the town the traffic is almost animated and 
there are plenty of people about.  Young women of not even doubtful virtue and dressed 
in almost the latest fashion flit about like butterflies on pavements… Many shops and 
hotels are open and seem to be carrying on as if nothing happened.”65  Other books and 
pamphlets fitting the same pattern as the above-mentioned books were available to 
readers in the occupied zone. However, they added little to the knowledge of the people, 
as their content was so distasteful to the occupied French that they either disregarded 
what they read, or more frequently, simply chose not to read those books.  
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One should not exaggerate the influence of the sources discussed in this chapter 
upon the people of the occupied zone.  Either few Frenchmen had access to these 
newspapers, books, and pamphlets, or the messages these sources contained were so 
disagreeable few people would heed them.  However, the people of Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing dealt with an overwhelming feeling that they lacked news and information 
about the war raging in such close proximity to them.  Under these circumstances, some 
people were bound to read any source that could potential provided them with the 
information they so craved.  In such a situation, these news sources need to be included in 
a study of the media available to the occupied people.   
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Conclusion 
 
In his study of the occupation of Belgium, Larry Zuckerman raises an interesting 
question: why did Germany’s enemies make so little of the occupation, even when the 
Germans provided them with fresh insults every week?1 Zuckerman suggests that perhaps 
the rest of the world was not outraged by German behavior in areas they occupied 
because nobody outside the occupied zones could appreciate what was happening, as they 
lacked a frame of reference. Once the world truly understood the possible effects of 
German military extremism with the Second World War, the horrors of that war 
overshadowed the indignities of the First World War. During the last fifteen years, 
several historians have taken on the task of examining what happened in northern France 
during the First World War and providing a frame of reference for life in the occupied 
zones.  This dissertation aimed to add to this discussion, through an examination of what 
news was available. As Asa Briggs and Peter Burke note in the introduction of their 
work, A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet, historians need to 
take serious account of the role of communication in history.2 Historians need to treat 
media not only as a source recording history, but also as an element that helps shape 
events and is worthy of analysis.   
 Piqued at losing control of the three great cities of northern France, the Germans 
were radical in defiling, destroying, and stealing from the cities as they withdrew in 1918. 
They systematically burglarized the French cities, vandalizing, usually beyond repair, any 
industrial or agricultural item they could not take with them. If Frenchmen had believed 
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what the German-controlled press reported for four years of conflict about how the 
Germans conducted war and which side was winning the war, the Germans’ withdrawal 
and their actions in leaving would have shocked those Frenchmen.  However, nobody 
was shocked. Despite four years of reading how the Germans were fighting and winning 
the war in an honorable manner, in the face of dastardly British acts, the people of Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing knew when the Germans began facing difficulties, and the large-
scale pettiness the Germans were capable of in the face of that loss. This disconnect 
between the world presented in the pages of the German-controlled newspaper and reality 
became obvious during the final weeks of the war.  It was apparent that the Germans 
were losing the war, as the once confident German occupiers became mere shadows of 
their former selves.  However, the German-controlled newspapers continued to report as 
if the war was going reasonably well for the Germans, especially in the papers produced 
in France. The newspapers in the occupied zone usually only referenced the changing 
situation and the potential of a German loss in their last issue, immediately before the 
German evacuation.   
During the First World War in non-occupied zones, governments suppressed all 
news that could distress their people and shift domestic public opinion away from 
supporting the war. The reverse was true in the occupied zone – editors and censors 
attempted to withold any news that could provide hope. The aim was to create feelings of 
disillusionment and surrender, creating an occupied populace that was easy to control and 
whose desires for peace outweighed any patriotic concerns over who won the war and 
what the repercussions would be. If such propaganda was hugely successful, perhaps the 
occupied people would even be willing to continue a relationship with the occupiers once 
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the war was over.   Having to ingest news with this raison d’être, with only a short lived 
clandestine press and intermittently available smuggled newspapers as an alternative, was 
one of the greatest hardships of occupation that the people of Lille, Roubaix, and 
Tourcoing endured. 
The Germans considered their ability to control news in the occupied zone as vital 
to their war aims. Hence, distribution of clandestine papers was one of the most serious 
infractions against occupation rules.  Receiving unadulterated news was also a passion 
for many in the occupied zone, making the producers of the secret press some of the 
greatest heroes in northern France. For those fortunate enough to have access to these 
underground newspapers, the papers could act as a potential counter to the interpretations 
of news in the German-controlled press. For example, both sources reported upon the 
German zeppelin attacks on Paris and London.  The German papers painted an image of a 
Paris and London crippled with fear.  The clandestine press cited the same events as 
evidence of the German’s panicking. This fresh point of view was a great gift to the 
occupied.  However, these newspapers were available for only eighteen short months of 
the four long years of occupation, and people had to read the German-controlled press to 
fulfill their human desire for information.  
The Germans wanted to foster a certain amount of dependence among the people 
of the Nord by being their only link to the outside world.3 Through different German-
controlled or censored newspapers, the Germans provided a substantial amount of news 
reflecting their viewpoint. The two local newspapers, the Gazette des Ardennes, Le 
Bruxellois, and briefly, two other Belgian papers, combined to provide a significant 
amount of news. While some of the German-controlled newspapers only provided short 
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blurbs about crucial events, readers could piece together information from the different 
sources, since the individual newspapers told different parts of the same story. Early 
during the war, readers could find out that female refugees repatriated from their northern 
cities to Paris were helping the war effort by working a few hours a week making clothes 
for the wounded and children.4 From La Gazette des Ardennes, readers could learn that 
people repatriated from the north living in Paris faced some hostilities, as locals resented 
the competition for employment.5 Finally, from La Belgique readers would find out that 
authorities created a floating village made of barges on the Seine for those refugees 
unable to find a place to live.6 Furthermore, the newspapers may have reinforced their 
shared message.  Before the Germans occupied the area, people may have read different 
newspapers that provided slightly different analyses of the same events. Now several 
newspapers, while varying in what information they provided, all carried the same 
message that France was weakening, Britain was evil, and Germany was the future of 
Europe. The occupied people’s reliance upon the Germans for news has historically 
created the perception that those in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing received little 
information about the war beyond what they could garner with their own senses. Perhaps 
the true problem of news was not the sheer lack of it, although it was an element as 
compared to pre-war levels, but the lack of certainty that it could be trusted, the amount 
of speculation needed to be digested with it, the delay with which it was received, and the 
uncertainty that any follow-up might be forthcoming. 
 The industrial urban areas of northern France knew both the hardships and 
benefits of city life.  German occupation exacerbated the problems of city life, including 
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difficulties finding employment that allowed for a decent standard of living. The 
occupation also took away some of the privileges of urban living, such as easy access to 
news prepared by French journalists and editors. Surprisingly, considering the harsh life 
and limitations on advancement the large working class endured, most adults in these 
cities were literate and considering being informed a way of life. As the German military 
gravitated towards military extremism, demanding complete obedience from enemy 
populations, they took away information supplied from outside sources. To help attain 
complete obedience, the Germans isolated the occupied French not only physically from 
their countrymen, but also mentally, by acting as the most powerful conduit of 
information. 
By taking control of the information people received, the German occupiers in 
northern France created their own version of history and current events. To use a modern 
term, the “spin” placed on events perpetrated the German line, and often distorted the 
truth to the point of deception. However distorted, the news in German-controlled 
newspapers did give the readers of occupied France great insight into what events were 
occurring, even when misleading them in the significance of those events or who they 
were benefiting. Since readers did not trust German-controlled media, they knew to 
question the “spin,” hence leaving readers with a knowledge of what events were 
important to the war, but uncertainty about who was winning. They did not know if the 
Germans were leaving vital facts out or exaggerating the importance of other elements of 
the story.  For example, people in Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing knew about the Battles 
of the Somme and Ypres as fact; they speculated about who was winning these battles. 
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Analyzing the news became a passionate hobby for many in the occupied zone, who were 
just trying to figure out some semblance of the truth.    
 In his portrayal of life in occupied Lille, one of Maxence van der Meersh’s 
characters commented that since October 1914 news from France had entirely ceased.  
He used language poignantly foreshadowing later history, when he said the Germans 
lowered a steel curtain between the occupied districts and the rest of the world. The 
narrator noted that, “it was quite obvious that the continued ignorance was sapping the 
morale and generally unsettling the civilian population; and it was undoubtedly the 
intention of the enemy to do so.”7 Indeed, with the liberalization of press laws during the 
Third Republic, the average urban Frenchman had grown to expect an abundance of 
relatively unadulterated information from a variety of sources. Despite the hardship 
caused by the lack of trusted news, however, it did not disappear as entirely as imagined. 
Rather, the pain came from the source of news. Rumors and false information occurred in 
the occupied cities, as the newspaper’s versions always came with doubt.  When it came 
to information, in many ways the occupied zone was comparable to the trenches.  Both 
were environments that produced their share of fausses novellas. Like the occupied 
populations men in the trenches had a lack of regular news from the outside, endured the 
closeness of the enemy, and relied upon mouth to mouth communication that made 
inaccuracies quite common.8 
 Responsibility to evaluate the information presented falls upon the media 
consumer every time he or she reads a newspaper, a greatly amplified situation in 
occupied France.  As John Merril and Jack Odell waxed poetic on the topic, “The 
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problem faced by journalist’s audiences is to…. try to separate the wheat of honest 
journalism from the chaff of propaganda.”9 Propaganda propagators, in general, can only 
take advantage of trusting people.  Readers can protect themselves by “wrapping 
themselves in a protective cloak of skepticism, or even cynicism.”10 The people of Lille, 
Roubaix, and Tourcoing, while losing safety and comfort, did have, along with their 
dignity, a heavy cloak of cynicism about anything touched by the German occupiers. In 
general, newspapers may have historically encouraged skepticism, as readers noted the 
discrepancies between reports of the same events in different newspapers, or even within 
the same newspaper, and the regularity with which later issues contradict statements 
made earlier.11 The people of these cities were media savvy enough to naturally question 
the information received and questions the writers’ motives. 
Madame Reboux escaped occupation after twenty-six months but not before her 
daughter died from a lack of food.  She said, “it is easy to forbid a conquered people; it is 
hard to compel them.”12 While not the aim of this dissertation, it is natural to want to 
comment on whether German propaganda disseminated through newspapers in the 
occupied zone was successful. The easy answer is no, as the people of occupied France 
never began to sympathize with the German point of view. Even the German military 
leaders did not feel their propaganda efforts during the First World War were successful; 
they lamented their lack of propaganda sophistication as compared to that of the British, 
and believed it was a contributing factor to them losing the war.  The Nazis took 
propaganda to a new level under Josef Goebbels, but he and Hitler looked to British and 
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Russian propaganda from the First World War for inspiration, not their own country’s 
efforts. However, it is easy to dismiss German propaganda efforts in hindsight because 
they lost the war.  The people of northern France were a strong, resilient people able to 
fend off assimilating German propaganda, while utilizing their newspapers to gather what 
information they could.  Could these people have remained resilient if the war had lasted 
another year or two or would or would they have simply wanted peace at any cost and 
become more susceptible to the German line?   
 It is also interesting to think about how the occupation and its news reception 
affected historical thought. One of the most distinctive features of French historical 
scholarship is its contribution to the study of mentalité, or the mental furniture of 
populations in the past.  Mentalité in this discourse means visceral commitments rather 
than ideologies, unspoken assumptions rather than political or social programmes.13 In 
her work studying media-related memories, Ingrid Volkmer determined that the news 
people receive is a part of their historical perception, or what people remember of history, 
which is a key component of culture memory.14 People remember time not as a sequence 
of events but as a discursive surface, readable only through layers of subsequent 
meanings and context, such as how media sources reporting the events at the time 
affected memory.  To understand the relationship between events and how people 
remember those events and the role media plays between the two is comparable to 
“archeology in which the goal is not simply to uncover something that has been buried, 
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but to discover how and why additional layers have been built on top of it.”15 Studying 
the content of these newspapers reveals a great deal about different topics.  Beyond 
demonstrating that the occupied zone did receive more news than previously believed, 
they show how Germans wanted people to see the war.  They also provide glimpses (if 
one can weed out the propaganda) of what life was like in the occupied zone.  They also 
show the information these people received that became a part of the collective 
consciousness and hence an element in how they understood the war. The content of 
these newspapers is a small but important tool in providing a cultural reconstruction of 
the cities’ shared mentality during the war. 
 While this dissertation revealed that the people of occupied France had access to 
more news than believed, it does not diminish what they lost in terms of media access 
during the occupation.  More than precise information about specific events, the great gift 
a system of news imparts is the confidence that we will be informed about any especially 
important or interesting events in an accurate manner.16  When such information comes 
from a trusted source, it provides a type of security people in northern France expected by 
the First World War and that they lost during occupation.  The source of their news and 
their lack of trust in that source to provide an accurate description is why the people of 
occupied France remember receiving very little news during the war. 
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